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How to Think Constitutionally About 




This Article challenges the view of “prerogative” as a discretionary 
authority to act outside the law. For seventy years, political 
scientists, lawyers and judges have drawn on John Locke’s account 
of prerogative in the Second Treatise, using it to read foundational 
texts in American constitutional law. American writings on 
prerogative produced between 1760 and 1788 are rarely discussed 
(excepting The Federalist), though these materials exist in 
abundance. Based on a study of over 700 of these texts, including 
pamphlets, broadsides, letters, essays, newspaper items, state 
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papers, and legislative debates, this Article argues that early 
Americans almost never used “prerogative” as Locke defined it. 
Instead, the early American understanding of “prerogative” appears 
to have been shaped predominantly by the imperial crisis, the series 
of escalating disputes with the British ministry over taxation which 
preceded the Revolutionary War; in this crisis, Americans based 
their claims to enjoy rights of self-taxation on their colonial 
charters, which were issued by the King’s prerogative. The primary 
connotations of “prerogative” for Americans were thus self-
government and the benefits of government, principally the 
protection of property and liberty. Drawing on this view, the Article 
proffers several principles for constructing the powers of the 
President. It argues that the Article II Vesting Clause should be 
treated as a substantive grant of executive power, but conceived 
narrowly as the power to carry out the law and not as a grant of 
prerogative. It is the enumerated powers in Article II that establish 
presidential prerogatives. These powers should be treated as 
“defeasible” in the sense that they may be regulated by statute and 
judicial decision, within limits reflecting the independence of the 
presidential office. This framework is consistent with the series of 
modern statutes regulating presidential emergency powers, 
including the War Powers Resolution and the National Emergencies 
Act. 
INTRODUCTION 
What does “prerogative” mean in American 
constitutional law? What does it mean to say that it is 
someone’s “prerogative” to decide on a course of action? To 
describe the powers of an office as “prerogatives”? 
A common answer to these questions is that to have a 
“prerogative” is to enjoy a kind of discretion. More precisely, 
“prerogative” is a discretionary power that inheres in an 
office, and which cannot be controlled by law, but only guided 
by the officer’s sense of public interest.1 American writers 
 
 1. See, e.g., HAROLD H. BRUFF, UNTRODDEN GROUND: HOW PRESIDENTS 
INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION 13, 71 (2015); SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, 
IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 
206–15 (2015) [hereinafter PRAKASH, IMPERIAL]; ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., 
THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 2–3, 8–10, 23–25, 115–16, 142–43, 147–49, 263–64 
(1973); David Gray Adler, The Framers and Executive Prerogative: A  
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giving this account largely credit John Locke.2 A short 
chapter in the Second Treatise of Government, conveniently 
titled “Of Prerogative,” tells us that prerogative is the 
executive’s “[p]ower to act according to discretion, for the 
publick good, without the prescription of the Law, and 
sometimes even against it.”3 Originally, Locke surmised, 
“Government was almost all Prerogative,” but over time its 
misuse by “weak Princes” led the people to form legislative 
assemblies and “by express Laws to get Prerogative 
determin’d.”4 What remained was a kind of residual 
executive discretion. William Blackstone repeated Locke’s 
definition in the first book of his Commentaries on the Laws 
 
Constitutional and Historical Rebuke, 42 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 376, 377–79 
(2012); Larry Arnhart, “The god-Like Prince”: John Locke, Executive Prerogative, 
and the American Presidency, 9 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 121, 122–25 (1979); 
Richard H. Cox, Executive and Prerogative: A Problem for Adherents of 
Constitutional Government, in 2 CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA: EL [sic] 
PLURIBUS UNUM: CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF 
GOVERNMENT 102, 111–18 (Sarah Baumgartner Thurow ed., 1988); Robert J. 
Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care 
Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 808–13 (2013); Clement Fatovic, Constitutionalism 
and Presidential Prerogative: Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian Perspectives, 48 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 429, 437–38 (2004); Owen Gross, Emergency Powers, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 785, 792 (Mark Tushnet, Mark A. Graber, 
& Sanford Levinson eds., 2015); Benjamin A. Kleinerman, Cant the Prince Really 
Be Tamed? Executive Prerogative, Popular Apathy, and the Constitutional Frame 
in Locke’s Second Treatise, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 209, 209–10 (2007); Jules Lobel, 
Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1392 (1989); 
Julian Davis Mortenson, A Theory of Republican Prerogative, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 
45, 50, 54–57 (2014); Richard M. Pious, Inherent War and Executive Powers and 
Prerogative Politics, 37 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 66, 67–71 (2007); Robert Scigliano, 
The President’s “Prerogative Power”, in INVENTING THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 
236, 239–46 (Thomas E. Cronin ed., 1989); Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., The President 
and the Law, 67 POL. SCI. Q. 321, 321–23, 331–38 (1952). Cf. Prerogative, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “prerogative,” without reference to the 
public interest, as “[a]n exclusive right, power, privilege, or immunity, usu[ally] 
acquired by virtue of office”). 
 2. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 375 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). On Locke’s influence on the literature on 
presidential prerogative, see, for example, Adler, supra note 1, at 377; Scigliano, 
supra note 1, at 236–39. 
 3. LOCKE, supra note 2, at 375. 
 4. Id. at 376. 
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of England, inserting it into a catalogue of traditional royal 
powers—making war, concluding peace, appointing 
ministers, dispensing justice, and so on—which, taken 
together, described the King’s place in the British 
constitution. He called these powers the King’s 
“prerogatives.”5 
The notion of prerogative as a kind of discretion has been 
extremely important to the development of American 
constitutional law, especially in the last seventy years. It has 
furnished a language and a set of ideas for describing the 
extent of the President’s subordination to law. In denying 
that the President could seize domestic steel mills in the face 
of contrary legislation, Justice Jackson described the 
assertion of such a power as “military prerogative,” and the 
President’s duty to comply with legal limits, an absence of 
“prerogative.”6 To others it has seemed undeniable that the 
President requires this discretion, and that presidents have 
actually employed it to manage foreign affairs, military 
conflicts and emergencies.7 Lawyers have used “prerogative,” 
 
 5. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 244–70 
(David Lemmings ed., Oxford University Press 2016). Modern commentators use 
Locke and Blackstone to interpret prerogative talk in The Federalist and other 
early sources. For commentators relying on Locke, see sources cited supra note 
1. For an analysis of executive power based on Blackstone’s catalogue of 
prerogatives, see generally, e.g., Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive 
Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259 (2009). Other writers combine Locke and 
Blackstone, suggesting (or implying) that the powers Blackstone identifies are in 
some way discretionary or immune to regulation by law. See generally, e.g., 
Michael W. McConnell, The Logical Structure of Article Two (Nov. 14, 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/colloquium/constitutionallaw
/documents/2016_Fall_McConnell_Art.pdf. 
 6. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 
641, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“What the power of command may 
include I do not try to envision, but I think it is not a military prerogative, without 
support of law, to seize persons or property because they are important or even 
essential for the military and naval establishment.”). 
 7. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 677–78 (1981) 
(Rehnquist, C.J.); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 700 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting); United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (Sutherland, J.); 
Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area: 
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as well, to mark an upper boundary on Congress’s power over 
the President under the portion of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause known as the “Sweeping Clause.”8 In this sense, to 
say a presidential power is a “prerogative” is to suggest that 
Congress has limited authority to regulate that power—or 
perhaps no authority at all.9 Such “prerogatives” are powers 
the President can exercise unilaterally, without consulting 
Congress or following any particular procedures.10 
“Prerogative” may even imply the absence of legal limits 
altogether. As one historian memorably described this idea, 
which he attributed to Americans, “to be governed by 
prerogative was to live at the mere grace and pleasure of a 
master.”11 
 
Hearing on S. Res. 8 Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations & S. Comm. on 
Armed Servs., 82d Cong. 88–93 (1951) (statement of Dean Acheson, Sec’y of 
State); Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Alberto R. 
Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE 
ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172, 173, 202–07 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel 
eds., 2005) (regarding standards of conduct for interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2340–2340A); John G. Tower, Congress Versus the President: The Formulation 
and Implementation of American Foreign Policy, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 229, 231–34 
(1981). For scholarly use of “prerogative” to describe such powers, see EDWARD S. 
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1984, at 7–10, 169–81 
(Randall w. Bland, Theodore T. Hindson, & Jack W. Peltason eds., 5th ed., 1984); 
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 43 (1972). 
 8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“To make all Laws which shall be necessary 
and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or 
Officer thereof.”). 
 9. E.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866) (Field, J.) (“The 
benign prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any legislative 
restrictions.”); Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 262–63 (1974) (similar); McConnell, 
supra note 5 (manuscript at 90) (concluding that the powers listed in Article II, 
section 2, clause 1 are “[p]rerogative powers, meaning powers that the President 
has the constitutional right to exercise without need for statutory authorization, 
and which cannot be regulated or abridged by Congress”). 
 10. See ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
POWER: THE ORIGINS 14 (1976) (arguing that, with respect to prerogative powers, 
“the executive could take any action . . . on its own responsibility, without 
consulting [the legislature] in advance”). 
 11. Eric Nelson, Patriot Royalism: The Stuart Monarchy in American Political 
Thought, 1769–75, 68 WM. & MARY Q. 533, 542 (2011). Nelson was criticized for 
this line. Referring in particular to James Wilson, from whose views Nelson drew 
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This view of prerogative has had its proponents, but it is 
worth understanding that eighteenth-century Americans 
were generally not among them. This Article is a study, first, 
of how early Americans actually used the word “prerogative.” 
Its aim is to describe and make sense of the forensic 
arguments in which they employed the term, and to identify 
various constitutional roles for which they recruited 
“prerogative” over time. Rather than returning, yet again, to 
Locke and Blackstone, and relying, as one leading historian 
has put it, on Americans’ “presumed uncritical acceptance” 
of their theories,12 this study is based on a much larger body 
of texts: over 700 American pamphlets, broadsides, letters, 
essays and newspaper items, along with state papers and 
legislative debates, all created between 1764 and 1788.13 
Broadening the body of evidence and setting that evidence in 
its political and social context reveals patterns of usage that 
 
support, historian Pauline Maier responded, 
Wilson thought the harmony and interests of the British people would be better 
preserved under “the legal prerogatives of the Crown” than “an unlimited 
authority by Parliament,” but neither he nor any other colonial writer thought of 
the prerogative as a means of subjecting the people, as Nelson assumes, to “the 
mere grace and pleasure of a master.” 
Pauline Maier, Whigs Against Whigs Against Whigs: The Imperial Debates of 
1765–76 Reconsidered, 68 WM. & MARY Q. 578, 580 (2011) (emphasis in original). 
See discussion infra Section I.A on Wilson. 
 12. Jack N. Rakove, Taking the Prerogative out of the Presidency: An 
Originalist Perspective, 37 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 85, 88 (2007). 
 13. There is a large volume of printed material from this period that discusses 
prerogative or mentions the term. For example, a search of “prerogative” in the 
Readex database of “Early American Newspapers” between 1764 and 1783 
returned roughly 2200 items. To reduce the amount of material, I narrowed my 
search of pre-independence texts in Readex to the dates 1764–68 and 1774–75, 
in light of their importance in the imperial crisis. This resulted in 677 items 
mentioning “prerogative,” all of which were examined. I searched for post-
independence materials mentioning “prerogative” in Peter Force’s “American 
Archives,” the National Archives’s “Founders Online,” and Rotunda’s “American 
Founding Era Collection,” which includes the Jefferson, Hamilton, and Adams 
papers, as well as a digital edition of the Documentary History of the Ratification 
of the Constitution. I combined this body of material with pamphlets and other 
texts identified in the existing secondary literature, nearly all of which are now 
available in Gale’s “Eighteenth Century Collections Online,” HathiTrust Digital 
Library, Internet Archive, Google Books, or similar digital repositories. 
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are otherwise invisible.14 It also corrects for errors of 
perspective, showing actual lines of influence of European 
writers on Americans and setting American innovations in 
relief. 
The results of following this approach are set out below. 
As we will see, the revolutionaries and framers of our state 
and federal constitutions almost never used “prerogative” as 
Locke defined it, though they understood well the 
importance of discretion.15 Far more common were a 
different set of uses. Americans used “prerogative” to 
describe the power of the King over his subjects’ liberty and 
property, both within the realm and in the colonies of the 
British empire. They used it to refer to the King’s authority 
to charter colonial governments. They used it to describe 
specific royal powers under the British constitution, as 
Blackstone had, but also Mansfield, Bacon, Comyns and 
other English legal writers, whose texts Americans cited. 
When it came time to frame the first state constitutions, 
Americans pointedly contrasted these “royal prerogatives” 
with “executive power,” which, in that context, they 
conceived as a narrower power to carry out the law.16 A 
 
 14. Cf. Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English 
Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575, 581–83 
(2008) (faulting legal scholarship on the Suspension Clause for relying on “the 
same problematic body of evidence,” i.e., leading legal treatises). 
 15. See infra Part I. On discretion, see Jefferson Powell, The Political 
Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 949, 996–97 (1993) 
(“‘Discretion’ was an important and extremely controversial concept in early 
American constitutional discourse . . . .”). Powell observes that “discretion” had 
two principal meanings: prudence and knowledge or skill; and uncontrolled, 
unconditional power. Id. at 996 (citing 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755)). The issue raised by Lockean prerogative is the place 
of the second kind of discretion in constitutional government. 
 16. For this definition of “executive power,” see, for example, Adler, supra 
note 1, at 380–81; Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive 
Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 704, 716; Wilmerding, supra note 1, at 334. This 
is what Harvey Mansfield calls the “dictionary definition” of the executive, in 
contrast to the Machiavellian conception of “execution” as action that is sudden, 
secret, performed by a single person, without procedure, and for the purpose of 
preserving the state. HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., TAMING THE PRINCE: THE 
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principal constitutional task of the 1780s was figuring out 
which prerogatives could be vested in an executive 
department (understood narrowly), consistent with 
republicanism.17 Prerogatives like the veto could be used to 
prevent the legislature from interfering with law 
enforcement, giving the executive some “independence” and 
thereby enhancing its ability to carry out the law and bring 
security to liberty and property; the danger was that 
prerogatives would also give the executive the appearance of 
a monarch, or even an ability to “corrupt” the legislature, as 
British kings had done by offering members lucrative offices 
or special privileges. If anything, then, it was government, 
not discretion, that was the core connotation of “prerogative” 
for early Americans. Appeals to prerogative were typically 
appeals to the benefits of government—self-government 
under colonial legislatures, or, later, a more “vigorous” 
execution of state government. But usage was hardly 
uniform. The English constitutional heritage of “prerogative” 
was layered, and disputants digging through it for helpful 
precedents came away with diverse notions.18 
 
AMBIVALENCE OF MODERN EXECUTIVE POWER 2, 130–49 (1989). 
 17. Consider Madison’s account of the aim of the Philadelphia Convention: 
“blending a proper stability & energy in the Government with the essential 
characters of the republican Form.” Letter from James Madison to Edmund 
Pendleton (Sept. 20, 1787), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-
10-02-0124. (Very similar language can be found in Number 37 of The Federalist.) 
Even though Madison did not contribute significantly to the design of the federal 
executive, he understood the parameters well. 
 18. The early modern law of prerogative was, in essence, the predecessor to 
English public law. For a sense of its scope in the relevant periods, see 4 A NEW 
ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW, “A Table of the Several Titles” and 149–214 (1759) 
(entries on “prerogative”); Sir Matthew Hale, The Prerogatives of the King, 92 
SELDEN SOC’Y, at xii–xx (D.E.C. Yale ed., 1976) (figures depicting the law of 
prerogative). From an historical perspective, “prerogative” was connected to a 
variety of issues in the English constitution and government, including royal 
pleading rights, royal revenue, succession, foreign affairs, the nature of 
‘sovereignty,’ the authority of Parliament, and Crown supervision of imperial and 
local government. See, e.g., P. R. CAVILL, THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENTS OF HENRY 
VII: 1485–1504, at 207–10 (2009); S. B. CHRIMES, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 
IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 41–62 (1936); ALAN CROMARTIE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION: AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 1450–1642, at 179–233 
2018] EXECUTIVE PREROGATIVE 565 
The Article’s second aim is to explore some implications 
of these findings for our own understanding of Article II. It 
is not my position that we can derive concrete answers to our 
questions about presidential power, and, even if we could, 
much has happened in the interim that I would want to 
consider. Still, early Americans’ views about prerogative do 
suggest some principles useful for constructing Article II and 
its relationship to Article I. These principles are meant to 
constitute a framework for, as my title has it, “thinking 
constitutionally about prerogative,” in the sense that they 
help to situate prerogative within a government whose 
powers are limited by fundamental law. 
First, as I have already noted, Americans engaged in 
framing our first republican constitutions regularly 
distinguished executive power from prerogative. A 
presumption that the federal Constitution reflects this 
distinction would be of some use in resolving a well-known 
interpretive dispute over the meaning of the Article II 
 
(2009); G. R. ELTON, THE TUDOR CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 17–
20, 25–26 (1960); J. W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY 48–49, 56, 67–72 (1961); PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM 
ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 64–95 (2010); 4 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW 190–217 (3d ed. 1945); MARGARET ATWOOD JUDSON, THE CRISIS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL THOUGH IN ENGLAND, 
1603–1645, at 23–34 (Octagon Books 1971) (1949); DANIEL LEE, POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY IN EARLY MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 274–82 (2016); 
JENNIFER LOACH, PARLIAMENT UNDER THE TUDORS 105–08 (1991); MARGARET 
MCGLYNN, THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE AND THE LEARNING OF THE INNS OF COURT 1–
26 (2003); CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND 
MODERN 111–25 (1940); FRANCIS OAKLEY, OMNIPOTENCE, COVENANT, AND ORDER: 
AN EXCURSION IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS FROM ABELARD TO LEIBNIZ 103–18 (1984); 
THOMAS POOLE, REASON OF STATE: LAW, PREROGATIVE AND EMPIRE 19–60 (2015); 
FRANCIS D. WORMUTH, THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE, 1603–1649, at 47–82 (1939); G. 
R. Elton, The Rule of Law in Sixteenth-Century England, in TUDOR MEN AND 
INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN ENGLISH LAW AND GOVERNMENT 265, 270–81, 286 
(Arthur J. Slavin ed., 1972); G. L. Harriss, Medieval Doctrines in the Debates on 
Supply, 1610–1629, in FACTION AND PARLIAMENT: ESSAYS ON EARLY STUART 
HISTORY 73, 75–80, 90–91, 100–03 (Kevin Sharpe ed., 1978); Francis Oakley, 
Jacobean Political Theology: The Absolute and Ordinary Powers of the King, 29 
J. HIST. IDEAS 323, 326–29, 334–46 (1968); Kevin Sharpe, Introduction: 
Parliamentary History 1603–1629: In or Out of Perspective?, in FACTION AND 
PARLIAMENT, supra, at 1, 28–32. 
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Vesting Clause. One party in that dispute would read the 
Vesting Clause merely as providing for a single chief 
executive officer, while their antagonists would read it as a 
substantive grant of all powers traditionally held by 
executives, including a number of prerogatives.19 Here, I 
suggest we presume the clause is a grant of substantive 
power, but only “executive power” narrowly conceived—the 
power to carry out the law. The power to carry out the law 
implies a significant discretion, but it is not a discretionary 
authority to contravene the law for the public good; this, or 
any other presidential prerogative, should be derived from 
an enumerated grant of power. Second, early Americans 
discussing prerogative generally assumed that it was defined 
and limited by law. They called it “legal prerogative”; in 
contemporary terms, we would say that prerogative powers 
were regarded as “defeasible.”20 This assumption appears to 
have been widely held. Thus, for example, the staunchest 
defender of an independent executive in the Philadelphia 
Convention, James Wilson, was also the author of the 
Sweeping Clause, which, by its terms, grants Congress a 
power to regulate the President and the administration.21 
 
 19. See, e.g., PRAKASH, IMPERIAL, supra note 1, at 84–85. 
 20. On this usage of “defeasible,” see, for example, Jack Goldsmith & John F. 
Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 2282 (2006); 
McConnell, supra note 5 (manuscript at 88). In this context, to say an executive 
power is defeasible is to say that the legislature may define it and prescribe the 
manner in which it is exercised; however, it is not to say that the legislature may 
eliminate the power entirely. For this reason, I sometimes write of the legislature 
“regulating” prerogative, or of prerogative powers being “regulable.” 
 21. John Mikhail, who has studied the Sweeping Clause in greatest depth, 
has argued persuasively that Wilson was its principal author (as well as the 
source of a similar provision in Resolution VI of the Virginia Plan), and that he 
“presumably intended to give Congress whatever instrumental power it needed 
to organize and regulate the other branches and agencies of the government.” 
John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1056 
(2014). In the same vein, but one step further, Jack Goldsmith and John Manning 
have provocatively described the Sweeping Clause as Congress’s portion of 
executive power. Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 20, at 2307 (“In a quite literal 
sense, the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress a form of executive 
power . . . .”). 
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Yet, there must be some limits to the power to regulate 
presidential prerogatives. I suggest that congressional 
regulation of prerogative powers under the Sweeping Clause 
should not compromise the President’s “independence of 
judgment”—his autonomy in exercising the power as limited 
by law—a capacity leading framers thought necessary for a 
“vigorous” executive power. Finally, I explore the 
Constitution’s framework for handling emergencies. Early 
Americans tended to regard executive action without 
sanction of law as illegal, but expected that an officer could 
be indemnified after the fact by the legislature.22 This 
approach has been mistakenly credited to Locke.23 The 
embrace of the Lockean prerogative, which began in earnest 
during the Cold War, sought to justify the adoption of a very 
different regime: executive unilateralism. Although the early 
institutional framework for handling emergencies has not 
persisted, its core political values have, and are reflected 
today in framework statutes regulating the President’s use 
of emergency power, and in judicial decisions, like Jackson’s 
Steel Seizure concurrence, which buttress those statutes.24 
The executive discretion and institutional flexibility under 
this regime leave little practical need for a Lockean 
prerogative. 
What follows is divided into two parts, corresponding to 
 
 22. Wilmerding, supra note 1, at 324 (“That this doctrine was accepted by 
every single one of our early statesmen can easily be shown.”). Scigliano objects, 
but only to Wilmerding’s requirement that the executive immediately report his 
illegal conduct to the legislature. Scigliano, supra note 1, at 252–53 (“We should 
amend Wilmerding’s statement: executive officers must be prepared to justify 
acts outside the law to Congress . . . should the acts be questioned.”); see also 
SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 10, 148–49. 
 23. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 1, at 1392. This is the basis for the proposition, 
often encountered in the political science literature, that Thomas Jefferson 
believed the President to possess a Lockean prerogative. For the distinction 
between Lockean prerogative and Jefferson’s views—that an executive acting 
illegally might be indemnified by the legislature—see Mortenson, supra note 1, 
at 63–65, 64 nn. 49 & 51; Wilmerding, supra note 1, at 323, 328–38. 
 24. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 
635–38, 649–51 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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my two announced aims. Part I, the bulk of the Article, 
describes the uses that Americans made of “prerogative” 
between 1764 and 1788. On the basis of this account, Part II 
proffers three principles for the construction of Article II, 
applying them to the Vesting Clause, the Take Care Clause 
and the question of emergency power. 
I. HOW AMERICANS USED “PREROGATIVE” 
“Prerogative” wore a Janus face for Americans. Viewed 
from one side, it was the source of their rights to govern 
themselves, and of the liberties self-government secured. As 
one writer reminded the American patriots, they were 
“contending for the crown and prerogative of our King, as 
well as for liberty—property—and life.”25 Turned round, 
however, prerogative was power, and like all kinds of power, 
it sought aggressively to expand, and if left unchecked would 
destroy liberty. It was this guise that James Warren 
described as “the dirty part of the Constitution.”26 
The upheaval and transformation Americans 
experienced between 1764 and 1788 brought out both faces, 
in some cases simultaneously. The first problem that 
presents itself is therefore how to impose some order on the 
evidence without doing violence to it. Below, I have divided 
my study into three periods. First is the imperial crisis, by 
which I mean the political struggle between the British 
ministry and the colonial gentry over the series of taxation 
measures beginning in the mid-1760s, which led to armed 
conflict in April 1775 and a declaration of American 
independence about a year later. The second period is the 
formation of the first American governments, including the 
revolutionary conventions and congresses that took over 
 
 25. Letter, To the Freemen of America, PA. J., May 18, 1774, at 3. 
 26. Letter from James Warren to John Adams (Nov. 5, 1775), in FOUNDERS 
ONLINE, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov [hereinafter FOUNDERS 
ONLINE] (Warren was referring in particular to the prerogatives exercised by 
governors, as opposed to the King or Crown). 
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when imperial government lapsed, followed by the framing 
of state constitutions and the establishment of government 
under those constitutions. The third period is the framing 
and ratification of the federal Constitution. In each of these 
periods, I will argue, Americans faced specific political and 
constitutional problems that gave shape to their uses of 
“prerogative.” By consulting a broad range of sources and 
paying close attention to context, we can untangle the term’s 
various uses and describe how those uses changed over time. 
The result might be called a “conceptual history” of 
prerogative in the era of revolution and state formation.27 
A. The Imperial Crisis 
The core of the ideological account of the imperial crisis, 
probably the account most influential among lawyers, is the 
debate between the British ministry and Americans over the 
meaning of parliamentary sovereignty.28 In its mature form, 
parliamentary sovereignty was the doctrine that, as 
Blackstone put it, there must exist in every state a “supreme, 
irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority,” which in 
Great Britain was vested in the national legislature, 
Parliament.29 This theory had a wide currency in the late 
eighteenth century. Even Americans acknowledged it; the 
difficulty was then explaining why Parliament should lack a 
power to tax them. In the late 1760s, patriots aired a series 
of distinctions, now familiar, between external taxes 
(permissible, they said) and internal taxes (not), taxes with 
a regulatory purpose (okay) and taxes for raising revenue 
 
 27. See, e.g., Peter S. Onuf, Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional 
Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective, 46 WILL. & MARY Q. 341, 354–55 
(1989) (On Onuf’s usage, following Terence Ball and J.G.A. Pocock, “conceptual 
history” is more concerned with political context than are traditional histories of 
ideas.). 
 28. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 198–229 (1967); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 344–54 (1998 ed.) (1969). 
 29. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 39–41. 
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(not okay), and commercial regulation (yes) and taxes (no), 
but these did little to persuade British administrators, whose 
views largely hardened over the same period.30 By the early 
1770s, the state of debate brought about what Gordon Wood 
describes as “a fundamental shift in the American 
position.”31 Unable to work around parliamentary 
sovereignty, American writers began to disavow 
Parliament’s authority entirely and to appeal instead to the 
person of the King. The colonies, they maintained, were his 
overseas “dominions,” granted and chartered under the 
authority of the King’s prerogative.32 Thus we see an 
increasing reference to “prerogative” in the final stages of the 
crisis. 
The conventional account encourages us to think about 
prerogative in a particular way. That royal prerogative was 
a solution to a crisis caused by insisting on parliamentary 
jurisdiction over an empire implies, or at least suggests, that 
prerogative was thought to be immune from parliamentary 
control. In fleeing from parliamentary sovereignty to royal 
prerogative, the colonists were fleeing to a royal jurisdiction 
unregulated by acts of Parliament. The suggestion is, 
further, that royal jurisdiction is something like the 
equitable jurisdiction of early Chancery, in which the King’s 
conscience is the measure of state power, rather than the 
common law or statute.33 Yet if we study how Americans 
wrote about prerogative during the imperial crisis, it 
becomes obvious that the term could not stand, simply, for 
immunity from parliamentary control and subjection to royal 
 
 30. The imperial administrator William Knox is the leading example. BAILYN, 
supra note 28, at 218. 
 31. WOOD, supra note 28, at 352. 
 32. See, e.g., CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 18–21, 112–47 (1923); ERIC NELSON, THE 
ROYALIST REVOLUTION: MONARCHY AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 33 (2014); 
Barbara A. Black, The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists, 124 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1157, 1194–1211 (1976). 
 33. Eric Nelson’s repeated invocations of a patriot embrace of “sweeping 
prerogatives” carry this connotation. See NELSON, supra note 32, at 5, 123. 
2018] EXECUTIVE PREROGATIVE 571 
control. As I show in the next several subsections, Americans 
often used “prerogative” to justify their immunity from 
parliamentary and royal control, by analogizing their 
charters to Magna Carta and arguing that the King had 
indefeasibly delegated his law-making power to colonial 
assemblies. On other occasions, writers used “prerogative” to 
describe matters within Parliament’s jurisdiction, in order to 
emphasize that royal power was limited by law. The term 
was ambiguous, and because it was ambiguous it could be 
used to describe a variety of institutional and legal 
relationships of value to writers uncertain about the 
constitution of the British empire, or who intended to invoke 
different constitutions at different times. “Prerogative” thus 
illustrates what John Phillip Reid called the “state of 
contrariety” or “polarity” in eighteenth-century British 
constitutional thought.34 
In the last subsection, I explore the differences in 
American and English perspectives on “prerogative,” and the 
significance it had for the imperial crisis. From the American 
perspective, prerogative’s role in sanctioning the royal 
charters that formed the basis of their political communities 
seems to have left an indelible mark on the term, 
transforming it into a metonym for American rights to self-
government. This is why “prerogative” formed a crucial 
component in what Charles McIlwain called “the charter 
claim” against metropolitan English power.35 From the 
metropolitan perspective, in contrast, American appeals to 
“prerogative” invoked past efforts to undermine Parliament’s 
control over governmental supply, principally King Charles’s 
 
 34. JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 4 (1993). 
 35. MCILWAIN, supra note 32, at 184. Rather uncharacteristically, McIlwain 
took a Londoner’s dismissive view of the argument. For more sympathetic 
accounts of the charter argument, see Black, supra note 32, at 1198–1207, as well 
as the sources cited in Jack P. Greene, From the Perspective of Law: Context and 
Legitimacy in the Origins of the American Revolution, 85 S. ATL. Q. 56, 58–73 
(1986). 
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use of “prerogative taxation.”36 Not sharing the Americans’ 
association of royal prerogative with political community, the 
ministry could not understand how prerogative might 
sanctify colonial assemblies any more than it had 
“prerogative courts,” commissions, monopolies or other 
instruments of royal administration subject to 
parliamentary dissolution.37 As McIlwain put it, that a 
colonial charter “was in fact . . . a provincial constitution for 
some thousands of Englishmen affected its legal status not 
in the slightest degree. From that point of view, the people of 
Maryland did not exist . . . .”38 The focus on charters may 
explain why Americans found little occasion to use 
“prerogative” as Locke had defined it, since a discretionary 
authority to violate the law would be at cross-purposes with 
paeans in its defense. 
1. Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the 
Legislative Authority 
We should begin with James Wilson’s short pamphlet, 
Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative 
Authority of the British Parliament, which was written in 
1768 and, although not published until 1774, is probably the 
most important treatment of the issue from the crisis.39 The 
 
 36. See Black, supra note 32, at 1200 (describing the metropolitan concern 
that “royal power must not wax fat on contributions from grateful colonial 
beneficiaries of royal license, lessening dependence on Parliament”). “Prerogative 
taxation” refers to royal powers to raise money from subjects without 
parliamentary consent. For its use under Charles I, see J. P. KENYON, THE STUART 
CONSTITUTION, 1603–1688: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 53–89 (1966). 
 37. “Prerogative courts,” sometimes “conciliar courts,” emerged from the 
King’s Council after the common law courts were already distinct, with relatively 
settled forms and a body of professional advocates and judges. The most famous 
of these courts, Star Chamber, was used to political ends and abolished by 
Parliament in 1641. See KENYON, supra note 36, at 117–24, 192, 223–25. 
 38. MCILWAIN, supra note 32, at 179, 180–81 (emphasis added). 
 39. JAMES WILSON, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE 
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT (Philadelphia, William & 
Thomas Bradford 1774). Wilson tells us that the pamphlet was “written during 
the late Non-Importation Agreement,” id. at iii, and Robert McCloskey dates it to 
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pamphlet illustrates well the diversity of meanings I have 
already attributed to “prerogative.” Wilson uses the term to 
describe the power of the Crown generally; its specific 
powers, among which he lists war, peace, and treating with 
foreign nations; the particular royal powers to establish 
governments and regulate domestic trade; and, most familiar 
to us, a “discretionary power of acting where the laws are 
silent,” a prerogative Wilson thinks “most properly entrusted 
to the executor of the laws.”40 In the last phrase, the 
expression “discretionary power” is appositional to 
“prerogative” and can be read naturally as a definition, 
though it does not account for the term’s other uses in the 
pamphlet. We read of “its prerogative” (the Crown’s), “his 
prerogative” (the King’s, used four times, twice italicized), 
“all prerogative” (plural), “this prerogative” and 
“prerogative” (both singular, but the latter a putative ‘kind 
term’), “Royal prerogative” and “legal prerogative”—without 
any hint as to whether these are meant to be the same or 
different things.41 Indeed, the last two uses, or even the first 
two, could refer to contrasting or opposed things; and if we 
look to see what idea, institution or practice prerogative is 
opposed to, we see that it is opposed to “the privileges of the 
people” or “the liberties of the people”—except, apparently, 
when the liberties of the people are secured by “governments 
under the sanction of his prerogative”; and that prerogative 
is opposed to law or “the exertion of an unlimited authority 
by Parliament”—except, that is, when prerogative is 
expanded by acts of Parliament, whose House of Commons, 
says Wilson, has occasionally “thr[own] into the scale of 
prerogative all that weight, which they derived from the 
 
1768. Robert Green McCloskey, Introduction to 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 9 
(Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967). Its importance for us stems in part from 
Wilson’s sustained discussion of prerogative; he uses the term seventeen times in 
thirty-five pages. 
 40. WILSON, supra note 39, at 6, 9, 13, 29, 33. 
 41. Id. at 6, 9, 11–14, 29, 33–35, 34 n.*. 
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people.”42 It is enough to make one’s head spin. And this from 
James Wilson, generally regarded as one of the patriots’ most 
acute legal thinkers.43 
Wilson was one of the patriots’ most acute legal thinkers. 
Acute lawyers did not grasp at general principles where none 
were to be had; they understood how to use terms whose 
meaning depended on context and purpose. We can make 
better sense of Wilson’s varied uses of “prerogative” if we 
approach the pamphlet from this perspective. His core 
purpose, announced on page three, is to trace the 
consequences of the view that “lawful government” rests on 
“the consent of those, who are subject to it.”44 This was a 
familiar starting point for American writers disputing 
Parliament’s power to tax the colonies, but it also could be 
used to impugn any parliamentary jurisdiction over the 
colonies, as demonstrated in a pamphlet by the radical 
William Hicks, published the year Wilson was writing.45 
Wilson quotes Burlamaqui, the Swiss legal theorist, for the 
proposition that “sovereigns” derive their authority from the 
agreement of “individuals” to part with a portion of their 
natural liberty in exchange for happiness.46 Yet, reasons 
 
 42. Id. at 6, 9, 11, 13, 29, 34. 
 43. See, e.g., McCloskey, supra note 39, at 6. 
 44. WILSON, supra note 39, at 3. 
 45. See WILLIAM HICKS, THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF PARLIAMENTARY POWER 
CONSIDERED 3–5, 21 (New York, John Holt 1768). Hicks regarded the general 
assemblies as guarding the “liberties” of “colonists” “not only . . . against the 
encroachments of the royal prerogative, but” also protecting “their property 
against the invasions of their more powerful brethren” (in Parliament). Id. at 4–
5. On the role of consent in arguments by American Whigs against parliamentary 
taxation, see The Virginia Petitions to the King and Parliament (1764) as 
reprinted in PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP 
ACT CRISIS, 1764–1766, at 14 (Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1959) [hereinafter 
PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION]; The New York Petition to the House of Commons 
(1764), as reprinted in PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION, supra, at 8–9; The Resolutions 
as Recalled by Patrick Henry, as reprinted in PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION, supra, 
at 48; and MCILWAIN, supra note 32, at 156–57. 
 46. WILSON, supra note 39, at 3. This looks like the familiar social contract. 
Burlamaqui followed Pufendorf in identifying two contracts: the first was the 
transfer of some portion of individual rights to a sovereign, constituting the 
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Wilson, the British Parliament cannot actually promote the 
happiness of Americans, since Americans lack the privilege 
to vote for its members. History shows that such a 
Parliament will be corrupted by the Crown, who will use 
offices and emoluments to extend “the prerogative” and 
destroy the privileges of the people. Since Parliament could 
not secure Americans against the prerogative, it could not be 
their sovereign. 
An imperial Parliament would threaten the ‘balanced 
constitution’ so praised by establishment Whigs in a second 
way, as well.47 Parliaments elected by the people, whose 
members share interests with the people, are “[s]ensible” of 
the need to limit themselves, says Wilson, and thus preserve 
for “the executor” “a discretionary power of acting where the 
laws are silent.”48 This he also calls “prerogative.”49 We are 
left to infer that the present British Parliament will not 
preserve this prerogative in the empire, since its members 
know little of American interests; it would surely trench on 
uses of executive discretion that accommodated and 
benefitted the colonies. 
The consequence to which Wilson is drawn is that 
imperial sovereignty cannot constitutionally be lodged in the 
British Parliament. He closes his essay by turning, briefly, 
to an alternative account of how lawful government in the 
colonies is constituted.50 Here Wilson drops the 
constitutional framework of the establishment Whig and 
 
formation of political society (this is the ‘social contract’); the second was a 
contract settling the form of government. J. J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF 
POLITIC LAW 29 (Nugent trans., London, J. Nourse 1752); see RICHARD TUCK, THE 
SLEEPING SOVEREIGN: THE INVENTION OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 129–30 (2016); 
Mikhail, supra note 21, at 1076–77 (describing the first contract and Wilson’s use 
of the idea). 
 47. On the constitutional views of establishment Whigs, see JERRILYN GREENE 
MARSTON, KING AND CONGRESS: THE TRANSFER OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY, 1774–
1776, at 14–16 (1987); REID, supra note 34, at 160. 
 48. WILSON, supra note 39, at 13. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 28–29. 
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assumes a different perspective, more distinctively 
American. He adopts the views, then in print, of former 
Massachusetts Governor Thomas Pownall, as well as “N.N.,” 
the author of a series of letters published in the Pennsylvania 
Chronicle, who turns out to be Benjamin Franklin.51 Their 
accounts feature the King presiding over an “imperial 
federation,” whose provinces each have a basic charter and 
an independent legislative assembly.52 The King can occupy 
this place in the empire because he has a constitutional 
obligation to protect his subjects, wherever they are, in 
exchange for their obedience.53 To manage the “great 
machine” of imperial government, the King is to employ a 
litany of traditional royal powers, called “prerogatives,” 
using them to balance conflicting interests expressed by 
“different legislatures throughout his dominions.”54 Note 
again how “prerogative” is being used. In this part of the 
essay, Wilson opposes “prerogative” to itself, but in two 
 
 51. THOMAS POWNALL, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COLONIES 43–55 (4th ed., 
London, J. Walter 1768); Benjamin Franklin (N.N.), On the Tenure of the Manor 
of East Greenwich, PENN. CHRON., Mar. 9, 1767 (essay dated Jan. 6, 1766), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-13-02-0006. Franklin also 
authored a letter from “A Briton,” published in the London Chronicle, which 
advanced the same views. Benjamin Franklin (A Briton), To the Printer of the 
London Chronicle, LONDON CHRON., Oct. 18–20, 1768, reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS 
OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 233–37 (William B. Willcox ed., 1972). Wilson is likely to 
have read or at least discussed these texts. In 1767 he was reading law with John 
Dickinson, who was then publishing the Farmer’s Letters, which argued that 
Parliament lacked a power to tax the colonies for purposes of raising revenue and 
thus was engaged in this debate. Wilson was apparently drafting Considerations 
around the same time. McCloskey, supra note 39, at 10. In addition to Pownall 
and Franklin, James Otis had advanced a similar argument several years earlier, 
also in print (in several editions) by the late 1760s. E.g., JAMES OTIS, A 
VINDICATION OF THE BRITISH COLONIES, AGAINST THE ASPERSIONS OF THE HALIFAX 
GENTLEMAN 21, 23–24 (Boston, Edes & Gill 1765). 
 52. RANDOLPH GREENFIELD ADAMS, POLITICAL IDEAS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 29–39 (1922). 
 53. WILSON, supra note 39, at 31. As Aaron Knapp has observed, “although 
Wilson advocated remaining loyal to the crown’s ‘legal prerogatives’ . . . [it was] 
only so long as the king protected the colonists.” Aaron T. Knapp, Law’s 
Revolutionary: James Wilson and the Birth of American Jurisprudence, 29 J. L. 
& POL. 189, 200 (2013). 
 54. WILSON, supra note 39, at 33–34. 
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different senses: first, as a royal power to charter assemblies, 
which serve to express local interests; and second, as a set of 
powers to manage an empire of conflicting local interests.55 
In no case was there a “royal prerogative” to alter colonial 
charters, since, as Wilson explained later, this would be 
“diametrically opposed to the principles and the ends of 
prerogative.”56 
Using the structure of the argument as a guide, there 
appear to be at least four senses of “prerogative” in 
Considerations. “Prerogative” means: (1) royal power over 
subjects; (2) an executive discretion to act where the laws are 
silent; (3) a royal authority to charter provincial 
governments and legislative assemblies, although not to 
alter or destroy them; and, (4) a traditional set of specific 
royal powers, set out in English legal literature, with which 
the King is to manage and direct an imperial federation of 
provincial governments. Wilson is not alone in using the 
term these ways for these purposes. Indeed, as we will see, 
the four senses of “prerogative” just identified occur 
 
 55. Id. at 29, 33–34. Among the royal powers to manage imperial government, 
Wilson includes “regulat[ing] domestic trade by his prerogative.” Id.  at 33. Eric 
Nelson finds the passage “remarkable.” NELSON, supra note 32, at 35–36. The 
power to regulate domestic trade is, however, included in most period treatises 
on prerogative. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 176; 6 JOHN COMYNS, A 
DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50–51 (4th ed., Dublin, Luke White 1793). The 
King traditionally regulated trade by chartering associations for that purpose. 
See 4 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 203–04 (London, 
Catherine Lintot 1759). These associations self-regulated by law or custom. A 
defense of their charter liberties was in this sense corporatist and anti-Stuart, 
not absolutist and pro-Stuart, as Nelson frames the passage. See Victor Morgan, 
Whose Prerogative in Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Century England?, 5 
J. LEGAL HIST. 39, 47–49 (1984); Catherine Patterson, Quo Warranto and 
Borough Corporations in Early Stuart England: Royal Prerogative and Local 
Privileges in Central Courts, 70 ENGLISH HIST. REV. 879, 879, 905 (2005). 
 56. That is, altering a charter would be opposed to the well-being of the 
people. James Wilson, Speech Delivered in the Convention for the Province of 
Pennsylvania (Jan. 1775), in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 39, at 
754, 756. Again, Benjamin Franklin had made the same argument, in print, over 
ten years earlier. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, COOL THOUGHTS ON THE PRESENT 
SITUATION OF OUR PUBLIC AFFAIRS, IN A LETTER TO A FRIEND IN THE COUNTRY 18–
19 (Philadelphia, W. Dunlap 1764). 
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throughout American writing during the imperial crisis. 
Each is relevant to the arguments advanced by American 
writers, but in different ways. 
2. “Prerogative” in Pamphlets and Broadsides 
Like Wilson, but to a greater degree, the leading 
pamphlet literature reveals a concern with establishing the 
sanctity of American charters and positioning their 
legislative assemblies as a check on imperial power, whether 
royal or parliamentary. For example, in response to the gibe 
of metropolitan writers that appealing to the royal 
prerogative invited “Danger,” Edward Bancroft reminded his 
readers that “Royal Charters” are “fundamental, and 
consequently indefeasible Acts, equally binding on the Prince 
and his Subjects.”57 These royal charters confer “[l]iberties,” 
and render these liberties “at least as secure from the 
[e]ncroachments of Prerogative” as Parliament does within 
the realm.58 Once the King divested himself of authority to 
convene a legislative assembly, “the Royal Prerogative could 
afterwards have no Power,” thereby exempting colonists 
from “Impositions by the King’s Prerogative.”59 To Bancroft’s 
eye, then, colonial charters were indefeasible acts of 
prerogative, and as such served to check imperial 
administrative power, also described as “prerogative.” But 
why should colonial charters be indefeasible? Any other view, 
wrote James Iredell, would fashion the charters “a mere 
snare and delusion to induce our forefathers to come 
abroad.”60 In truth, “the share which the people have in the 
 
 57. EDWARD BANCROFT, REMARKS ON THE REVIEW OF THE CONTROVERSY 
BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND HER COLONIES 9, 11 (London 1769). The charter 
specifying the form of government was an exercise of “his Prerogative.” Id. at 43. 
 58. Id. at 13. 
 59. Id. at 20, 24, 40, 41. Bancroft makes the same point about judicial 
authority, although a right of final appeal to the Privy Council was reclaimed 
from corporate colonies in the eighteenth century. Id. at 66–67; see generally 
MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL 
CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE (2004). 
 60. James Iredell, To the Inhabitants of Great Britain, September 1774, in 1 
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legislative power” under those charters was “the chief 
essential” for protecting their property from arbitrary 
deprivation; and the king “had a right to stipulate the 
conditions upon which his subjects might be encouraged to 
venture risks.”61 Americans therefore would “not submit to 
any alteration of the original terms of the contract, because 
they were the price for which the service was engaged.”62 The 
position was self-consciously anti-Stuart. As American expat 
Stephen Sayre observed, the practice of “the faithless 
Stuarts” had been to “look[] upon the people’s charters as 
waste-paper.”63 Moses Mather, a Connecticut clergyman, 
imagined an idealized past in which charters had been 
“settled and established, determining and bounding the 
power and prerogative of the ruler” and the liberties of the 
subject.64 Though the charters rested on “certain 
prerogatives,” they were now “permanent and perpetual, as 
unalterable as Magna Charta,” and could not be “vacated or 
changed by the king.”65 Mather’s argument followed that of 
another minister, the Georgian John Zubly, who had earlier 
observed that the Crown did not “reserve unto itself a right 
to rule over [the colonies] without their own Assemblies.”66 
 
THE PAPERS OF JAMES IREDELL 253, 253 (Don Higginbotham ed., 1976). 
 61. Id. at 260. Several years later, Thomas Jefferson made the same point in 
his draft of resolutions in response to Lord North’s “Conciliatory Proposal,” which 
would exempt any colony from parliamentary taxation for common defense or 
support of government if the assembly voluntarily voted a supply. Jefferson 
objected that it was “the freedom of granting our Money for which we have 
contended. Without this we possess no check on the royal prerogative . . .” 
Thomas Jefferson, Virginia Resolutions on Lord North’s Conciliatory Proposal, 
10 June 1775, in FOUNDERS ONLINE, supra note 26. 
 62. Iredell, supra note 60, at 261. 
 63. STEPHEN SAYRE, THE ENGLISHMAN DECEIVED; A POLITICAL PIECE 27 
(London, Samuel Hall 1768). 
 64. MOSES MATHER, AMERICA’S APPEAL TO THE IMPARTIAL WORLD 22 (Hartford, 
Ebenezer Watson 1775). 
 65. Id. at 25. 
 66. JOHN ZUBLY, AN HUMBLE ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF THE DEPENDENCY 
OF THE AMERICAN COLONIES UPON THE PARLIAMENT OF GREAT-BRITAIN 23 
(Charleston 1769). Zubly, it should be noted, sought reconciliation during the 
imperial crisis and eventually became a loyalist. The passage quoted here speaks 
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Nor could Parliament alter colonial charters, maintained 
another writer, for that would be inconsistent with “the 
Dignity of the British Crown.”67 
Pamphlet-writers also regularly invoked the fourth 
sense of “prerogative” to describe the structure of the 
imperial federation. “Prerogative” in this sense referred to a 
traditional set of royal powers with which the King 
conducted the business of government. Perhaps the most 
distinctive contribution to the line of argument from a patriot 
was from John Adams, writing to the people of 
Massachusetts as “Novanglus.” Although Adams described 
something like a federative imperial structure, he insisted 
that “the British government is not an empire.”68 Properly 
understood, an empire was “a despotism,” in which the ruler 
was “bound by no law or limitation, but his own will.”69 The 
British government, in contrast, was a “government of laws” 
and thus a republic. That the King possessed “ample and 
splendid prerogatives” did not make it an empire, Adams 
maintained, since his government was “bound by fixed laws, 
which the people have a voice in making.”70 So bound, 
Adams’s “prerogative” could not refer to Locke, but had to 
mean the royal powers, regulated by Parliament, with which 
the King governed this massive, transatlantic “republic.” 
John Dickinson, too, had been converted to this vision of 
British government, although he did not express it in 
Adams’s terminology. From the very beginning of his lengthy 
 
of royal “right” but not “prerogative”; the pamphlet mentions “prerogative” three 
times, each time opposing it to privilege or right, a traditional usage. Id. at 10, 
15, 20. 
 67. BENJAMIN PRESCOTT, A FREE AND CALM CONSIDERATION OF THE UNHAPPY 
MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND DEBATES 4, 43 (Salem, S. & E. Hall 1774). “Dignity” and 
“Prerogative” are closely related in early English writings on monarchical power. 
 68. John Adams, Novanglus VII. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of the 
Massachusetts-Bay of the Colony of the Massachusetts-Bay, in 2 THE ADAMS 
PAPERS DIGITAL EDITION 307, 314 (Sara Martin ed., 2018) [hereinafter ADAMS 
PAPERS]. 
 69. Id. at 314. 
 70. Id. 
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Essay on the Constitutional Power of Great-Britain over the 
Colonies in America, Dickinson thought it important to 
“acknowledge the prerogatives of the sovereign,” including 
powers of making “peace and war, treaties, leagues and 
alliances,” citing Blackstone’s Commentaries in support.71 
Just as treatise writers insisted, these prerogatives were 
limited, having been “vested in the crown for the support of 
society,” and infringing natural liberty no more “than is 
expedient for the maintenance of our civil.”72 These limits 
were firm. As Dickinson explained elsewhere, it was because 
Charles I had not satisfied himself with “the points of 
prerogative . . . contested and settled,” that even powers 
“legally vested” in the Crown had been lost.73 
Of course, the King might go astray by misusing his 
lawful prerogatives, as Thomas Jefferson explained in 
Summary View of the Rights of British America.74 George III 
had used his prerogative to veto salutary acts of colonial 
assemblies (in particular, observed Jefferson, laws that 
would have ended the slave trade in Virginia), while failing 
to stop the enactment of unjust legislation by Parliament.75 
For the King to be a true “mediatory power,” “holding the 
balance of a great, if a well poised empire,” he would need to 
exercise his prerogatives with greater concern for the well-
being of his American subjects.76 
 
 71. JOHN DICKINSON, AN ESSAY ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF GREAT-
BRITAIN OVER THE COLONIES IN AMERICA 10 n* (Philadelphia, William & Thomas 
Bradford 1774). 
 72. Id. at 11–12. 
 73. John Dickinson, Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, to the Inhabitants 
of the British Colonies: Letter XI, PROVIDENCE GAZETTE; & COUNTRY J., Mar. 5, 
1768, at 1. 
 74. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH 
AMERICA 16 (Philadelphia, John Dunlap 1774) [hereinafter SUMMARY VIEW]. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. at 15, 22. For incisive comments on this aspect of Jefferson’s 
constitutionalism, see PETER ONUF, THE MIND OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 83–95 
(2007). Iredell, too, thought the King should use his veto to “prevent the actual 
injury” of his colonies by a foreign legislature, Parliament. Iredell, supra note 60, 
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3. “Prerogative” in American Newspapers 
We see a similar set of uses if we expand the scope of our 
sources beyond the leading pamphlets. These uses are 
subsumed within a larger body exhibiting some variety; 
“prerogative” was not uncommon in print, and seems 
regularly to have suggested itself to writers in need of a 
synonym for “power,” or even a piquant name for a racehorse 
or a boat.77 In most cases, the term was used simply to refer 
to royal authority and contrasted with the privileges, 
liberties, or rights of the people.78 Elsewhere, “prerogative” 
 
at 266. 
 77. As a synonym for power, “prerogative” could be applied to Parliament, 
colonial legislative assemblies, or even “the kingdom.” See A. B., To the Printers, 
BOS. EVENING-POST, Aug. 12, 1765, at 1 (Parliament); Cato, From the Gazetteer, 
CONN. GAZETTE & UNIVERSAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 21, 1774, at 2 (Parliament); 
John Dickinson, Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the 
British Colonies: Letter V, PA. CHRON., Dec. 28, 1767, at 195 (“The people of Great-
Britain consider that kingdom as the sovereign of these colonies, and would now 
annex to that sovereignty a prerogative, never heard of before.”); Great and 
Glorious News to America, and Comfortable News to the Printer of the Virginia 
Gazette, VA. GAZETTE (Williamsburg), May 2, 1766 at 1 (colonial assemblies). 
“Prerogative” could be used, and regularly was, to refer to God’s power or special 
authority, see, e.g., From the Free Savages I now come to the Savages in Bonds, 
MASS. GAZETTE & BOS. NEWS-LETTER, Apr. 2, 1767, at 1 (“[t]o know what 
constitutes mine or your Happiness, is the sole Prerogative of Him who created 
us, . . .”), or the special authority of married men, see C. Arpasia, The Visitant, 
PA. CHRON. & UNIVERSAL ADVERTISER, Apr. 11, 1768, at 81 (the husband’s “lordly 
prerogative”), or even “the prerogative of every human being” to “commend Virtue 
and . . . oppose Vice  . . .” See Felton, From the Boston Gazette to Mr. Hutchinson, 
DUNLAP’S PA. PACKET, OR GEN. ADVERTISER, Jan. 31, 1774, at 2. For other uses, 
see reports of the “Scotch horse Prerogative” in Westminster Races, N.Y. 
MERCURY, July 22, 1765, at 3, or the wreck of “the Prerogative, a Custom-house 
Yatch, bound for the Leeward Islands” in More Ship News, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 
26, 1765, at 2. 
 78. See Americanus, To the Printers of the New-Hampshire Gazette, N.H. 
GAZETTE, & HIST. CHRON., Oct. 7, 1768, at 2 (referring to “a Balance between the 
Prerogative of the Crown, and the Rights of the People”); Claud, The Nature and 
Extent of Parliamentary Power Considered, N.Y. J., OR GEN. ADVERTISER, Feb. 6, 
1768, at 4 (“[Colonists] have not only to guard their liberties against the 
encroachments of the royal prerogative, but even to protect their property against 
the invasions of their more powerful brethren.”); Extract of a Letter from 
Dominica, Dated October 10, N.Y. GAZETTE; OR, THE WEEKLY POST-BOY, Nov. 26, 
1767, at 2 (“The four and a half per cent duty upon our produce, causes much 
murmuring, being not laid upon us by act of parliament, or act of assembly, but 
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was used to refer to a particular royal power or a power 
attached to a royally commissioned office.79 These 
 
only by prerogative royal, which is looked upon as unconstitutional and 
dangerous . . .”); Extract of a Letter from London, PA. J.; & WKLY. ADVERTISER, 
Sept. 7, 1774, at 3 (“The Bostonians . . . are cruelly used, deprived of their natural 
rights and liberties. . . . [C]ontinual steps advance, and increase the power of the 
ministry, and influence of the crown and prerogative.”); From the New York 
Gazette, BOS. EVENING-POST, July 22, 1765, at 1 (opposing “the prerogatives of 
the crown” and “the encroachments of the people” and “the rights of the 
commons”); T. M., Mr. Printer, CONN. COURANT, Mar. 28, 1768, at 1 (“[T]he stretch 
of the prerogative in King James the Second’s short reign, brought all people to 
see the necessity of a revolution.”); May it Please Your Excellency, BOS. EVENING-
POST, Oct. 28, 1765, at 3 (“[T]he King . . . holds the rights of all his subjects sacred 
as his own prerogative . . .”); Messeurs Edes & Cill, BOS. GAZETTE, Mar. 9, 1767, 
at 4 (“It is as much the duty of a member of society to oppose every encroachment 
on the subject, as it is to support the prerogative when in danger, from the 
licentiousness of the people.”); N.Y. MERCURY, Sept. 2, 1765, at 3 (describing the 
General Assembly “weighing the privileges of the prerogative on the one side and 
the liberty of the subject on the other”); Observations Historical and Political, 
N.Y. GAZETTE, Apr. 21, 1766, at 1 (stating that under Elizabeth, “it became the 
grand struggle of the people and their sovereign, on the one part, to enlarge the 
royal prerogative, and on the other to preserve the CHARTER of LIBERTY 
entire.”); John Penn, On Delaware, and Province of Pennsylvania, to the General 
Assembly of the said Counties, PA. GAZETTE, Apr. 12, 1764, at 1 (“The Harmony 
and good Understanding, which have so long and happily subsisted between the 
Legislative Branches here, have principally been owing to a due and constant 
Attention to the civil and religious Rights of the People, without attempting to 
invade the Royal Prerogative, or trample on the just Rights of Government.”); To 
the Publisher of the New-Hampshire Gazette, N.H. GAZETTE, & HIST. CHRON., Apr. 
1, 1774, at 1 (contrasting “the Rights of the Prerogative,” entrusted to the Peers 
of Great Britain, with “the People’s Privileges”). This use is also present in the 
leading pamphlet literature. See PRESCOTT, supra note 67, at 31; ZUBLY, supra 
note 66, at 15, 20. 
 79. See A Letter from Mr. Wilkes to his Grace the Duke of Grafton, BOS. POST-
BOY & ADVERTISER, July 6, 1767, at 1 (describing the “Prerogative” of “mercy”); A 
Letter to a Right Noble Lord, BOS. GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., July 22, 1765, at 2 (“It 
is a maxim at this day that the Crown by royal prerogative alone can levy no 
taxes on the subject.”); Copy of a Petition Reported to the Late House of 
Representatives, ESSEX GAZETTE, Aug. 2, 1768, at 7 (noting the “Royal 
Prerogative” to grant “a Charter for a College”); London, BOS. POST-BOY & 
ADVERTISER, Apr. 1, 1765, at 3 (judicial prerogatives); London, February 4, BOS. 
POST-BOY & ADVERTISER, Apr. 15, 1765, at 2 (prerogative to levy an impost); 
Phocion’s Letter to the K—, DUNLAP’S PA. PACKET OR, GEN. ADVERTISER, Aug. 29, 
1774, at 1 (appealing to the King to use “Your prerogative . . . power to suppress 
the unjustifiable invasions of our fellow-subjects [in] the Parliament”); To His 
Excellency Josiah Martin, N.Y. J., OR GEN. ADVERTISER, Feb. 10, 1774, at 4 
(referring to “his Majesty’s prerogative,” vested in the governor, to issue 
“commissions of Oyer and Terminer”); To Metriotes, VA. GAZETTE (Williamsburg), 
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prerogatives had legal limits; even “the most extensive 
prerogatives of the crown,” while “discretionary,” were not 
“unlimited.”80 To maintain otherwise was to advocate 
prerogative “above [l]aw,” rather than prerogative “limited 
by the law.”81 Whether the precise legal limits on prerogative 
should be settled by Parliament or by some other body was 
disputed.82 Whoever it was, however, this approach to 
“prerogative” was the seed of a more general theory of 
government. As one essayist put it, drawing on language 
attributed to Lord Mansfield, prerogative was not “some 
peculiar riches, or interest, which the crown has above, or 
opposed to, the rights and privileges of the people,” but “in 
reality, no more than that share of the government, which is 
vested in the crown . . . for the general welfare of the 
community.”83 Thus, we see in the period two uses of 
 
Sept. 12, 1766, at 1 (describing an “ancient prerogative,” given the King’s Bench, 
to bail in criminal cases); To the Printers, BOS. GAZETTE, & COUNTRY J., Aug. 20, 
1764, at 3 (prerogative to “prorogue the assembly”). 
 80. A Citizen, To the Farmer, N.Y. MERCURY, Dec. 21, 1767, at 2. 
 81. Mr. Parker, N.Y. GAZETTE; OR, WKLY. POST-BOY, Feb. 15, 1768, at 2 
(prerogative limited by law); Preface for a 30th of January Sermon, BOS. GAZETTE, 
& COUNTRY J., Feb. 29, 1768, at 1 (prerogative above the law). “Prerogative above 
the law” was likely something akin to what Englishmen called “high prerogative,” 
a general power to act when necessary to protect the public. See Wilmerding, 
supra note 1, at 322. 
 82. Compare Queries Proposed to the Committee of Philadelphia Merchants, 
Now Sitting, MASS. GAZETTE, Aug. 11, 1768, at 2 (“Whenever any Contention or 
Controversy arises between the Governors and Governed, whether the 
Legislature is not the proper Tribunal for the Determination of them; being a 
Body of Men, duly authorized, in a legal Capacity, to address, redress, hear and 
determine the Rights of the Subject and the Prerogative of the Crown . . .”), with 
The British American: Number IX, VA. GAZETTE (Rind), July 28, 1774, at 1 
(“[T]hough this prerogative may be exercised oppressively, still the subject must 
submit. He may petition, but majesty only can redress the grievance.”). 
 83. Further Remarks on the British Government, GA. GAZETTE, Feb. 24, 1768, 
at 1. For Mansfield’s view, see 16 WILLIAM A. COBBETT, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY 
OF ENGLAND: FROM THE NORMAN CONQUEST, IN 1066 TO THE YEAR 1803. AD 1765 – 
1771, at 266–67 (London, T.C. Hansard 1813) (“[P]rerogative is that share of the 
government which, by the constitution, is vested in the king alone.”). For other 
American expressions of this view, see A View of the British Constitution, ESSEX 
GAZETTE, Oct. 25, 1768, at 54 (listing powers of war and peace, assenting to “new 
laws” or withholding assent, etc.); At a Provincial Meeting of Deputies Chosen by 
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“prerogative,” coexisting alongside one another: prerogative 
as opposed to privilege or right, and prerogative as a suite of 
powers associated with the Crown, with which imperial 
government could be conducted. 
We see, also, beginning in the mid-1760s, royal 
“prerogative” regularly adduced (or denied) as authority for 
colonial charters and legislative assemblies.84 In his 1771 
Oration commemorating the Boston Massacre, James Lovell 
told his listeners that the colony’s first settlers had “entered 
into a mutual, sacred compact” with the King, in which “we 
find our only true legislative authority.”85 This compact, said 
Lovell, bound the British King, “though the most powerful 
 
the Several Counties of Pennsylvania, PA. J., July 23, 1774, at 1 (similar). 
 84. See A Vindication of a Late Pamphlet, PROVIDENCE GAZETTE; & COUNTRY 
J., Mar. 2, 1765, at 1 (describing the colony charters as “mere efforts of the royal 
prerogative”); Causes of the Present Discontent and Commotion in America, VA. 
GAZETTE (Pinkney), Feb. 16, 1775, at 2 (“such are the great charters of the 
colonies, each alike deriving its vigour and activity from the same immutable 
source, the ROYAL PREROGATIVE.”); Extract of a Letter from London, N.Y. 
MERCURY, May 27, 1765, at 3 (“[I]t was absurd, to suppose that a body of 
Adventurers could carry the Legislative power of Great-Britain along with them; 
that he was sure the charters could convey no such power, for the very best reason 
in the world, because the prerogative could not grant it.”); From the Public 
Advertiser, London, April 11, N.H. GAZETTE, & HIST. CHRON., June 20, 1766, at 1 
(“[T]he Moment that the Crown parted with a Grant, or a Charter, the Colonists 
considered themselves as possessed of the very Power which the King had given 
away, and that it was not even in his own Option to resume it. . . .”); MASS. 
GAZETTE, Mar. 6, 1766, at 2 (describing the colonies “claim to . . . their respective 
legislatures” under the “royal prerogative”; and continuing, “it has been asserted 
with more justice and consistency, that the King’s Scepter is the instrument of 
power over the colonies, and Prerogative the rule by which their obedience must 
be regulated. In this case, however, have not the royal charters been granted, 
establishing a constitution, and delegating to them [a] qualified power of 
legislation?”); PA. GAZETTE, May 29, 1766, at 1 (“King, Lords and 
Commons . . . would, in effect, surrender their ancient unalienable rights of 
supreme jurisdiction, and give them exclusively to the subordinate provincial 
legislatures, established by prerogative . . . .”); To the Printer of the London 
Chronicle, PA. GAZETTE, Apr. 10, 1766, at 1 (“[T]he modelling of those matters 
[i.e., relating to currency] peculiarly belongs to the Royal Prerogative, and was 
certainly not conceded to the Colonies by their Charters . . .”). 
 85. James Lovell, Remarks at Boston (Apr. 2, 1771), in PRINCIPLES AND ACTS 
OF THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 17, 19 (H. Niles ed., 1822). Lovell made no 
mention of the revocation of the original colonial charter and the colony’s 
royalization in the late seventeenth century. 
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prince on earth, yet, a subject under a divine constitution of 
LAW,” while expressing, at the same time, his constitutional 
authority as “royal landlord of this territory.”86 Parliament’s 
assertion of the right to legislate for the colonies ‘in all cases 
whatsoever’ was, therefore, “A DOWN-RIGHT 
USURPATION OF HIS PREROGATIVE as king of 
America.”87 Probably the line drove the crowd to huzzahs, as 
it expressed the ‘cult’ of limited, protestant monarchy that 
took hold in the colonies after the Glorious Revolution, and 
which traced sovereign authority to a sacred contract, in 
contrast to the arbitrary rule of Catholic princes.88 Thus, 
when the author of an Address to the Freemen of America 
reminded his “countrymen” that “we are contending for the 
crown and prerogative of our King, as well as for liberty, 
property, and life,” no one thought him guilty of 
contradiction, since prerogative was the origin of charter 
rights, by which life, liberty and property were secured.89 The 
measure of colonial legislative authority under the 
prerogative, according to another, more lawyerly writer, was 
the limitation expressed in the writ of Quo Warranto, “illi qui 
 
 86. Id.; see also A.B., The Centinel No. VII, BOS. EVENING-POST, June 6, 1768, 
at 1 (arguing that it had been “prudent . . . to receive a charter,” because it 
enabled colonists to “direct the mode of exercising their privileges, and 
to . . . ascertain the bounds of royal prerogative with regard to them.”). 
 87. Lovell, supra note 85, at 19. 
 88. See BRENDAN MCCONVILLE, THE KING’S THREE FACES: THE RISE & FALL OF 
ROYAL AMERICA, 1688 – 1776, at 15–21, 40–46, 203–04 (2006). 
 89. To the Freemen of America, in 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES 335, 
336 (Peter Force ed., 1837); see also MASS. GAZETTE: & BOS. WKLY. NEWSL., Jan. 
6, 1774, at 2 (“We are of Opinion, that the Prerogative of the Crown and the 
Rights of the Subjects are by the English Constitution inseparable, so in the 
Maintenance of the one we shall secure the other.”). Indeed, the same argument 
could be made about Magna Carta and English liberty; according to “Caius 
Memmius,” a metropolitan writer sympathetic to the Americans, colonial 
governments “derived from the same authority from which we have received our 
great charter of liberties,” and that “in this light,” Parliament’s effort to tax the 
colonies was “an infringement of the sovereign’s prerogative.” Caius Memmius, 
From the Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, N.Y. GAZETTE, & WKLY. MERCURY, 
Dec. 5, 1768, at 2. The argument implies Magna Carta is a fundamental law, by 
framing it as an exercise of the sovereign’s prerogative to enter into a “sacred” 
compact. 
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habent chartas regales, secundum chartas istas et earundem 
plenitudinem judicentur [Let those who have royal charters 
be judged according to those charters and their breadth of 
content].”90 Even if granting the charters had exceeded “the 
power of prerogative,” the fact was, wrote one commentator, 
that “prerogative did grant them, [and] parliament 
acquiesced in the grant, and the free people of Britain acted 
under the security of that grant”—an argument Benjamin 
Franklin would reiterate, several months later, writing as “A 
Briton” in the London Chronicle.91 It was only during the 
English Civil War that Parliament had begun “to interfere in 
that prerogative” and “usurped the government” in all the 
King’s dominions.92 Thus, prescription ratified the King’s use 
of prerogative and now guaranteed Americans’ charter 
rights.93 No American took the opposing view, defended on 
the floor of Commons by Welbore Ellis, who maintained that 
“chartered rights are by no means those sacred things which 
never can be altered,” and that, while “vested in the crown 
as a prerogative, for the good of the people at large,” they 
might be altered “if the supreme legislature find [them] unfit 
and inconvenient.”94 Rather, according to the authors of the 
 
 90. To P. P., Author of the Letters to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies in 
America, in 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES, supra note 89, at 396 
(emphasis added). Authority to conduct government was legally understood as a 
franchise, derived by grant from the King by his prerogative; this is why it might 
be challenged in a quo warranto proceeding. See Hale, supra note 18, at 240–41. 
 91. Monitor V, N.Y.  J.; OR, GEN. ADVERTISER, Apr. 14, 1768, at 1; see Franklin, 
supra note 51, at 233. 
 92. B. Franklin, The Answer, PA. J., Apr. 20, 1774, at 5. 
 93. See Black, supra note 32, at 1201–02 (discussing the doctrine of usage). 
 94. Interesting Debate on the Second Reading of the Bill for Regulating the 
Civil Government of Massachusetts Bay, in 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH 
SERIES, supra note 89, at 415. Eric Nelson cites Bancroft for the proposition that 
“the King might, by his Prerogative, put the Inhabitants of that Colony under 
whatever Form of Government he pleased,” but the language is a quotation 
Bancroft attributes to the King’s judges, and which Bancroft himself denies, 
concluding that the King “could not, by his Prerogative” alter their form of 
government. Compare BANCROFT, supra note 57, at 43 (emphasis added), with 
NELSON, supra note 32, at 46. According to Gervase Parker Bushe, attacks on the 
sanctity of colonial charters, even by British administrators and members of 
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Humble Petition and Memorial of the Assembly of Jamaica, 
“the royal prerogative” was “totally independent of the 
[English] people,” who could not, through their House of 
Commons, “restrain or invalidate those legal grants which 
the prerogative hath a just right to give, and hath very 
liberally given for the encouragement, of colonization.”95 
4. “Prerogative” and Self-Government: The Imperial 
Crisis 
Of the different senses of “prerogative,” by far the most 
important in the imperial crisis was the third, which 
Americans used to describe the founding of their political 
communities and the basis of those communities’ continuing 
rights of self-governance. In this sense, from the American 
perspective, the question of the King’s power to raise money 
by grant of supply from his provincial legislative assemblies 
 
Parliament, “have been very weak, and very few.” G. P. BUSHE, THE CASE OF 
GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA 2–3 (Dublin, James Williams 1769). Asserting a 
sovereign power to alter charters was Stuartist in its connotation; compare the 
claim advanced 150 years earlier by Archbishop William Laud: “all corporations, 
societies, nay counties, provinces and depending kingdoms, have all their 
jurisdictions and governments established by [the King]; and by him (for public 
good) to be changed or dissolved.” Morgan, supra note 55, at 47 (emphasis added) 
(quoting Statutes of Oxford). 
 95. To the King’s Most Excellent Majesty in Council: The Humble Petition and 
Memorial of the Assembly of Jamaica, in 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES, 
supra note 89, at 1073. Notably, the Jamaican Assembly had opposed itself to the 
royal prerogative in the struggle to maintain its privileges with the colony’s 
governor during the 1760s. See JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 135 (2011). There was no charge of inconsistency for 
first attacking and then invoking “prerogative” in a different context. Similarly, 
when in the Quebec Act, Parliament did transfer legislative power from 
provincial assembly to royal governor and council, Americans could describe it as 
“the most daring stretch of the prerogative of the Crown.” Extract of a Letter from 
a Very Respectable Gentleman in London, to a Correspondent in Philadelphia, in 
1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES, supra note 89, at 513. Complaining of a 
different feature of the act, Alexander Hamilton remarked that “[t]here must be 
an end of all liberty, where the Prince is possessed of such an exorbitant 
prerogative as enables him, at pleasure, to establish the most iniquitous, cruel, 
and oppressive courts of criminal, civil, and ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and to 
appoint temporary judges and officers, whom he can displace and change, as often 
as he pleases.” Remarks on the Quebec Bill: Part One, in 4 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON DIGITAL EDITION 165, 167 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 2011). 
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was different than the question of his power to raise money 
by non-parliamentary mechanisms within the realm. 
Members of Parliament, in contrast, might sensibly debate 
whether grants of supply by American assemblies violated 
the English Bill of Rights, which prohibited “levying 
money . . . by pretence of Prerogative, without grant of 
Parliament.”96 Their constitutional views were formed by a 
need to control the King and his administration of 
government.97 From this metropolitan perspective, 
“prerogative” suggested that American legislative 
assemblies were like prerogative courts, or other 
instruments of administration founded on prerogative, 
whose so-called ‘liberties’ or ‘privileges’ might be employed to 
undermine Parliament. This is what Benjamin Franklin 
meant when he suggested that the right of colonial 
assemblies to grant supply to the King “begins to give 
[Parliament] jealousy.”98 
From the American perspective, “prerogative” connoted 
a right of government the King had transferred to colonial 
communities. “The original intent of the prerogative,” wrote 
 
 96. Debate on Mr. Burke’s Resolutions, in 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH 
SERIES, supra note 89, at 1776 n.* (“[I]f the dispositions of the Colonies had been 
as favourable as they were represented, still it was denied that the American 
Assemblies ever had a legal power of granting a revenue to the Crown. This they 
insisted to be the privilege of Parliament only; and a privilege which could not be 
communicated to any other body whatsoever. In support of this doctrine, they 
quoted the following clause from that palladium of the English Constitution, and 
of the rights and liberties of the subject, commonly called, the Bill, or Declaration, 
of Rights: viz. that ‘Levying money for, of to the use of the Crown, by pretence of 
prerogative, without grant of Parliament, for a longer time, or in other manner, 
than the same is, or shall be granted, is illegal.’”). 
 97. See REID, supra note 34, at 151. In this respect, there is another 
constitutional parallel to be drawn between mechanisms of legal control over 
localities under a developing English public law, and those asserted against 
American colonies. See Joanna Innes, The Local Acts of a National Parliament: 
Parliament’s Role in Sanctioning Local Action in Eighteenth-Century Britain, 17 
PARLIAMENTARY HIST. 23, 30–37 (1998); Michael Lobban, Custom, Nature, and 
Authority: The Roots of English Legal Positivism, in THE BRITISH AND THEIR LAWS 
IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 27, 57–58 (David Lemmings ed., 2005). 
 98. Franklin, supra note 51, at 260–61. 
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one author, “was to enable the representatives of the State 
to form inferiour communities, with municipal rights and 
privileges.”99 The King had exercised his “prerogative right” 
to form the colonies “into separate civil states” by “solemn 
compact.”100 Because this exercise of the prerogative 
established a political society, it implied limits on royal 
power. The King’s “prerogatives” had to be exercised for “the 
happiness of the people” whose political community his 
prerogative had created.101 As the author of a series of letters 
To the Inhabitants of Massachusetts-Bay described it, “The 
prerogatives of the Crown are defined, and limited with 
convenient certainty by our several Charters, the ends of 
Government being confined within the circle of doing 
good.”102 Most charters limited prerogative by requiring that 
colonial laws conform to English law, so as to “reduce to a 
certainty the rights and privileges we were entitled to by our 
Charter, [and] to point out and circumscribe the prerogatives 
 
 99. A Candid Examination of the Mutual Claims of GREAT BRITAIN and 
her COLONIES, in 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES, supra note 89, at 88. 
 100. E. B. Grotius, Extract Referred to by the British American No. VI, N.Y. J.; 
OR GEN. ADVERTISER, Sept. 1, 1774, at 1. 
 101. Argumentative Part of the Instructions to the Representatives in Assembly, 
in 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES, supra note 89, at 565. 
 102. Id. at 246 (emphasis added) (To the Inhabitants of the Massachusetts-Bay. 
No. VII.). For other examples of this argument, see Continuation of the Piece in 
Our Paper of the 30th September Last, BOS. GAZETTE, Oct. 21, 1765, at 2 (“Let it 
be known, that British liberties are not the grants of princes or parliaments but 
original rights, conditions of original contracts, coequal with prerogative & co-
eval with government . . .”); From a London Paper, MASS. GAZETTE & BOS. 
NEWSL., Feb. 7, 1765, at 2 (“Thus the good of the people may spring from 
prerogative, &c. but prerogative cannot spring from the good of the people. 
Prerogative is established to produce the good of the people.”); From the Newport 
Mercury, CONN. GAZETTE, Jan. 24, 1766, at 2 (“I know no prerogative in the crown, 
which is not, at the same time, a certain privilege of the people, for their sake 
granted, and for their sake to be exerted . . . .”). The claim in To the Inhabitants 
of Massachusetts-Bay that prerogatives could be “defined, and limited” by those 
who decide what the public good is thoroughly anti-Stuart, to the extent that it 
denies what James called “the mysterie of the Kings power,” which “is not lawful 
to be disputed.” It is, insisted James, “Atheisme and blasphemie to dispute what 
God can do. . . . So, it is presumption and high contempt in a Subject, to dispute 
what a King can doe, or say that a King cannot doe this, or that. . . .” OAKLEY, 
supra note 19, at 103–18. 
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of the Crown,” which were consequently “as much limited 
and confined in the Colonies as they are in England.”103 
Again, this put “prerogative” on both sides of the 
constitutional balance, in two difference senses. Prerogative 
became associated both with American privileges of self-
government and with the imperial power that self-
government checked. The logic was captured in July 1775 by 
the Continental Congress, which explained that the 
“privilege of giving or withholding our moneys”—a charter 
right originating in prerogative—“is an important barrier 
against the undue exertion of prerogative, which, if left 
altogether without controul, may be exercised to our great 
oppression.”104 Such arguments can be found throughout the 
final decade of the imperial crisis. Although Charles 
McIlwain thought all but “a handful” of Americans conceded 
the weakness of the charter claim, the evidence examined 
here suggests that American reliance on charters was 
widespread and persistent.105 
Largely in the background during the imperial crisis is 
“prerogative” in the second sense, executive discretion to act 
where the law is silent.106 There are occasional references to 
 
 103. To the Inhabitants of Massachusetts-Bay No. VII, in 1 AMERICAN 
ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES, supra note 89, at 292. 
 104. Report of the Committee on the Resolve of the House of Congress, in 2 
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS: 1775, at 224, 226–27 (Worthington 
Chauncey Ford ed., 1905). 
 105. MCILWAIN, supra note 32, at 185. McIlwain focuses on the authority at 
English law for the insulation of colonial charters from legal and parliamentary 
challenge, which he reasonably judges to be poor; American writers focused, in 
contrast, on the connection between the charters and their long-standing 
privileges of self-government—liberties American elites claimed as a matter of 
birthright. See MICHAEL JAN ROZBICKI, CULTURE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 74–77, 81–82, 83–84 (2011). 
 106. For two uses of “prerogative” in something like this sense, see A Letter to 
G. G., BOS. POST-BOY & ADVERTISER, May 18, 1767, at 2 (“[T]he King of this 
country has ever been invested with a prerogative, during the intervals of 
parliament, to lay embargoes in case of famine, or other natural necessity, 
although in no other case whatever.”); Vaneris, 8 Die Novembris, A.D. 1765, BOS. 
GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., Nov. 11, 1765, at 1 (“[T]he Good of the Society for obvious 
Reasons requires, that, several Things should be left to the Direction of him or 
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Blackstone and a handful to Locke, but many, many more to 
colonial charters and acts of Parliament. It is therefore 
almost certainly a mistake to read writers like Wilson as 
defining “prerogative” as Lockean executive discretion; 
rather, because it was an exceptional usage in this context, 
writers were explicit when they intended to invoke the idea. 
For the same reason, it is also incorrect to cite Americans’ 
invocation of prerogative during the imperial crisis as 
evidence of their desire to live under a royal jurisdiction 
resembling equity. Indeed, I am unaware of a single patriot 
text that expresses such a view. If anything, this was their 
principal fear, the boogeyman of Catholic despotism from 
which the colonists’ beloved protestant monarch was 
supposed to protect them, by use of his lawful prerogative. 
The nightmare was memorably captured by one American 
writer, who described a feverish vision of England’s Glorious 
Revolution, in which 
English Liberty, like a beast, was made to run on all four with 
Prerogative mounted on her back, whipping and spurring her, and 
running her out of breath, till at last she droped down, and, would 
have expired with her sister Religion by her side, had not the belgie 
Hero [William III], at the request of the Whigs, hurried to her relief, 
and drove the detestable tyrant, who had gagged, bound, and 
trampled on them, out of the kingdom, set Liberty and Religion free, 
and exalted their banners high.107 
 
them who have the Executive Power. But this hinders not but that the 
Prerogative should in certain Instances be limited and bounded.”). These are the 
only pre-independence examples I found. 
 107. From the London Public Advertiser, N.H. GAZETTE, & HIST. CHRON., Aug. 
31, 1764, at 1. Americans widely perceived a connection between lawful 
prerogative, liberty and resistance to Catholicism. In October 1774, “Scipio” 
reminded his King that “’Tis your’s, Sir, to maintain and support, equitably, the 
prerogative of your Crown:—’Tis your Subjects to oppose every encroachment of 
that authority, to prevent the smallest violation of their civil and religious 
liberties, and to endeavor to be always before hand with the Pope, the Devil, and 
ALL their Emissaries . . .” Scipio, To the King, CONN. COURANT, & HARTFORD 
WKLY. INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 24, 1774, at 2. It was princely discretion that these 
writers feared; as Benjamin Prescott explained, “I am sadly sensible, that in some 
former Reigns the King’s Prerogative has been carried to an enormous Heighth, 
so high as to include in it a Power, at Pleasure, to take and apply to his own Use 
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B. Revolutionary Government and State Constitutions 
This background should serve as a premise in an account 
of the place of prerogative in the first state constitutions. 
What we know, already, of how Americans used 
“prerogative” during the imperial crisis tells us that a 
purported “[i]dentification by the popular mind of executive 
strength with the limitation of individual rights” gets things 
nearly backwards.108 In explaining how framers thought 
about executive power and its relationship to prerogative, we 
cannot begin from the premise that all good Whigs distrusted 
“magisterial power.”109 That was true in some contexts, but 
 
his Subjects Property; and King Charles the First proceeded so far in the 
exercising such a Power, as cost him first his Crown, and soon after His Head 
that wore it. But our wise and gracious Sovereign, now upon his British Throne, 
lays Claim to no such Prerogative as vests him with a Right to do Wrong to any 
of his Subjects . . .” PRESCOTT, supra note 65, at 51. For further discussion of these 
ideas, see MARSTON, supra note 47, at 29; MCCONVILLE, supra note 86, at 108, 
136–37, 192–219, 250. The emphasis on charter rights as constituting legal limits 
on prerogative is one reason I regard the account of prerogative given in Francis 
Oakley and Paul Halliday’s writings—as an absolute power to perform ‘miracles,’ 
intervening in a legal order—as incomplete and, as applied to this context, 
unsatisfactory. Here, the aim was to vindicate legal restrictions embodied in 
colonial charters (which functioned as ‘franchises’), not to dissolve them or act 
arbitrarily by absolute power. See OAKLEY, supra note 18, at 103–18; Halliday & 
White, supra note 15, at 600–03. 
 108. CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775–1789, at 
25 (1922). As Thach summarized his view of the changes in this period, “[i]n 
short, the change of emphasis from liberty to authority had meant a 
corresponding change of emphasis from the legislature to the executive.” Id. at 
51–52. But magisterial power could be associated with liberty or authority; a 
desire to protect liberty explains, in part, why mere ‘executives’ were invested 
with prerogatives. 
 109. See PRAKASH, IMPERIAL supra note 1, at 31–34; WOOD, supra note 28, at 
135–36. Jefferson’s own request in Summary View that the king use his 
prerogative to protect the rights of Virginians, described above, cautions us 
against interpreting too broadly the oft-quoted remark in his 1821 Autobiography 
that “[b]efore the Revolution we were all good English Whigs, cordial . . . in their 
jealousies of their executive Magistrate.” Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography, in 1 
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3, 121 (Thomas Leicester Ford ed., 1904). This 
was not true of all Whigs. As Jerrilyn Marston observed, “[w]ith the very 
definition of the king’s prerogative precluding the abuse of such discretionary 
power, Whigs could defend the considerable prerogative powers that the 
eighteenth-century constitution confided in the king.” MARSTON, supra note 47, 
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not in others. From the imperial perspective, the King’s 
prerogative was the source of their liberties. 
Again we have a conventional account to help us frame 
our study. The account distinguishes two stages of 
constitution-making in the period from 1776 to 1786.110 State 
constitutions framed in 1776 and 1777 (sometimes described 
as the “first wave”) expressed a distrust of imperial 
government and consequently emptied the governorship of 
all prerogatives, leaving it a mere executive department with 
the power to carry out laws passed by the state legislature. 
The executive department was in this sense an agent of the 
legislature and executive power an inferior power. 
Beginning, however, with the New York Constitution 
enacted in April 1777 (the start of the “second wave”), 
governors were reinvested with some prerogatives, 
principally the veto, and made independent of state 
legislatures by longer terms and direct election. Prerogative 
played a key role in this transformation. Indeed, a leading 
commentator has maintained that “[t]he history of 
constitutional doctrine in the decade between the 
Constitution of Georgia [enacted in 1777] and the Federal 
Constitution is, in part at least, the history of the search for 
a rationale for dealing with the former prerogatives of the 
Crown.”111 Constitutions in the first wave withheld these 
prerogatives entirely, or deposited them in the legislature; 
constitutions in the second wave (and beyond) allocated them 
 
at 30. 
 110. See DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 96–
110 (1988); G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 86–88 (1998); 
WOOD, supra note 28, at 127–60, 430–67. For a brief account that does not 
emphasize this transition, at least in terms of separation of powers, see GERHARD 
CASPER, SEPARATING POWER 7–16 (1997). In contrast to Casper, Marc Kruman 
argues that from the beginning, state constitutions largely embraced separation 
of powers, and that in the service of this end, they stripped state executives of 
prerogative powers like the veto. See MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY & 
LIBERTY: STATE CONSTITUTION MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 109–30 
(1997). 
 111. M. J. C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 143 
(1967). 
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more evenly, in an effort to give the executive independence 
and thereby bring “energy” to “the administration of 
government.”112 
The conventional account has much to recommend it, but 
it is marred by an overemphasis of American distrust of 
magisterial power. We have to start with the right 
perspective. There was no abstract problem of ‘allocating 
powers among the branches,’ as if the framers were 
theoretical writers, or retirees recalling events from far 
outside the window of threat. Framers were revolutionaries 
trying to achieve ends of government—security, peace, 
order—and to preserve what they regarded as their rightful 
place in government. Ordinary forms of government, rather 
than ad hoc revolutionary forms, secured these goals best, 
but ordinary government required a plan or frame—what 
Americans called a “written constitution.”113 “Prerogative” 
was useful to the elites drawing up constitutions insofar as 
it referred to a suite of relatively well-known, legally defined 
powers that had been used to administer government in the 
empire. These were powers that American writers had 
entreated the King to exercise in their defense during the 
 
 112. WOOD, supra note 28, at 432 n. 5 (quoting the Hartford Connecticut 
Courant published on September 16, 1783); see also THACH, supra note 108, at 
36–37, 44. 
 113. For a period expression, see THE POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3–5 (Philadelphia, Robert Bell 1784) [hereinafter 
POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENTS]. This proposition—that framers sought ordinary 
government to achieve security, peace and order, principal ends of government—
is consistent both with the thesis that framers sought ordinary government 
because they felt insecure under revolutionary forms of government, see, e.g., 
WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY 
AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 40–46 
(Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2001) 
(1973), and that they sought benefits that flowed from recognition by the 
international community, see Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Revolutionary Portfolio: 
Constitution-Making and the Wider World in the American Revolution, 47 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 759, 770–90 (2014). On the significance of written 
constitutions, see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 40 (2004); SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL 
REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 23–30 (1990). 
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imperial crisis. Now their natural repository was with “the 
people” whose safety and security they were meant to ensure, 
embodied in the assembly by colonial elites.114 James Wilson, 
seeking to justify efforts by the Continental Congress to 
establish military forces, described the “Prerogative of the 
Crown” as that “Share of Power, which the King derives from 
the People,” and which “the sacred Authority of the People” 
now required Congress to exercise for their safety.115 
“Prerogatives” in this sense were, Wilson wrote, “well known 
and precisely ascertained,” since they had long been subject 
to law.116 They fit naturally in an assembly whose acts were 
law. It was this connection between prerogative and “the 
people,” along with an expectation that colonial elites would 
continue to fill the assembly, that led the framers of ‘first-
wave’ constitutions to invest assemblies with such extensive 
authority. Where it was thought that a strong magistrate 
would be necessary to preserve the existing social and 
political order, elites considered sharing a portion of the 
prerogative with the chief executive; as we will see, these 
debates occurred in the framing of the earliest state 
constitutions, rather than awaiting a ‘second wave.’ 
The demands of the war and conduct of assemblymen 
soon exposed difficulties with the first constitutions. State 
assemblies did not exercise their prerogative powers merely 
by the passage of laws; assemblies regularly embraced 
extraordinary and irregular forms to accomplish their ends, 
in some cases executing government directly.117 The resort to 
 
 114. See ROZBICKI, supra note 105, at 115–16, 122–23 (describing the 
relationship between the King and “the people” and the presence of “the people” 
in the legislature). 
 115. James Wilson, To the Inhabitants of the Colonies of New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New 
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, the Counties of New Castle and Sussex on 
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, 
from their Delegates in Congress, in 4 JOURNALS OF CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 
1774–1789, at 134, 135, 141 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1906). 
 116. Id. at 135. 
 117. See Edward S. Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the 
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“novelties and singularities,” wrote one contemporary, had 
left “prerogative and privilege . . . wholly undefined and 
unlimited,” with “no rule established for public procedure.”118 
This destabilized and enervated government, as the 
conventional account emphasizes, but it also endangered the 
liberties protected by executing ordinary forms.119 Old 
concerns about the sanctity of colonial charters, which 
writers had linked to the King’s prerogative, now resurfaced 
as concerns about the inviolability of state constitutions, 
which were made to rest on what Wilson had identified as 
the font of prerogative, “the sacred Authority of the People.” 
Just as before, the security of liberty and the protection of 
property seemed at risk. This is one reason why, in a 1783 
draft of a new constitution for Virginia, Thomas Jefferson 
thought it important to expressly deny the legislature a 
“power to infringe this constitution.”120 To give effect to such 
a limit, however, required that the departments of 
government have some independence from the legislative 
assembly, so that they might employ customary forms 
without interference. In the case of the executive, this was 
accomplished, to some degree, by its investiture with the 
prerogative powers of the veto and appointment.121 
 
Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30 
AM. HIST. REV. 511, 514–15, 519–20 (1925). 
 118. POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 113, at 22. The author of Political 
Establishments is unknown. Edmund S. Morgan, The Political Establishments of 
the United States 1784, 23 WILL. & MARY Q. 286, 286–87 (1966). 
 119. Corwin, supra note 117, at 513–14, 517. 
 120. Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s Draft of a Constitution for Virginia, in 6 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON DIGITAL EDITION 294, 298 (James P. McClure & J. 
Jefferson Looney eds., 2018) [hereinafter JEFFERSON PAPERS]. 
 121. The extent of change in the constitution of the executive department was 
not great and has been, at times, exaggerated. Compare WOOD, supra note 28, at 
433–34, and THACH, supra note 108, at 44–48 (describing the Essex Result and 
the office of Governor under the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780), with 
CASPER, supra note 110, at 15 (“In the end, the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution 
was not dramatically different from the 1778 draft in the manner in which it 
distributed powers, although the later document did provide for the 
(overrideable) gubernatorial veto.”). 
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In what follows, I explore these developments in more 
detail. I begin by tracing the efforts of revolutionary bodies 
to reclaim and exercise royal prerogatives on behalf of the 
people. I then examine debates over the allocation of 
prerogative powers under what is perhaps the most 
influential of the early state constitutions, the Virginia 
Constitution of 1776. It was to quiet concerns among the 
Virginia elite about preserving the existing social order that 
John Adams recommended they vest their executive with a 
veto. Adams’s advice evolved into one of the leading 
pamphlets of the period, Thoughts on Government. Finally, I 
briefly consider changes in second-wave state constitutions. 
1. Revolutionary Government 
To understand this perspective requires that we begin, 
briefly, with the revolutionary governments that emerged 
after the collapse of royal authority in 1775 and 1776. There 
is no question that revolutionary governments that took 
control after the dissolution of royal colonial governments 
exercised powers that could be described as “prerogatives.” 
Governor Josiah Martin of North Carolina complained that 
companies of North Carolina volunteers had “usurp[ed] the 
prerogative of the Crown, by forming a Militia, and 
appointing officers thereto.”122 When the Second Continental 
Congress turned in the summer of 1775 to supplying and 
regulating a continental army, it, too, was described as 
asserting a “claim” to the King’s “prerogatives.”123 It was 
these actions that Wilson sought to justify by describing 
them as a popular reclaiming of prerogative.124 Congress 
worked in conjunction with the Provincial Congresses or 
Conventions, which provided men and supplies, thereby 
 
 122. Martin, in 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES, supra note 89, at 63. 
 123. Patriotic Letter from a Minister of the Church of England, to the Earl of 
Dartmouth, in PRINCIPLES AND ACTS OF THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA, supra note 
85, at 265; see also A Proclamation, PROVIDENCE GAZETTE; & COUNTRY J., Nov. 19, 
1774, at 3 (similar). 
 124. Wilson, supra note 115, at 135, 141. 
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partitioning the royal obligation to “protect the continent” 
along lines the Articles of Confederation would later 
confirm.125 Local committees, too, exercised a “prerogative” 
to protect their communities. Recent studies of the 
revolutionary committees have tended to focus on their 
harsh treatment of loyalists who violated the continental 
boycott of British goods or refused to subscribe to a loyalty 
oath.126 The focus is understandable but risks throwing the 
committees out of perspective. The intolerance 
committeemen showed for speech ‘inimical to the common 
cause’ and symbolic conduct like ‘toasts to the King’ 
expressed largely conventional views of seditious libel and 
“hot and angry words” that tended to disturb the public 
peace.127 In handling such cases, committees built upon 
existing practices and understandings that had long 
characterized local government in the American colonies 
(and which are seriously invasive by modern standards).128 
And while the committees used force, intimidation, 
harassment, and mock or summary legal proceedings to 
coerce the intransigent, they also took steps to ensure that 
revolutionary action did not unwind into complete 
lawlessness or uncontrolled violence—thereby exercising 
 
 125. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX; see also MARSTON, supra 
note 47, at 131–32 (“The appointment of Virginia’s George Washington to 
command the New England troops symbolized congressional acceptance of the 
old royal responsibility of protecting the continent.”). On the role of the provincial 
congresses and conventions in establishing, supplying and regulating a regular 
armed force, see MARSTON, supra note 47, at 140–41. 
 126. See, e.g., T. H. BREEN, AMERICAN INSURGENTS, AMERICAN PATRIOTS: THE 
REVOLUTION OF THE PEOPLE 185–206 (2010). Breen calls the committees “schools 
of revolution” for their role in disciplining political ideology and consolidating the 
revolutionary movement. While there is a renewed interest in this function of the 
committees, the thesis itself isn’t new. Hamilton Eckenrode described the same 
function for the county committees of safety in Virginia. H. J. ECKENRODE, THE 
REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA 96 (1916). 
 127. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 241–54. 
 128. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND 
LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 8–27 (Peter Charles Hoffer & N.E.H. Hull eds., 2000) 
(Chapter 1, The Consensual Community). 
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what was, in effect, a kind of police power.129 In legal 
treatises, this power was sometimes described as patria 
potestas, the King’s power to preserve order and protect the 
well-being of the community, another form of royal 
prerogative.130 
2. Adams, Jefferson and the Virginia Constitution of 
1776 
The transition from revolutionary government by 
committee to ordinary government began in 1776 with the 
formation of the first state constitutions. Rather than survey 
the appearance of “prerogative” in these documents, I want 
to focus on one particular, influential constitution: the 
Virginia Constitution of 1776. As it happens, a number of the 
most important texts discussing “prerogative” from the 
period can be linked to this constitution and its framing. Set 
in context, what they suggest is that the framers of our first 
constitutions associated “prerogative” primarily with 
governmental structures that ensured order, peace and the 
preservation of existing social and political hierarchies. The 
question faced by those drawing up republican constitutions 
was the degree to which these values—peace and order—
 
 129. ADAMS, supra note 113, at 32; RICHARD D. BROWN, REVOLUTIONARY 
POLITICS IN MASSACHUSETTS: THE BOSTON COMMITTEE OF CORRESPONDENCE AND 
THE TOWNS, 1772–1774, at 213–14, 220–22, 225 (1970); EDWARD COUNTRYMAN, A 
PEOPLE IN REVOLUTION: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND POLITICAL SOCIETY IN 
NEW YORK, 1760–1790, at 136–43 (W. W. Norton & Co. 1989) (1981); see Jack P. 
Greene, From the Perspective of Law: Context and Legitimacy in the Origins of 
the American Revolution, 85 S. ATLANTIC Q. 56, 61 (1986) (advancing a similar 
claim about mobbing during the Revolution); Pauline Maier, Popular Uprisings 
and Civil Authority in Eighteenth-Century America, 27 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 28–29 
(1970) (similar). Breen edges up this point, but he doesn’t focus on it. BREEN, 
supra note 126, at 199. 
 130. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 162–63 (describing the King’s 
prerogative over domestic commerce and the establishment of marts, “which, 
considering the kingdom as a large family, and the king as the master of it, he 
clearly has a right to dispose and order as he pleases”); id. at *375–76 (similar, 
with respect to criminal law). These ideas are the subject of an ambitious and 
important study. See MARKUS DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 16–20, 29, 42–43, 49–61 (1999). 
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could be achieved under a government whose dominant 
central body was an assembly and in which a considerable 
amount of governance took place solely at the local level. 
Our account of Virginia’s constitution begins in 
November 1775, when John Adams wrote to Richard Henry 
Lee on the “curious problem” of what form of government “is 
most readily and easily adopted by a Colony, upon a Sudden 
Emergency.”131 The two men had conversed while serving as 
delegates at the Continental Congress, and Lee “quickly 
perceived the value of Adams’s approach to constitution 
making for persuading hesitant colonists that the practice 
difficulties of declaring independences were not as great as 
they feared.”132 Leading men in Virginia were concerned that 
a democratic form of government, which declared and 
guaranteed the natural equality of men, would serve, in the 
words of planter Robert Carter Nicholas, as a “forerunner or 
pretext of civil convulsion.”133 Nicholas referred to an 
emancipation of Virginia’s slaves, a prospect he knew 
triggered deep-seated fears of violence, but planters were 
also concerned with preserving their economic independence 
and prominence in the colonial political order.134 The elderly 
 
 131. Letter from John Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Nov. 15, 1775), in 3 ADAMS 
PAPERS, supra note 68, at 307. 
 132. John E. Selby, Richard Henry Lee, John Adams, and the Virginia 
Constitution of 1776, 84 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 387, 391 (1976). 
 133. Robert Leroy Hilldrup, The Virginia Convention of 1776: A Study in 
Revolutionary Politics 185 (1935) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Virginia) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review). 
 134. JOHN E. SELBY, THE REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA 1775–1783 106–08 (1988); 
Hilldrup, supra note 133, at 220–21. As Selby notes, George Wythe later held 
that language in the constitution’s Declaration of Rights freed the state’s slaves, 
although the position was rejected by St. George Tucker on the state’s high Court 
of Appeals. SELBY, supra at 107. The case was Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. (1 Hen. 
& M.) 134 (1806). See ALAN TAYLOR, THE INTERNAL ENEMY: SLAVERY AND WAR IN 
VIRGINIA, 1772–1832 106–10 (2013). On the decline of the social standing of 
Virginia gentry in the decades prior to the Revolution, see generally RHYS ISAAC, 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA 1740–1790 (1982). Edmund Randolph 
explained in his History that “it was tacitly understood, that every body and 
individual came into the revolution with their rights, and was to continue to enjoy 
them as they exixsted under the former government.” Edmund Randolph, Essay 
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Landon Carter suspected middling Virginians were after “a 
form of government” that would make them “independent of 
the rich men,” so “every man” could “do as he pleased.”135 
From this perspective, Adams’s aim was to advise Lee how 
republican government could be established while 
preserving—indeed, buttressing—“the form we have been 
used to,” the political institutions through which men like 
Nicholas and Carter had exerted such a profound influence 
on colonial life.136 As Adams explained later, his advice to Lee 
was particularly “calcullated for Southern Latitudes, not 
northern.”137 In particular, he thought, “[t]he Negative 
given . . . to the first Magistrate” (that is, the veto given to 
the governor) would “be adopted no Where but in S. 
Carolina,” and Adams himself would “certainly never be 
happy under such a Government.”138 A number of southern 
delegates also sought Adams’s advice, and each time he 
refined it slightly. A copy was finally printed as Thoughts on 
Government, Applicable to the Present State of the American 
Colonies, and, far from being “a poor Scrap,” as Adams 
described it, it became one of the most influential plans of 
 
on the Revolutionary History of Virginia, 1774–1782, 44 VA. MAG. HIST. & 
BIOGRAPHY 35, 48–49 (1936). 
 135. Hilldrup, supra note 133, at 225 (quoting Letter from Landon Carter to 
George Washington (May 9, 1776)). 
 136. Thomas Jefferson, The Virginia Constitution: Editorial Note, in 1 
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 120, at 334; Selby, supra note 132, at 396. 
 137. Letter from John Adams to Francis Dana (Aug. 16, 1776), in ADAMS 
PAPERS, supra note 68, at 465, 466. 
 138. Id. at 466–67; see also id. at 181 (Letter from John Adams to James 
Warren) (“In New England, the ‘Thoughts on Government’ will be disdained, 
because they are not popular enough. In the Southern Colonies, they will be 
despised and dissected, because too popular. . . . I dont expect, nor indeed desire 
that it should be attempted to give the Governor a Negative, in our Colony. Make 
him President, with a casting Voice.”). Interestingly, Adams prediction was 
reversed; Virginia did not adopt an executive veto in its 1776 Constitution, while 
the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 did—which Adams endorsed. See John 
Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of 
America, Letter LIII, in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF 
THE CONSTITUTION DIGITAL EDITION 87, 87 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2009) 
[hereinafter DHRC]. 
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government circulated during the revolutionary period.139 
Adams didn’t mention prerogative powers in his initial 
letter to Lee, but subsequent versions did, including one to 
Virginian George Wythe that became Thoughts on 
Government. He began by revisiting a point he had made 
during the imperial crisis as “Novanglus”: that men had 
nothing to fear from republican government, as “[t]he British 
Constitution itself is republican,” since it was “‘an Empire of 
Laws and not of Men,’” which was “the very definition of a 
Republic.”140 Novanglus had not complained of the British 
King’s “ample and splendid prerogative,” since it was (he had 
said) “bound by strict laws,” but now Adams recommended 
that governors “be stripped of most of those badges of 
domination called prerogatives.”141 The office was merely to 
have “the executive power.”142 The only prerogative a 
governor should possess over a state’s legislative assembly 
was “a negative,” in order to prevent the legislature from 
“continually encroaching upon” his executive office.143 The 
result, thought Adams, would be a balance between 
executive and legislative departments, rather than a 
government in which they “oppose and enervate upon each 
 
 139. See Martin, supra note 139, at 72. 
 140. Adams, supra note 140, at 86–87. To be sure, Adams’ use of “empire of 
laws” shows he had amended his categories, since as Novanglus he had 
contrasted an empire with a government of laws. 
 141. Id. at 89; Adams, supra note 68, at 314. As Adams explained in an earlier 
version of Thoughts, it was not the possession of prerogative that made the 
“spirit” of colonial government absolute rather than republican, but the Crown’s 
possession of “the whole of the Executive [power],” “with an enormous 
Prerogative,” and the legislative and judicial powers as well. Letter from John 
Adams to William Hooper (Mar. 27, 1776), in ADAMS PAPERS, supra note 68, at 
74. The concern about “badges of domination” thus appears to concern the use of 
prerogative against the legislature or judges, rather than private persons. In 
another version of Thoughts, however, Adams uses “badges of slavery” rather 
than “domination,” invoking constitutional ideas relating to security of property 
and liberty, rather than governmental balance. 
 142. Adams, supra note 140, at 89. 
 143. Id. 
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other,” a “contest” Adams worried would “end in war.”144 
Adams would also grant the governor the King’s prerogative 
powers to command the army and militia; with the approval 
of a privy council, he might also pardon crimes and appoint 
civil and military officers.145 On the other hand, indictments 
should be framed as against the peace of the colony (they had 
formerly been contra pacem regis) and writs run in the 
colony’s name, rather than the governor’s.146 The aim, in 
short, was to alloy executive power with a few traditional 
royal powers, thereby securing for the governor the “free and 
independent exercise of his judgment,” which was necessary 
for “an impartial and exact execution of the laws”—
something Virginia planters wanted—while avoiding, at the 
same time, magisterial domination of the assembly, where 
the leading planters would sit.147 If the proposal proved 
“inconvenient,” wrote Adams, there should be no worry; “the 
legislature” could “devise other methods of creating” an 
executive department.148 
When, on May 15, 1776, the Virginia Convention 
appointed a committee to prepare a “plan of government as 
will be most likely to maintain peace and order in this 
colony,” Adams’s pamphlet did its intended work.149 Richard 
 
 144. Id. James Warren had pressed this point in a series of letters to Adams 
during late 1775, when the lower house of the General Court was struggling with 
the Council over the right to appoint military officers. He complained in one letter 
that “we are plagued with a Constitution where the Prerogative of the Crown, 
and the Liberty of the Subject are Eternally militateing,” a state of affairs that 
led him to declare, “I am so sick of our Constitution.” Letter from James Warren 
to John Adams (Nov. 14, 1775), in ADAMS PAPERS, supra note 68, at 303. 
 145. Adams, supra note 140, at 90. 
 146. Id. at 90–91. Commissions would likewise be under the seal of the colony 
and the signature of the governor. 
 147. Id. at 87, 89. Interestingly, after the Revolution, a movement arose to have 
judicial process run in the name of the President. 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY 
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 
1801, at 538–40 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1971). 
 148. Adams, supra note 140, at 90; Martin, supra note 139, at 66. 
 149. Proceedings of the Ninth Day of Session, Fifth Virginia Convention (1776), 
in 7 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE 141, 143 (Brent 
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Henry Lee was not in attendance, as he was again serving as 
a delegate to the Continental Congress in Philadelphia, but 
he mailed printed copies of Thoughts on Government to the 
framing committee’s leading men, including Patrick Henry, 
Robert Carter Nicholas and others.150 At the same time, Lee 
drew up a handbill of his own setting out a simple plan of 
government, based on Adams’s earlier letter to him (though 
saying nothing about prerogative), which was printed and 
then published in the Virginia Gazette.151 Lee pitched both 
plans as familiar, orderly and flexible, and it seems the pitch 
was successful.152 Adams’s plan would likely continue the 
lower house of the assembly as the dominant force in 
Virginia’s central government, and it said nothing of (and 
thus left undisturbed) the system of local county courts 
through which planters’ exercised much of their authority. 
Moderates were attracted enough so that by the time a more 
aristocratic plan surfaced, in late May, it could be derided by 
Patrick Henry as “a silly thing.”153 Unlike Adams, the author 
of this plan, Carter Braxton, saw no danger from vesting the 
royal prerogative in a governor who held his office for life. “If 
placemen and pensioners were excluded a seat in either 
house,” he reasoned, describing men whose financial 
connection to the governor might corrupt their judgment, 
“what danger could be apprehended from the 
prerogative[?]”154 Yet Adams had struck first, and, as 
 
Tarter ed., 1983). 
 150. CHARLES RAMSDELL LINGLEY, THE TRANSITION IN VIRGINIA FROM COLONY TO 
COMMONWEALTH 169 (1910); Jefferson, Editorial Note, in JEFFERSON PAPERS, 
supra note 120, at 333–34. 
 151. A Government Scheme, VA. GAZETTE (Purdie), May 10, 1776, at 1. 
 152. See SELBY, supra note 134, at 112–13; Selby, supra note 132, at 394–96. 
Hilldrup paints a less sanguine picture, influenced by his odd attachment to 
Carter Braxton’s plan of government. Hilldrup, supra note 133, at 244–51. 
 153. Letter from Patrick Henry to John Adams (May 20, 1776), in 1 PATRICK 
HENRY: LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE AND SPEECHES 412, 412–13 (William Wirt Henry 
ed., 1891). 
 154. CARTER BRAXTON, AN ADDRESS TO THE CONVENTION OF THE COLONY AND 
ANCIENT DOMINION OF VIRGINIA 11 (Philadelphia, John Dunlap 1776) (emphasis 
added). Braxton’s governor would continue in his office during good behavior, “of 
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committeemen began their work with his pamphlet at hand, 
its ideas acquired a degree of normativity, giving the Braxton 
plan a look of “extreme conservativism.”155 
Lee and Adams had succeeded in checking the effect of 
conservatives on the framing process, but the framing 
committee was still dominated by politically moderate, older 
planters, and these men proved equally resistant to 
incorporating democratic features into the constitution.156 
Another delegate to the Continental Congress frustrated 
with having to miss the Virginia Convention was Thomas 
Jefferson, who drafted three versions of a state constitution 
and dispatched them to Williamsburg in early June.157 
Jefferson’s plan included liberal provisions that broadened 
 
which the two houses of the Council of State and Assembly should jointly be the 
Judges,” and thus “have dignity to command necessary respect and authority, to 
enable him to execute the laws, without being deterred by the fear of giving 
offence; and yet be amenable to the other branches of the legislature for every 
violation of the rights of the people.” Id. at 20, 21–22. 
 155. Jefferson, supra note 150, at 335. Braxton’s defense of “elegance and 
refinement,” BRAXTON, supra note 154, at 16–17, helps both to capture the point 
of view from which Braxton wrote and the vague embarrassment with which the 
plan was apparently greeted. Braxton’s argument was that Adams, in connecting 
happiness to virtue, had confused public virtue with private virtue; private virtue 
was an interest in one’s own welfare, and it was this self-interestedness that had 
made a “bountiful” country like Virginia so wealthy. There was thus nothing 
wrong with the “elegance and refinement” of the great planters, contrary to the 
sumptuary laws included in Adams’s plan. Id. at 15–17. A certain ambivalence, 
even among planters, about luxury, gaming and idleness had characterized 
Virginia society since the rise of evangelical religions in the 1750s. See generally 
ISAAC, supra note 134. For more on Braxton’s pamphlet, see WOOD, supra note 
28, at 96–97; Isaac Kramnick, The “Great National Discussion”: The Discourse of 
Politics in 1787, 45 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 22 (1988). With respect to the formation of 
the Virginia Constitution, at least, it is hard to accord the Braxton pamphlet the 
significance Wood and Kramnick want to give it. 
 156. Hilldrup, supra note 133, at 171–76. 
 157. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Nelson (May 16, 1776), in 
JEFFERSON PAPERS supra note 120, at 292 (“Should our Convention propose to 
establish now a form of government perhaps it might be agreeable to recall for a 
short time their delegates [to the Congress]. It is a work of the most interesting 
nature and such as every individual would wish to have his voice in. In truth it 
is the whole object of the present controversy . . .”). On the dating of the draft 
constitutions, see First Draft by Jefferson, in JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 120, 
at 345. 
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suffrage, subjected local offices like the sheriff to popular 
vote, and ended the importation of slaves, but these “fell by 
the roadside,” arriving too late in the framing process and 
challenging too centrally the gentry’s social authority and 
way of life.158 In contrast, provisions in Jefferson’s plan 
relating to prerogative did have some influence. Jefferson 
faulted the King for misusing his prerogative to veto colonial 
legislation and (through his governor) to dissolve legislative 
assemblies, a complaint Jefferson had made previously in 
Summary View, and he now proposed that the state’s 
legislative assembly should continue to sit “so long as they 
shall think the publick service requires.”159 Jefferson’s 
governor, like Adams’s, was expressly divested of a set of 
identified royal prerogatives, retitled “Administrator” and 
granted only undefined “executive powers.”160 The 
prerogatives, including “declaring war or concluding peace,” 
“raising or introducing armed forces,” and “erecting courts, 
offices, boroughs, [or] corporations,” were to be “exercised by 
the legislature alone.”161 Other provisions in Jefferson’s plan 
stripped the Administrator of the veto and the pardon, 
making him weaker than Adams’s governor relative to the 
legislative assembly, although both offices possessed a power 
to appoint civil and military officers, subject to the approval 
of another body.162 Neither office approached Braxton’s 
governor-for-life. 
When the framing committee’s draft constitution came 
before the full Convention, it debated Jefferson’s language on 
 
 158. SELBY, supra note 134, at 120. 
 159. Third Draft by Jefferson, in JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 120, at 356, 
358; SUMMARY VIEW, supra note 74, at 19, 23. 
 160. Jefferson, supra note 159, at 359–60. 
 161. Id. at 360. 
 162. Id. at 359–60. In addition, the same Administrator could not be appointed 
by the lower house twice in a row. Id. at 359. Thoughts on Government did express 
some support for a requirement of rotation in office. Adams, supra note 140, at 
90. 
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prerogative and added some of it to the draft.163 It added and 
then deleted the list of prerogative powers Jefferson had 
expressly prohibited, opting instead for a general prohibition 
on exercising “any power or prerogative by virtue of any law 
statute or custom of England.”164 The only exception was the 
pardon, a power the governor could exercise with the 
approval of his privy council, setting aside impeachment or 
where “the law shall otherwise particularly direct.”165 The 
governor was to have no veto.166 
That the governor was to exercise no prerogative “by 
virtue of any law” evidenced an understanding that royal 
prerogatives were in some cases articulated in acts of 
Parliament and judicial decisions. The delegates’ concern 
was, it seems, to prohibit “laws for enlarging the 
prerogatives”—and not, as Jefferson recalled some years 
later, to “prescribe[] under the name of prerogative the 
exercise of all powers undefined by the laws.”167 Restrictions 
on the exercise of “powers undefined by law” did exist in the 
new constitution, but they were to be found elsewhere. 
Earlier in June, “Democraticus,” writing in the Virginia 
Gazette, had suggested granting an executive department a 
 
 163. See Amendments to the Plan of Government Continued, Proceedings of the 
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power to act “in all cases of emergencies not provided for by 
the laws,” but “aided and assisted by the upper house.”168 The 
Convention expressly rejected the suggestion, requiring that 
the governor exercise his executive powers “according to the 
laws of this common Wealth.”169 It reserved a power of 
“suspending laws, or the execution of laws” for the legislative 
assembly.170 During deliberations on the state’s new 
Declaration of Rights in May, Patrick Henry and his allies 
had insisted on removing language that banned ex post facto 
laws and bills of attainder, on grounds that “the safety of the 
state” might require the legislature to employ them in place 
of judicial proceedings.171 Moreover, a power to act where the 
laws were silent, in order to safeguard the welfare of the 
community, had remained all along in the hands of elite 
planters, implicitly attached to local offices like justice of the 
peace.172 The state’s constitution would do nothing to disturb 
this.173 
In short, while ‘conservative’ Adams differed from 
‘liberal’ Jefferson in proposing an executive veto and pardon, 
 
 168. Loose Thoughts on Government, VA. GAZETTE (Purdie), June 7, 1776, at 2. 
 169. Amendments to the Plan of Government Continued, supra note 147, at 637. 
A number of state constitutions in the first wave followed Virginia in restricting 
the exercise of executive power to state law. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 
VII; GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XIX; MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIII; N.C. CONST. 
OF 1776, art. XIX. 
 170. A Declaration of Rights, VA. GAZETTE (Purdie), June 14, 1776, postscript 
at 1. 
 171. SELBY, supra note 134, at 102; Randolph, supra note 134, at 47 (“An article 
prohibiting bills of attainder was defeated by Henry, who with a terrifying picture 
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supra note 133, at 183–84, 202–03. 
 172. See 3 WILLIAM NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: THE 
CHESAPEAKE AND NEW ENGLAND, 1660–1750 33–37, 43–45, 49–50 (2016); A. G. 
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VIRGINIA LEGAL CULTURE, 1680–1810 44 (Morris S. Arnold, ed. 1981). 
 173. Thus breaking the control of the planter gentry over local justice became 
a principal object of law reform spearheaded by Jefferson and James Madison in 
the decades after independence. See generally ROEBER, supra note 172. 
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neither approached the full panoply of prerogative implied 
by the Braxton plan, which appeared reactionary and had 
little influence. Delegates were principally concerned with 
which traditional royal powers should be vested in a 
republican governor, so he could execute the law and 
preserve order without unduly interfering with planter 
control; constitutional allocations of emergency power and 
the discretion to act where the law was silent, where such 
powers existed at all, were given to bodies those planters 
dominated. Practice under Virginia’s first three governors 
largely followed these forms. As historian Emory Evans has 
put it, “the legislature had been more powerful than the 
executive in Virginia for a number of years. The new House 
of Delegates was a mirror of the old House of Burgesses, and 
it was accustomed to a position of leadership.”174 Henry’s 
principal task was to raise military forces and supply them, 
and to do this he “worked primarily with the various county 
lieutenants,” the leading planters who commanded them.175 
Even directing the movement of Virginia soldiers required 
the assembly to pass a law delegating the authority to the 
governor, which it did on a temporary basis, typically until 
the next meeting of the assembly. Henry found the office “too 
much cramped,” and though he did not complain about the 
need to seek legislative authorization, says Evans, he and his 
council were “very sensitive of their own prerogatives,” 
especially his power, in conformance with state law, to direct 
the militia.176 When the British navy threatened an invasion 
from the Chesapeake, Henry and the council ordered 
loyalists forcibly removed from the area, for which the 
 
 174. Emory G. Evans, Executive Leadership in Virginia, 1776–1781: Henry, 
Jefferson, and Nelson, in SOVEREIGN STATES IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 188 
(Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds., 1981). 
 175. Id. at 189. 
 176. Id. at 190–92. The Constitution granted the Governor the authority to 
raise the militia with the approval of the privy council, and, when raised stated 
that he “shall alone have the direction of the Militia under the laws of the 
Country.” VA. CONST. of 1776. 
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legislature later indemnified him.177 When the Norfolk 
County Lieutenant requested another mass removal 
sometime later, Henry forwarded the request to the House of 
Delegates, along with a message stating that as “the 
executive power” was “not competent to such a purpose, I 
must beg leave to submit the whole matter to the general 
Assembly, who are the only Judges how far the methods of 
proceeding directed by Law are to be dispensed with on 
occasion.”178 The methods proved cumbersome for 
prosecuting the war.179 Governor Nelson, who took office 
following Jefferson, obtained sweeping grants of authority 
from the legislative assembly to call out the militia, direct its 
forces, impress food and supplies, confiscate the property of 
those who resisted state law, constitute common-law courts 
and declare martial law.180 Nelson exceeded even these 
grants of authority, for which he was again indemnified by 
the Virginia elite sitting in the General Assembly.181 
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3. Prerogative in Second-Wave Constitutions 
Second-wave state constitutions tended to make two 
changes to this allocation of powers. First, they pared back 
the ability of legislative assemblies to interfere in judicial 
proceedings by directly exercising judicial power. In 
Virginia’s case, as early as 1783, Jefferson proposed revisions 
to the constitution that would bar bills of attainder outright 
and guarantee access to habeas corpus.182 Second, 
constitutions elevated the governor by vesting royal 
prerogatives in the executive department. Jefferson retitled 
his Administrator as “Governor,” but would still deny him 
“the prerogative powers of erecting courts, . . . laying 
embargoes, . . . of retaining within the state or recalling to it 
any citizen thereof,” along with other powers, “except so far 
as he may be authorized from time to time by the legislature 
to exercise.”183 The last phrase clarified the relationship 
between the assembly and the governor in matters of 
prerogative; rather than the assembly exercising prerogative 
powers itself, it could empower the governor to exercise them 
by passing a law. Other prerogative powers, like declaring 
war and concluding peace, entering into alliances and 
regulating weights and measures, were to be reserved for a 
national assembly, acting “under the authority of the 
Confederation.”184 What about the authority to act where the 
law was silent? Jefferson addressed the matter explicitly, but 
described the power as a matter of “execution” rather than 
“prerogative.” Jefferson wrote, “We give [the Governor] those 
powers only which are necessary to carry into execution the 
laws, and which are not in their nature either legislative or 
Judiciary. The application of this idea must be left to 
 
1789) (statement of Representative Alexander White (June 18, 1789)) (Nelson 
“exceeded his authority, . . . and [was] he himself afterwards indemnified by the 
legislature.”). 
 182. JEFFERSON’S DRAFT OF A CONSTITUTION FOR VIRGINIA (1783) reprinted in 6 
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 175, at 298, 304. 
 183. Id. at 299. 
 184. Id. 
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reason.”185 In no sense did “Executive powers” mean “powers 
exercised under our former government by the crown as of 
it’s prerogative.”186 Jefferson followed most other states in 
still denying the Governor a veto. But it was clear that he 
was trying to solve much the same problem as was being 
confronted elsewhere: how to make an executive department 
sufficiently independent for it to execute the law. 
C. The Federal Constitution 
As we have seen, Americans engaged in framing state 
constitutions tended to distinguish executive power and 
prerogative. “Executive power” was a power to carry out the 
law, and it might be vested in a department that lacked 
prerogatives, in the sense of discrete, traditionally royal 
powers used to conduct government. There are textual 
signals of this distinction; for example, grants of executive 
power were usually general, while grants of prerogative 
powers were specific and defined.187 A second point about 
usage was that “prerogative” did not signal immunity from 
the power of a legislative assembly. Indeed, legislative 
assemblies in the states both regulated prerogatives and 
exercised such powers themselves by passing acts. The 
problems raised by legislative exercise of prerogative powers 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 298–99. 
 187. See, e.g., MARGARET BURNHAM MACMILLAN, THE WAR GOVERNORS IN THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 62–63 (1943); PRAKASH, supra note 1, at 73–74, 77; 
THACH, supra note 108 at 36–37. Prakash reads these general grants differently 
than I do. He maintains that their coupling with express exclusions of specific 
prerogative powers implies that the grants were of a substantive executive power 
including prerogatives, while I do not see the necessity of that reading. The 
exclusions may have been included because of a customary association of certain 
prerogatives with the office holding executive power. After all, there were also 
express inclusions of prerogative power, which would have been unnecessary had 
a grant of “executive power” simply implied prerogative. There may also have 
been disagreements, or confusion, or compromise, concerning which royal 
prerogatives were appropriate for republican executives—a possibility that 
suggests we should not simply assume express exclusions or inclusions of 
prerogative power reflect broadly shared understandings. 
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led framers to search for ways to ensure the independence of 
the executive department; and this they did not only by 
adjusting the institutional form of the office, but also by 
vesting it with prerogative powers. The difficult question, 
which continued to divide elites at the time of the 
Philadelphia convention, was which powers could be vested 
in an executive consistent with the premises of republican 
government. Most men believed that establishing a vigorous, 
independent executive department did not require rejecting 
a government in which the legislature was superior and 
possessed the greatest share of power.188 Still, certain 
prerogatives could not be vested in the executive without 
creating at least the appearance of a monarchy. Finally, 
framers did not tend to use “prerogative” to describe the 
discretion that attached itself to a power to carry the law into 
effect (that is, executive power), or to powers to act in the 
absence of the law or even against the law to protect the 
public. “Prerogative” certainly could be used to describe 
executive discretion; it just usually wasn’t. As we’ve seen, 
emergency powers found their way to legislative assemblies 
by means of powers of suspension and legislative 
adjudication. 
Drawing on this background, the men framing a federal 
constitution at Philadelphia employed “prerogative” for two 
related purposes. First, they drew on associations with 
prerogative to describe and defend an exclusive jurisdiction 
for the national government.189 As Charles Pinckney put it, 
 
 188. As Thach describes the views of the Virginia delegation, for example, “the 
executive proposed by them was essentially subordinate to the legislature. The 
fixed nature of the executive salary, the provision for ineligibility for reelection, 
and the council of revision point unmistakably towards a desire for an 
independent exercise of the executive powers. But legislative election and 
legislative determination of the major part of executive competency negated any 
idea of departmental coordination.” Id. at 84. Not everyone believed a vigorous 
executive was possible in a republic. For example, see 1 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 86 (speech of John Dickinson (June 2, 1787)) 
(Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS]. 
 189. The usage was familiar; Hamilton, writing in 1781 as “The 
Continentalist,” had complained of the states, driven by “ambition and local 
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speaking in defense of a proposed national veto over state 
legislation, “the States must be kept in due subordination to 
the nation,” and without a veto, “it wd. be impossible to 
defend the national prerogatives, however extensive they 
might be on paper.”190 “Prerogative” could be used to describe 
national powers because of the imperial connotations it still 
retained. In making his own case for a congressional veto 
over state legislation, Madison argued that “[t]his 
prerogative of the General govt. is the great pervading 
principle that must controul the centrifugal tendency of the 
States.”191 The imperial comparison expressed the need not 
only to defend properly national interests, but to harmonize 
discordant state policies and maintain order. The veto, 
Madison thought, had operated just this way in the British 
empire, where “[n]othing could maintain the harmony & 
subordination of [its] various parts . . . , but the prerogative 
by which the Crown, stifles in the birth every Act of every 
part tending to discord or encroachment.”192 And, in a long 
speech criticizing the New Jersey Plan, Madison observed 
that “omitting a controul over the States” through the veto 
left the “defence of the federal prerogatives . . . particularly 
defective.”193 The weakness of the national government 
might be used to justify withholding “every effectual 
prerogative,” a result familiar to those who had sat in the 
Confederation Congress.194 
Second, framers invoked “prerogative” to advance 
 
interests,” “constantly undermining and usurping” the “prerogatives” of “the 
FOEDERAL GOVERNMENT.” Alexander Hamilton, The Continentalist No. 1, in 
FOUNDERS ONLINE, supra note 26. 
 190. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 164 (speech of Charles Pinckney 
(June 8, 1787)). 
 191. Id. at 165 (speech of James Madison (June 8, 1787)). 
 192. 2 id. at 28 (speech of James Madison (July 17, 1787)). In contrast, the 
power of taxation was “the highest prerogative of supremacy”—another use of 
“prerogative” that alluded to the imperial crisis. 1 id. at 447 (speech of James 
Madison (June 28, 1787)). 
 193. 1 id. at 317 (speech of James Madison (June 18, 1787)). 
 194. Id. at 551 (speech of James Madison (July 7, 1787)). 
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arguments about the form national government should take. 
Which powers should be allocated to the national legislature 
and which to the national executive? Securing the 
“independence” of the executive was important, but this was 
not merely a question of what we would call today separation 
of powers; it had a federalism dimension as well. If the 
national government was going to curb the excesses of state 
legislatures, it seemed important to ask whether that should 
be done in a national legislature, a national executive, or 
even by means of a system of national courts. Thinking about 
the constitutional role of courts had developed considerably 
in the five years before 1787, to the extent that most framers 
now assumed courts would confine state legislatures to 
constitutional limits through judicial review.195 But what 
should the role of the national executive be?196 According to 
one commentator, delegate John Dickinson worried that a 
firm national executive would centralize political authority 
by “its inevitable concomitant, a bureaucracy.”197 There is 
evidence that other delegates, too, felt this concern. Although 
during the imperial crisis patriots had used “prerogative” to 
press a case for a constitution of imperial federation, linked 
 
 195. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS IN POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION, 175 (1996). 
 196. See Matthew Steilen, Judicial Review and Non-Enforcement at the 
Founding, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 479, 490, 534–67 (2014). Although the veto had 
been theorized as a device for keeping a legislature within constitutional bounds, 
most of the men at Philadelphia seemed to think of it as a defensive device for 
preserving executive power. But nearly everyone who spoke described judicial 
review in more expansive terms. 
 197. THACH, supra note 108, at 90. Dickinson connected the firmness of the 
executive and the existence of separate states in a speech on June 2. 1 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 188, at 86. Responding to this concern, Luther Martin 
remarked several weeks later, “A general government may operate on individuals 
in cases of general concern, and still be federal. This distinction is with the states, 
as states, represented by the people of those states. States will take care of their 
internal police and local concerns.” Id. at 439. Gouverneur Morris, for his part, 
was more forthright in his view that states’ “internal police . . . ought to be 
infringed in many cases, as in the case of paper money & other tricks by which 
Citizens of other States may be affected.” 2 id. at 26; see also 1 id. at 164 (speech 
of James Madison (June 8, 1787)). 
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through the Crown, reformers now sought to combine a 
national (imperial) executive with a national (imperial) 
legislature. Nationalists like James Wilson, Gouverneur 
Morris and Benjamin Franklin, who desired to establish a 
central government with powers over public finance and 
western lands, saw the Sweeping Clause as a key text, since 
it empowered Congress “[t]o make all Laws . . . necessary 
and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States.”198 Thus, even proponents of a strong executive 
envisioned that “national prerogatives” would be regulated 
by a national legislature.199 Congress would establish a 
national bureaucracy by law, articulating legal limits that 
might be enforced in a suit for damages before the courts. 
The legalization of bureaucratic power under the Sweeping 
Clause was an important concession to the tradition of 
radical English ‘country’ thinking distrustful of centralized 
state power, from which the patriots and now the Anti-
Federalists drew so much inspiration.200 From this 
perspective, a grant of prerogatives would not secure the 
President’s discretion to act outside the law—the Lockean 
theory—but, rather, as we will see, his “independence of 
judgment” within the law: his autonomy to exercise the 
legally defined powers vested in his office. Nor should there 
be worries that Congress would threaten local power, since it 
lacked “the Royal prerogative[]” to directly veto state laws, 
ensuring state control over internal police.201 
 
 198. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added); Mikhail, supra note 21, at 
1070, 1078–86, 1121–24. 
 199. See Mikhail, supra note 21, at 1078–86, 1121–24. 
 200. MAX EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE 45–46, 61–66 (2003); 
Kramnick, supra note 155, at 23–24, 30. 
 201. In place of a national veto, Madison observed, was “the general provision 
that the Constitution & laws of the U. S. shall be paramount to the Constitutions 
& laws of the States.” Letter from James Madison to W. C. Rives (Oct. 21, 1833), 
in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 521–22; 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1786–1870, at 392 (1905). 
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In designing the presidency, then, the framers used 
“prerogative” in debating which of the traditional royal 
powers of government could be vested in a national 
republican executive. But they always assumed that the 
administration of national power would be under law, and no 
one used “prerogative” to press the case for a discretionary 
authority to act outside the law. This would pose too great a 
threat to local discretionary authority and police. To see this 
in more detail, I turn first to the use of “prerogative” in the 
first debates about the national executive on June 1, early in 
the Convention. The second subsection deals with the 
mysterious exchange over Congress’s power to “make war” 
two-and-a-half months later, in mid-August. As far as we can 
tell, the exchange concerned the need for a discretionary 
authority in the President to respond to sudden attacks 
without a legislative declaration of war; yet no one, 
apparently, used the word “prerogative” to describe such a 
power. In the final subsection, I turn to the ratification 
debates, and show that disputants largely employed 
“prerogative” as the term had been used in the imperial crisis 
and the framing of the first state constitutions. The principal 
divide was over whether the executive had been given the 
necessary prerogatives to be independent, or so many that he 
was, in fact, a monarch. “Prerogative” played a role, as well, 
in supporting the Anti-Federalist case for a bill of rights, as 
we can see from the debate in the Virginia ratifying 
convention. 
1. Prerogative Powers and the Problem of the 
Independent Executive 
“Prerogative” made its first appearance at Philadelphia 
on June 1, when Resolution 7 of the Virginia Plan came up 
for discussion.202 As it was drafted, Resolution 7 was sparse, 
reflecting Madison’s own uncertainty about the executive 
 
Of course, in the Philadelphia Convention Madison had strongly supported a 
national congressional veto over state laws. RAKOVE, supra note 195, at 51. 
 202. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 64–69. 
2018] EXECUTIVE PREROGATIVE 619 
and perhaps, too, differences about the executive within the 
Virginia delegation.203 The resolution stated that “a national 
Executive” should be “chosen> by the national Legislature,” 
and possess “the executive powers of Congress &c.”204 It said 
nothing about whether the office was singular or plural, its 
tenure or the length of term. (Resolution 8, not then under 
discussion, also made the executive part of a “Council of 
Revision,” which was to possess a qualified veto over national 
law.205) Several issues surfaced during the first exchange, 
but for our purposes most important was the association by 
several delegates of particular prerogative powers with 
monarchy. Charles Pinckney began debate by speaking in 
favor of “a vigorous Executive,” but thought if it possessed 
the “Executive powers of <the existing> Congress,” including 
“peace & war,” it would “render the Executive a 
Monarchy.”206 John Rutledge, too, opposed granting the 
executive “the power of war and peace.”207 James Wilson, 
who favored a strong national executive, seems to have 
thought the objection serious. Speaking after Rutledge, he 
declared that “[h]e did not consider the Prerogatives of the 
British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive 
powers.”208 A short time later, Wilson returned to the point, 
and, writes Madison, “repeated that he was not governed by 
the British model which was inapplicable to the situation of 
 
 203. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 66, 74, 88 (views of Virginia 
Governor Edmund Randolph); THACH, supra note 108, at 81–84. 
 204. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 64. 
 205. See id. at 105. 
 206. Id. at 64–65. Historian Richard Beeman suggests that Pinckney was 
speaking in support of the President in his own plan, who was made “Commander 
in chief of the Land Forces of U.S. and Admiral of their Navy,” and granted 
powers to convene the legislature “on extraordinary occasions,” and to prorogue 
them when they could not agree on a time to adjourn; but he did not possess a 
power of initiating war or concluding peace. RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST 
MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 126 (2009); 3 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 188, at 606. It’s possible, but I see no evidence of it in 
Pinckney’s remarks. 
 207. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 65. 
 208. Id. 
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this Country.”209 Advocating a single executive officer, as 
Wilson had, was apparently close enough to “the British 
model” that it required a disavowal.210 He would assert, 
again, several days later, that “[a]ll know that a single 
magistrate is not a King.”211 Wilson favored an executive 
that had “energy dispatch and responsibility,” because he 
thought it “would be the best safeguard against tyranny.”212 
The danger during the Revolution, after all, had come from 
“a corrupt multitude,” “the parliament.”213 But energy did 
not necessitate vesting the executive with a power of war and 
peace. The only powers the executive had to possess were the 
powers “of executing the laws and appointing officers” not 
“<appertaining to . . . >“ the legislature and thus rightly 
appointed by it.214 The scope of executive powers would be 
determined by reference to the purpose of the department; 
“Extive. powers,” Wilson said, “are designed for the execution 
of Laws” and the appointment of executive officers.215 
Madison agreed. “[E]xecutive powers,” Rufus King recorded 
him saying, “ex vi termini, do not include the Rights of war 
& peace.”216 After a brief discussion, the Convention modified 
Resolution 7 to empower the executive “to carry into effect. 
the national laws [and] to appoint to offices in cases not 
otherwise provided for.”217 
 
 209. Id. at 66. 
 210. Eric Nelson has argued that Wilson understood his June 1 motion “that 
the Executive consist of a single person” to be an embrace of monarchy. NELSON, 
supra note 32, at 185. Wilson denied this very point on June 4, but the denial 
clearly did not convince Randolph and Mason. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra 
note 188, at 96, 101. 
 211. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 96. 
 212. Id. at 65, 66. 
 213. Id. at 71. 
 214. Id. at 66. 
 215. Id. at 70. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 67. Madison suggested the delegates begin by ‘defining’ what powers 
were included, and then decide on the size and form of the office. Id. at 66–67. As 
King recorded Madison, “the powers shd. be confined and defined – if large we 
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This opening exchange was conventional in substance 
and well within the range of debate on state executive 
departments. Wilson’s use of “prerogatives” clearly refers to 
traditional royal powers used to conduct government, several 
of which are identified, and not to executive discretion or 
emergency power.218 Indeed, Madison was the only delegate 
who recorded anyone using the term “prerogative” at all 
during the discussion, and at this point of the convention, he 
was still writing from memory twice a week, with the 
assistance of rough notes.219 William Pierce recorded Wilson 
as disclaiming the “powers” of “Making peace and war,” 
which “Writers on the Laws of Nations” had described as 
“legislative.”220 Rufus King recorded Madison speaking of 
 
shall have the Evils of elective Monarchies.” Id. at 70. 
 218. For a defense of the contrary position, see McConnell, supra note 5 
(manuscript at 5–8). 
 219. BILDER, supra note 59, at 61–62. Bilder notes that Madison “translated 
the speakers’ political concepts and ideas into his own terminology,” and that 
other note-takers “recorded an inconsistent variety of political concepts and 
vocabularies.” Id. at 64. The diction and organized composition of Madison’s notes 
during this debate, in particular, make a striking contrast with the diaries of 
King, Hamilton and Pierce. Copies of rough notes included with Madison’s 
manuscript can be found in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, 
1787–1870, at 34–35 (1900) [Hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. 
 220. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 73–74. The reference to 
“[w]riters on the Laws of Nations” could be taken as a reference to Locke, whose 
Second Treatise was in conversation with Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf. See 
TUCK, supra note 46, at 117–20. Yet Locke famously describes war as a 
“[f]ederative” power, not a legislative one. LOCKE, supra note 2, at 365. Other 
writers take a variety of positions. Pufendorf distinguishes “the [l]egislative 
[p]ower” and “the power of [w]ar and [p]eace” as different “[p]arts of 
[s]overeignty.” SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS, BOOK 
VII 165–66 (Oxford, Lichfield 1703). Vattel takes the position that the sovereign 
possesses both the right to enter treaties and to make war, although he observes 
that this sovereign may constituted by fundamental law either as a prince or a 
legislative assembly. With regard to treaties, in particular, Vattel observes that 
some sovereigns “are obliged to take the advice of a senate, or of the 
representatives of the nation.” EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 192–93, 
292–93 (Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson & Co. 1863); see also LOUIS HENKIN, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 297–98 n.10 (1972). It is possible, too, 
that by describing war as “legislative,” Wilson’s intent was to describe it as an 
attribute of “sovereignty,” in light of the contrast writers like Grotius and 
Pufendorf drew between sovereign lawmaking and the execution of government. 
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“Rights of war & peace &c.”221 Thus, if “prerogative” was, in 
fact, used by any speaker at all, it was used in a sense that 
made it nearly synonymous with “power.”222 The usage was 
fitted to the problem delegates faced, set by Wilson, which 
was how to make a national executive sufficiently 
independent of the legislature to ensure “a vigorous 
execution of the Laws.”223 As we have seen, the strategy 
employed in state constitutions was, in part, to vest 
particular ‘prerogative powers’ in the executive department. 
This reflected what was a longstanding association between 
prerogative and providing, as Wilson put it, “security to 
liberty.”224 But too many prerogative powers, or the wrong 
sort, and the executive would appear to be a monarch, since 
it might frustrate or corrupt the legislature.225 Wilson 
assured his audience that there was no need for a vigorous 
executive department to possess powers of war and peace. 
Indeed, an executive should not possess such a power, since, 
as “Writers on the Laws of Nations” had explained, it was a 
prerogative “of a Legislative nature.”226 The words signaled 
to men from states whose legislative assemblies possessed 
many prerogative powers that even the learned, Tory James 
 
See TUCK, supra note 46, at 1–9 (distinguishing sovereignty and government, and 
crediting to Rousseau the view that war was a power of government). Madison, 
writing later as Helvidius, cites publicist writers for the proposition that “the 
powers to declare war, to conclude peace, and to form alliances, [are] among the 
highest acts of sovereignty; of which the legislative power must at least be an 
integral and preeminent part.” JAMES MADISON, LETTERS OF HELVIDIUS, NO. 1, 
reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 66, 67 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph 
Lerner eds., 1987). 
 221. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 70. 
 222. This use of “prerogative” was familiar from the imperial crisis. Supra 
Section I.A. 
 223. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 71 (speech of James Wilson); see 
CORWIN, supra note 7, at 11–12; PRAKASH, IMPERIAL, supra note 1, at 27; RAKOVE, 
supra note 195, at 259. 
 224. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 186, at 74. Pierce’s notes also state, 
“Safety to liberty the great object.” Id. at 73. 
 225. See PRAKASH, IMPERIAL, supra note 1, at 17 (observing that “[c]ertain 
powers . . . were said to make a single executive a monarch.”). 
 226. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 65, 74. 
2018] EXECUTIVE PREROGATIVE 623 
Wilson, might be an ally.227 No one on June 1 was advocating 
for the creation of an executive discretion immune from law; 
the thrust was exactly the opposite. 
The discussion of the council of revision and an executive 
veto power assumed much the same form. On the morning of 
June 4, Wilson finally prevailed on the Convention to make 
the executive unitary.228 The next issue up for discussion was 
the Council of Revision described in Resolution 8. The 
Council, which comprised the executive and “a convenient 
number of the National Judiciary,” was proposed to have a 
power to examine and reject every act of the national 
legislature.229 Elbridge Gerry thought the proposal 
problematic, since judges sitting on the Council would 
already possess a power of expounding the laws in cases that 
came before them, and thus (on occasion) “deciding on their 
Constitutionality.”230 In place of the Council, Gerry proposed 
that the executive “have a right to negative any Legislative 
act,” subject to legislative override.231 Wilson thought Gerry 
did not “go far enough,” as “a distinct & independent” 
“Exetiv” required “an absolute negative.”232 Hamilton 
agreed.233 The pace of proposals came fast, and other 
delegates expressed concern at the shape the national 
executive was assuming. Pierce Butler of South Carolina 
professed he “had been in favor of a single Executive 
Magistrate,” but had he known it would possess “a compleat 
negative on the laws,” “he certainly should have acted very 
differently.”234 George Mason agreed. “We are Mr. Chairman 
 
 227. On Wilson’s reputation as a stiff pedant with Tory sympathies, see 
BEEMAN, supra note 206, at 129–35. 
 228. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 93, 97. 
 229. Id. at 21. 
 230. Id. at 97–98. 
 231. Id. at 98. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 100, 109. 
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going very far in this business. We are not indeed 
constituting a British Government, but a more dangerous 
monarchy, an elective one.”235 The threat of a veto would 
enable the executive to control the legislature, a practice 
inconsistent with “the Genius of our People wh. is 
republican.”236 Again, only Madison records any of these 
delegates using the word “prerogative.” This time he puts it 
in his own mouth, speaking against an absolute veto. “To 
give such a prerogative would certainly be obnoxious to the 
<temper of this country; its present temper at least.>“237 
The debate over the veto was inconclusive on June 4, but 
still the discussion does something to reveal why delegates 
distinguished the veto from other prerogative powers like 
appointment. The issue was not the nature of the veto power. 
Madison did not mention the distinction between 
prerogatives “of a Legislative nature” and those “strictly 
Executive,” which he had drawn several days earlier, though 
it would have advanced his cause, as the veto was in an 
obvious way legislative rather than executive.238 Apparently 
the distinction had no purchase on the fourth, if it ever had 
any; after disapproving of an absolute veto, the delegates 
also voted to reject a more executive-like substitute, a power 
of suspension.239 Instead, delegates concerned about the veto 
focused on its application to corrupt the legislature, by 
requiring that it abandon a policy favored by the community, 
consent to desired appointments, or even that it pay the 
executive.240 Without the benefit of a council, there was no 
 
 235. Id. at 101. 
 236. Id. at 107–08. 
 237. Id. at 100. In Farrand’s edition, language enclosed in angle brackets was 
added after the Convention had concluded, as late as 1819. See id. at xvi–xix. In 
this case, Madison inserted the text to replace other text that he struck out and 
rendered illegible. See 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 219, at 57. 
 238. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 65–66. 
 239. Id. at 103–04. 
 240. Franklin suggested that the veto would be used as it had in proprietary 
Pennsylvania, to extract special benefits that enriched the governor. Id. at 99, 
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reason to think the views of the executive should be superior 
to “the decided and cool opinions” of “the best men in the 
Community,” sitting together in an august national 
legislature.241 This veto would likely function something like 
the modern Senate’s filibuster, keeping government 
“clogged” until private interests could be gratified, rather 
than “expeditiously executed” as Pierce Butler desired.242 It 
was because the negative empowered the executive to 
corrupt legislative judgment that it was “obnoxious” to the 
republican “genius” or “temper” of the people. When the veto 
came up for discussion again, several months later, Wilson 
succeed by insisting that where an executive did not possess 
the “formidable” powers of the British King—his other 
prerogatives—he did not pose this threat.243 The legislature 
would be far more powerful than the executive, and thus pose 
the real danger of tyranny.244 In essence, the dispute was 
which prerogatives had to be vested in the executive for the 
desired “vigor,” but which could not be without creating an 
appearance of monarchy and a threat of corruption. The line 
was contested, and it would remain so for some time.245 
 
106, 109. Mason used the same logic, applying it to appointments. Id. at 101. 
Butler worried more generally that the veto would feed a “constant course of 
increase” in executive power “in all countries.” Id. at 100. It was for this reason, 
Roger Sherman explained in the United States Congress several years later, that 
the Convention “prohibited the President from the sole appointment of all 
officers,” since the British Crown had used “that prerogative” “to swallow up the 
whole administration” and by its “influence . . . upon the Legislature” subject 
Parliament “to its will and pleasure.” 3 id. at 357 (1789) (statement of Roger 
Sherman in the House of Representatives). 
 241. 1 id. at 98, 99. 
 242. Id. at 109. 
 243. 2 id. at 301. 
 244. Id. at 298, 300–01. Gouverneur Morris, too, argued that “[t]he British 
Executive has so great an interest in his prerogatives and such powerful means 
of defending them that he will never yield any part of them. The interest of our 
Executive is so inconsiderable & so transitory, and his means of defending it so 
feeble, that there is the justest ground to fear his want of firmness in resisting 
incroachments.” Id. at 76. 
 245. That the Constitution could generate these conflicting appearances was 
well expressed by Jefferson in a letter to Massachusetts Attorney General James 
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2. War Power, Invasion and Discretion 
A resolution instituting a national executive was 
approved on June 4 and delivered to a committee of detail on 
July 23.246 The office consisted of a single person, and enjoyed 
powers to execute the national laws and appoint executive 
officers. What the committee reported to the convention on 
August 6, however, was quite different.247 It added a number 
of prerogative powers, although it vested them primarily in 
the legislature. Thus, the committee’s draft gave the Senate 
a “power to make treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors, and 
Judges of the supreme Court.”248 Congress was empowered 
“To make war.”249 The Senate’s foreign policy prerogatives 
remained in that body until the end of August, when the 
“Committee of eleven” transferred them to the President.250 
The war prerogative remained in Congress, although the 
convention had earlier made one important, and very famous 
change. 
 
Sullivan. Jefferson wrote, 
Where a constitution, like ours, wears a mixed aspect of monarchy and 
republicanism, it’s citizens will naturally divide into two classes of 
sentiment, according as their tone of body or mind, their habits, 
connections, and callings induce them to wish to strengthen either the 
monarchical or the republican features of the constitution.  ome will 
consider it as an elective monarchy which had better be made 
hereditary, and therefore endeavor to lead towards that all the forms 
and principles of it’s administration. Others will [view it] as an energetic 
republic, turning in all it’s points on the pivot of free and frequent 
elect[ions]. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Sullivan (Feb. 9, 1797), in 29 PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON: 1 MARCH 1796 TO 31 DECEMBER 1797, at 289 (Barbara B. 
Oberg ed., 2002). 
 246. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 129, 132. 
 247. E.g., McConnell, supra note 5, at 24 (“On a range of issues, the Committee 
did not hesitate to exceed the instructions of the Convention. It added many 
provisions . . . . It even adopted provisions inconsistent with the votes of the 
Convention.); see 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 177, 182, 183, 185. 
 248. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 183. 
 249. Id. at 182. 
 250. Id. at 493, 495. The Committee of Eleven is sometimes delightfully called 
the “Committee on Postponed Parts.” 
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On August 17 the convention changed the power “To 
make war” to a power “To declare war.”251 It is difficult to 
understand precisely why. Here we really are, as Justice 
Jackson put it, divining meaning “from materials almost as 
enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret 
for Pharaoh.”252 Madison’s record of the debate preceding the 
alteration is almost certainly incomplete, as his notes 
degraded appreciably in the second half of August.253 
Unfortunately, the completeness of the notes is relevant to 
our study here. What was absent, apparently, from 
deliberations over the draft’s allocation of war power was the 
word “prerogative.” There was certainly reason to invoke the 
concept. Pinckney opened the discussion by complaining that 
a legislature was “too slow” to make war.254 If ever there was 
an occasion to invoke the Lockean prerogative to justify 
cleaving the war power so as to ‘leave’ an unregulated 
discretion for the President, here it was. Yet Madison made 
no mention of the concept when he proposed substituting 
“declare” for “make,” with the aim, he said, of “leaving to the 
Executive the power to repel sudden attacks.”255 Several 
days later, members debated the draft’s handling of the 
treaty power, but again omitted any mention of prerogative, 
despite one delegate’s description of the President as “the 
general Guardian of the National interests,” a paternal 
image often associated with the King.256 
It is a mistake to hang much on omissions in the records 
of the Philadelphia Convention, but here we should couple 
 
 251. Id. at 319. 
 252. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. V. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 
634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). As Arthur Schlesinger remarked about the 
discussion, which he placed at the beginning of his own book, “no one really quite 
knows what this exchange meant.” SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 4. 
 253. BEEMAN, supra note 206, at 292; BILDER, supra note 59, at 122–25. 
 254. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 318. 
 255. Id.; see Scigliano, supra note 1, at 245. 
 256. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 540–41; see DUBBER, supra note 
130, at 16–20, 29. 
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the omission with several other acts the convention took, of 
which we possess a positive record. The President’s power to 
repel sudden attacks must be read alongside an allocation of 
emergency power that actually resembles structures 
employed under early state constitutions. The convention 
empowered the national legislature “to provide for calling 
forth the militia” to, among other things, “suppress 
insurrections and repel invasions.”257 Although it denied 
Congress (and state legislatures) the power to pass bills of 
attainder or ex post facto laws, two devices state legislatures 
had used in emergencies, Congress was authorized to 
establish military tribunals or courts to try offenses in 
similar circumstances.258 Congress could also suspend the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus “in cases of rebellion or 
invasion.”259 Suspension in eighteenth-century English 
practice was a parliamentary power, exercised by passing 
temporary statutes to secure public safety.260 Thus, if we set 
aside the carve-outs for bills of attainder and ex post facto 
laws, the Constitution’s allocation of emergency power 
assumes Congress is competent to regulate and even trigger 
the response of the national government to emergencies 
involving a breakdown in civil authority.261 The Revolution’s 
primary lesson appears to have been a narrowing of the 
forms by which a legislature should act; it could not exercise 
emergency power itself, for example, by trying and 
condemning rebels in the assembly by means of a bill of 
attainder, but should delegate that power by establishing an 
appropriate tribunal and body of law. Where governmental 
 
 257. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see Reinstein, supra note 5, at 302. 
 258. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9–11, 18; id. art. I, §§ 9–10. 
 259. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
 260. Halliday & White, supra note 14, at 613–28, 670–71, 674–76. According 
to the authors, “[b]y suspending the action of law, Parliament . . . in effect 
captured the royal prerogative.” Id. at 622. This was the tradition of legislative 
control over law in times of emergency in which the American revolutionaries 
had operated and which the framers of the Constitution largely continued. 
 261. See, e.g., CORWIN, supra note 7, at 152–69. 
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officers exceeded their authority to meet an emergency, 
Congress did retain a quasi-judicial power to judge that 
necessity on petition and to indemnify the officer if it thought 
his action justified by passage of a private bill.262 Lastly, it 
might impeach and convict the officer. Although a Lockean 
theory of ‘discretionary’ prerogative might have justified 
exclusively vesting these powers in a national executive, the 
convention instead preserved a central role for the national 
legislature in handling emergencies and approving the use of 
armed force. Indeed, the decision to vest Congress with 
powers to provide for the “defense of the republic” would play 
an important role in federalists’ support of the proposed 
Constitution during ratification.263 
3. The Place of “Prerogative” in the Ratification Debates 
The public debate over ratification of the Constitution, 
both in print and in the ratification conventions, drew on 
senses of “prerogative” familiar from the imperial crisis. 
Despite the presence in Philadelphia of Wilson, Hamilton 
and other proponents of a vigorous executive, “prerogative” 
seems to have found more use during ratification than 
during framing itself. It was not a term reserved for use by 
lawyers, or one whose appeal was limited to lawyers, but a 
familiar component of Whig orthodoxy. Writing early in the 
ratification process, “A True Friend” reminded both the 
“advocates for the new federal constitution” and their 
“antagonists” that “the liberties and the rights of the people 
 
 262. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Adler, supra note 1, at 384–88; James E. 
Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification 
and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1062, 
1929–31 (2010); Wilmerding, supra note 1, at 324–29. The framers’ embrace of 
what Adler’s calls “retroactive ratification” is not eo ipso an embrace of legalism 
or rule of law simply because it the legislature does the ratifying; it is vesting 
discretionary authority in a popular assembly, to be exercised after the fact, in 
the form of approval or disapproval of the prior conduct of an officer. Supposing 
this definition, it is unclear whether Adler will still agree that it was consistent 
with the American constitutional system, given the place he accords to law in his 
construction of that system. 
 263. EDLING, supra note 200, at 99. 
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have been always encroached on, and finally destroyed by 
those, whom they had entrusted with the powers of 
government,” who “in [their] nature” were continually 
“encreasing . . . their prerogatives” and “prolonging . . . the 
term of their function.”264 This was the classic constitutional 
scheme. “A.B.,” responding to the Anti-Federalist “Brutus” in 
the pages of the Hampshire Gazette, counseled against 
taking it too far; unlike a monarchy, where the principle 
“may be admitted as true in general,” in a government 
“strictly elective and popular,” like the proposed federal 
government, instead of “extending the prerogative and 
incroaching on or abridging the rights of the states or of the 
people,” the government would “underact” where “popular 
rumour” challenged it.265 Other writers showed how the old 
prerogative-v.-privilege frame had adapted itself to an 
emerging American doctrine of popular sovereignty. In its 
jurisdiction-constituting sense, the prerogative belonged to 
the people. “It is the prerogative of freemen,” wrote “The 
Landholder,” “to determine their own form of government,” 
and thus to settle the form “of the American empire.”266 
Although “the right of granting exclusive charters” had been, 
“in all old countries,” “considered as one principle branch of 
prerogative,” it now belonged to the people, who should not 
approve the Constitution without inserting “a restraining 
clause, which might prevent the Congress from making any 
such grant.”267 This prerogative should remain with the 
 
 264. A True Friend, RICHMOND, Dec. 5, 1787, in 14 DHRC, supra note 138, at 
373–74. 
 265. A.B., HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, Jan. 9, 1788, in 5 DHRC, supra note 138, at 
671. 
 266. The Landholder X, CONN. COURANT, Mar. 3, 1788, in 16 DHRC, supra note 
138, at 304–05; see also Statement of Thomas FitzSimons, 2 DHRC, supra note 
138, at 73 (stating, on the question of whether the Pennsylvania Assembly should 
call for a ratification convention, “it is my wish, that the legislature should take 
the lead and guide the people into a decent exercise of their prerogative”); A 
Delegate Who Has Catched Cold, VA. INDEP. CHRON., June 25, 1788, in 10 DHRC, 
supra note 138, at 1683 (describing “all peoples existing on the earth and the 
nations” as possessing “their prerogatives and their government”). 
 267. Agrippa VI, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 14, 1787, in 4 DHRC, supra note 138, at 
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people. From one point of view, the proposed Constitution 
threatened this prerogative—a point, fittingly enough, that 
could itself be expressed by describing the national 
government as an unconstitutional form of “prerogative.” 
According to “Cato Uticensis,” for example, the delegates in 
Philadelphia had “proposed to you a high prerogative 
government, which, like Aron’s serpent, is to swallow up the 
rest,” dissolving the government’s formed by the people in 
their states.268 
“Prerogative” was invoked, as well, in discussion of 
whether the convention had designed an appropriately 
independent executive power. Usage in this sense largely 
continued the constitutional framework that had emerged 
during the state framing process and which also 
characterized deliberations at Philadelphia. Executive power 
alone was usually distinguished from prerogative.269 Specific 
prerogative powers had been added to executive power to 
insulate the department from legislative interference. Anti-
Federalists thought the porridge too hot, and that this 
‘President’ was in reality a king; as “Tamony” observed, 
 
428. 
 268. Cato Uticensis, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Oct. 17, 1787, in 8 DHRC, supra note 
138, at 73 (emphasis added). 
 269. See, e.g., A Farmer, PHILADELPHIA FREEMAN’S J., Apr. 23, 1788, in 17 
DHRC, supra note 138, at 134 (identifying as a “general principle[]” that “[t]he 
power of making rules or laws to govern or protect the society is the essence of 
sovereignty, for by this the executive and the judicial powers are directed and 
controuled.”). For an important exception to this view of executive power, rooted 
in the Take Care Clause, see William Symmes, Jr. to Peter Osgood, Jr. (Nov. 15, 
1787), in 14 DHRC, supra note 138, at 113–14 (“That there must be an executive 
power independent of ye. Legislative branch, appears to have been generally 
agreed by ye. fabricators of modern Constitutions. . . . But was ever a commission 
so brief, so general, as this of our President? Can we exactly say how far a faithful 
execution of ye. Laws may extend—or what may be called, or comprehended in, 
a faithful execution? . . . Should a Federal act happen to be as generally expressed 
as ye. President’s authority, must he not interpret ye. act? For in many cases he 
must execute laws independently of any judicial decision.—And should ye. 
Legislature direct ye. mode of executing ye. laws, or any particular law, is he 
obliged to comply, if he did not think it will amount to a faithful execution? For 
to suppose that ye. Legislature can make laws to affect ye. office of ye. President, 
is to destroy his independence, & in this case to supersede ye. very constitution.”). 
632 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  66 
although the “president is treated with levity and intimated 
to be a machine calculated for state pageantry,” in reality 
“his great prerogatives” gave him “more supreme power, 
than Great Britain allows her hereditary monarchs.”270 
Particularly alarming was his command “of a standing 
army,” which was “unrestrained by law or limitation.”271 
“Brutus” was equally concerned about the President’s power 
to enter treaties with the approval of the Senate, which, 
under the Constitution, would be “the supreme law of the 
land”—a power greater than that possessed by the British 
King, who could not alter the law of the land.272 “An Old 
Whig” thought the President possessed every “important 
prerogative the King of Great Britain is entitled to,” and that 
subjecting such an office to election was, in fact, “dangerous,” 
violating conventional wisdom about the instability of 
nations with “an elective King.”273 But to Edmund Pendleton, 
these concerns were overblown. “The President is indeed to 
be a great man,” he conceded, but this was only “to represent 
the Federal dignity & Power”; in substance, the office had “no 
latent Prerogatives, nor any Powers but such as are defined 
and given him by law.”274 Although he was made 
commander-in-chief of the army and navy, “Congress are to 
raise & provide for them, & that not for above two years at a 
time.”275 He could nominate officers, but required the Senate 
to appoint them, and anyway “Congress must first creat[e] 
the offices & fix the Emoluments, and may discontinue them 
 
 270. Tamony, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 9, 1788, in 8 DHRC, supra note 138, at 
287. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Brutus, VA. INDEP. CHRON., May 14, 1788, in 9 DHRC, supra note 138, at 
801–02. 
 273. An Old Whig V, PHILADELPHIA INDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov. 1, 1787, in 13 
DHRC, supra note 138, at 541–42. On the authorship of the Old Whig essays, 
which consisted of a team of leading Pennsylvania ‘Constitutionalists,’ see id. at 
376. 
 274. Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Oct. 8, 1787), in 8 DHRC, supra 
note 138, at 354. 
 275. Id. 
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at pleasure.”276 Pendleton repeated the same point several 
months later in a letter to Richard Henry Lee, who opposed 
ratification but did not attend the state’s convention. “His 
powers are defined, & not left to latent Prerogatives—they 
none of them appear too large,” excepting perhaps the pardon 
and the treaty power.277 Pendleton thus leaned heavily on 
contrasting types of prerogative; “prerogatives undefined,” as 
existed under the British constitution, and prerogatives 
limited by law and the need for support from the 
legislature—a distinction others drew as well.278 Pendleton’s 
efforts did not prevent Henry and Mason from leading an 
attack in the ratifying convention on a presidency they 
thought conferred “too much power”—so much, they said, as 
to invite “foreign countries to interfere in his election.”279 
There was notably little hysteria over the President’s 
veto prerogative. Some Anti-Federalists doubted the veto 
would be used, citing the example of the British monarch,280 
 
 276. Id. 
 277. Edmund Pendleton to Richard Henry Lee (June 14, 1788), in 18 DHRC, 
supra note 138, at 182. 
 278. 10 DHRC, supra note 138, at 1196 (statement of Edmund Pendleton in 
the Virginia Convention (June 12, 1788)); see also John Brown Cutting to William 
Short (Dec. 13, 1787), in 14 DHRC, supra note 138, at 477 (“[T]he powers of a 
senate and house of representatives as marked out by the american constitution-
woud more than counter-ballance those even of an hereditary President—whose 
prerogatives and authorities were definite, supported & circumscrib’d by law-
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treaties—prorogations dissolutions and sudden conventions of a Septennial 
House of Commons . . . .”). 
 279. PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 
1787–1788, at 286 (2010); see also PRAKASH, supra note 1, at 20. 
 280. E.g., Brutus, supra note 272, at 800; Centinel II, PHILADELPHIA FREEMAN’S 
J., Oct. 24, 1787, in 13 DHRC, supra note 138, at 464 (“Even the king of England, 
circumstanced as he is, has not dared to exercise it for near a century past.”). 
Federalists made this point as well, arguing from the British example that the 
power would not be abused. See, e.g., 9 DHRC, supra note 138, at 922 (statement 
of George Nicholas in the Virginia Convention (June 4, 1788)) (“[T]here is scarcely 
an instance, for a century past, of the Crown’s exercising its undoubted 
prerogative, of rejecting a bill sent up to it by the two Houses of Parliament.”). 
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while others maintained it was inappropriate in a 
government where the executive did not possess “the 
sovereignty of the nation,” as the British King did.281 
Defenses emphasized that Massachusetts had already 
granted its executive a veto, and that the nation’s President 
would be a person of great public virtue.282 Much more 
heated was the debate over the need for a bill of rights, a 
debate in which “prerogative” played an important role in the 
Virginia Convention. As Pauline Maier has described, 
Patrick Henry’s “persistent demands that the Constitution 
needed a bill of rights could not be dismissed” and on several 
occasions nearly derailed the Virginia convention.283 English 
experience proved the need for explicit, clear guarantees of 
liberties. “The people of England lived without a declaration 
of rights,” Henry observed, until Charles “made usurpations 
upon the rights of the people.”284 The King had been able to 
do so because “rights were in a great measure before that 
time undefined,” and their measure “depended on 
implication and logical discussion.”285 It was only when the 
English “Bill of Rights put an end to all construction and 
implication” that liberty was made secured, “by defining the 
 
 281. The Impartial Examiner IV, VA. INDEP. CHRON. June 11, 1788, in 10 
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 284. 10 DHRC, supra note 138, at 1212 (statement of Patrick Henry in the 
Virginia Convention (June 12, 1788)). 
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rights of the people, and limiting the King’s prerogative.”286 
The key point for Henry was the general or undefined 
character of the prerogative, in which “every possible right 
which is not reserved to the people by some express provision 
or compact, is within the King’s prerogative.”287 Over time, 
rights were “reserved to the people,” by efforts to “enumerate 
the exceptions to his prerogative.”288 Henry returned to the 
point repeatedly; several days later, he observed again that 
“the prerogative of the King, and the frequent attacks on the 
privileges of the people,” made clear the “necessity of 
excluding implication.”289 George Mason, who also pushed 
for the necessity of a bill of rights, thought common law had 
supplied the necessary limits. It was the “common law,” 
Mason averred, that had “prevented the power of the crown 
from destroying the immunities of the people.”290 Although 
Virginia had received the common law by statute, the 
proposed federal Constitution made no provision for the 
common law. Absent some such guarantee, there was 
nothing to keep the President and Senate from, said Mason, 
“a dismemberment of the empire,” selling off territory or 
even a state—a “prerogative” prohibited to the British 
monarch.291 
The invocation of “prerogative” complicated, to some 
degree, the federalist response to Henry and Mason’s 
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demand for a bill of rights. The stock reply was that the 
grants of power to the federal government were few and 
defined, obviating any need for an explicit reservation of 
rights. A written constitution, defining the powers of the 
executive department, would itself secure liberty against 
prerogative.292 Yet the Constitution did grant the executive 
certain prerogatives; thus, if “prerogative” was understood to 
entail a broad discretion to act to protect the public, the 
limited nature of federal authority would offer little 
protection from tyranny. “A True Friend” insisted that, 
“[n]otwithstanding Mr. Wilson’s assertion, that every thing 
which is not given up by this federal constitution, is reserved 
to the body of the people; that security is not sufficient to calm 
the inquietude of a whole nation.”293 Not only was there a 
need for a bill of rights, explained “A Delegate who has 
Catched Cold,” but for one “so expressive, so clear, and at the 
same time so short, as never to require either comment or 
interpretations.”294 Defenders of the Constitution adopted 
several different responses. Some, like Pendleton, drew a 
distinction between the general and undefined character of 
the prerogatives of the British King, at least historically, and 
the particular, limited and legal prerogatives granted to the 
 
 292. 9 DHRC, supra note 138, at 1092, 1135–36 (statement of George Nicholas 
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President and the Congress under the Constitution.295 Other 
Federalists maintained that English charters, petitions, bills 
and other such guarantees were largely symbolic and had 
done little to actually limit monarchical power—pointedly 
reversing the valence of patriot thinking during the imperial 
crisis. In an undelivered speech, William Cushing, a delegate 
to the Massachusetts Convention, observed that “Bills of 
rights originated in ancient despotic times; in the times of 
despotic Kings, whose prerogatives were boundless & whole 
will alone was law.”296 In response to the conduct of King 
Charles, “Ld. Coke & others drew up a bill of rights,” “[b]ut 
it was of no consequences, for no sooner had he assented to 
the bill of rights than he trampled the whole under foot.”297 
As Pendleton put this point, adopting the English Bill of 
Rights as a model for this country was “humiliating & 
unsafe,” because, first, the people would be accepting from an 
“Agent of their Power a Charter of their rights,” and, second, 
such an origin “admits a Power in the Donor to take away,” a 
source of “mischief” that explained Magna Charta’s 
“numerous Ratifications.”298 The presence of prerogative 
powers in the Constitution thus forced federalists to 
characterize “prerogative” as legally limited and to 
subordinate it to the sovereignty of the people. 
The Federalist letters brought largely the same 
arguments to the debate over ratification in New York.299 In 
Number 26, Hamilton adopted the familiar framing on an 
establishment Whig in describing the effect of the Glorious 
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Revolution on the royal prerogative to raise armies. “Inroads 
were gradually made upon the prerogative, in favour of 
liberty,” he wrote, “[b]ut it was not ‘till the revolution in 
1688” that liberty “was completely triumphant,” secured by 
a requirement in the Bill of Rights that the prerogative be 
exercised with the consent of Parliament.300 In Number 47, 
Madison identified the other prerogative powers 
traditionally exercised by the King, including “the 
prerogative of making treaties,” appointing judges, and 
“put[ting] a negative on every law,” in the course of 
examining how the British constitution mixed the functions 
of government, a pattern early state constitutions had 
followed.301 ‘Paper’ constitutional boundaries between the 
departments had proved insufficient to maintain the 
functional distinctions that did exist, and thus, in Number 
48 Madison turned, famously, to providing “some practical 
security for each, against the invasion of the others.”302 The 
“executive power,” in particular, “being restrained within a 
narrower compass, and being more simple in its nature,” had 
been victimized by legislative assemblies, rendering it 
“dependent,” an account Madison then illustrated by citing 
Jefferson’s discussion of Virginia government in Notes on the 
State of Virginia.303 What was required, in the case of the 
executive department, was to increase “the constitutional 
rights of the place” to the point they were “commensurate to 
the danger of attack.”304 Madison was building the 
conventional case for returning royal prerogatives to the 
executive to insure its independence, a case he left to be 
 
 300. Publius, The Federalist 26, N.Y. INDEP. J., Dec. 22, 1787, in 15 DHRC, 
supra note 138, at 66. 
 301. Publius, The Federalist 47, N.Y. INDEP. J., Jan. 30, 1788, in 15 DHRC, 
supra note 138, at 500–04. 
 302. Publius, The Federalist 48, N.Y. Packet, Feb. 1, 1788, in 16 DHRC, supra 
note 138, at 4. 
 303. Id. at 5–6. 
 304. Publius, The Federalist 51, N.Y. INDEP. J., Feb. 6, 1788, in 16 DHRC, supra 
note 138, at 44. 
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concluded by Hamilton in the last of the essays.305 In 
Number 69, Hamilton undertook to demonstrate that the 
convention had not given the executive powers by which it 
could dominate or corrupt the national legislature, by 
comparing its powers to those of the British monarch.306 He 
began with the qualified veto, which he contrasted with the 
King’s “prerogative,” an absolute negative, but likened to the 
weaker “revisionary authority of the council of revision of 
this State [i.e., New York], of which the governor is a 
constituent part.”307 He turned, then, to the other 
prerogative powers vested in the national executive, 
including command of the army, navy and militia; the 
pardon; the power to adjourn the national legislature in 
limited cases; and the power to make treaties with the 
concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate.308 Comparing each 
with its analogue royal prerogative, as described by 
Blackstone, Hamilton concluded that the President was not, 
in fact, nearly as powerful as the British king. The argument 
was tendentious (as many understood, Blackstone’s chapter 
on prerogative both overstated the monarch’s constitutional 
power and understated its political power), but the same 
position had been advocated three months earlier in New 
York by “Americanus,” and by writers in other states as 
well.309 Most disputants agreed on the premise—the need for 
 
 305. See SOFAER, supra note 10, at 51, 56 (describing the aim of The Federalist 
as defending a vigorous, independent executive department with sufficient 
powers to avoid legislative control). 
 306. Publius, The Federalist 69, N.Y. PACKET, Mar. 14, 1788, in 16 DHRC, 
supra note 138, at 388. 
 307. Id. at 388–92. 
 308. Id. at 388–92. 
 309. See Americanus IV, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 5–6, 1787, in 19 DHRC, 
supra note 138, at 359–59 (“The most effectual way, perhaps, of effacing these 
gloomy fears from our minds, is to compare the distribution of power made by 
this Constitution, with the distribution of power which has taken place in the 
Government of Great-Britain. . . .”). For another example of this argument, again 
made some three months before Hamilton published Federalist 69, see Cutting 
to Short, supra note 295, at 477 (“[s]elect the king of this monarchic republic 
Britain-and compare his powers and prerogatives with those of our President.”). 
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an “energetic Executive”—since, as Hamilton put it in 
Federalist 70, “A feeble executive implies a feeble execution 
of the government,” and a feeble execution “is but another 
phrase for a bad execution.”310 The conventional strategy for 
making an executive energetic was to grant it certain 
prerogative powers. This is what the proposed Constitution 
did; the powers it vested in the national executive—
negotiating with foreign powers, preparing plans of finance, 
arranging the army and navy, directing the operations of 
war—were “most properly understood” as part of “the 
administration of government.”311 A government with such 
prerogative powers was necessary, Hamilton reasoned, for 
“the security of liberty”—an idea of central importance, 
which with Hamilton had opened the letters in Federalist 
1.312 
Finally, in Number 84, Hamilton answered the 
argument in favor of a bill of rights based on the English 
experience with prerogative. He began by acknowledging the 
usual view that “bills of rights are in their origin, 
stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgments 
of prerogative in favor of privilege.”313 But these agreements 
“have no application to constitutions professedly founded 
 
The debate about who was more powerful, the President or the British King, was 
common and usually carried out by comparing prerogatives and ‘influence’ over 
legislation. On the defects of Hamilton’s comparison in The Federalist, see 
NELSON, supra note 32, at 217–19; PRAKASH, IMPERIAL supra note 1, at 21; 
SOFAER, supra note 10, at 45, 51; Reinstein, supra note 5, at 267–69, 288–96. 
 310. Publius, The Federalist 70, N.Y. PACKET, Mar. 15, 1788, in 16 DHRC, 
supra note 138, at 396. 
 311. Id. at 612. The idea that prerogatives were powers necessary for the 
administration of government was, as we have seen, invoked during the imperial 
crisis. See supra Section I.A. When applied to these powers, the term 
“prerogative” was hardly, as Richard Pious describes it, a “forbidden term.” Pious, 
supra note 1, at 69. 
 312. Publius, supra note 310, at 451; see also id. at 91 (“the vigour of 
government is essential to the security of liberty”). On the association of 
“prerogative” and liberty, see supra Section I.B. 
 313. Publius, The Federalist 84, N.Y. PACKET, July 29, 1788, in 16 DHRC, 
supra note 138, at 128. 
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upon the power of the people,” since “in strictness, the people 
surrender nothing; and as they retain every thing they have 
no need of particular reservations.”314 There was no attempt 
to meet the argument that the grant of prerogative powers to 
the executive might be understood to convey broad, 
discretionary powers to protect the public—a suggestion, 
apparently, in no need of a response. 
II. USING “PREROGATIVE” TO CONSTRUCT ARTICLE II 
“Prerogative” had no single meaning for early 
Americans. It had multiple meanings, which grew out of the 
different uses to which the term could be put in political, 
legal and constitutional argument. While those uses drew on 
a law of prerogative and English political writings of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Americans did not 
typically treat the term as a technical one, in the sense that 
it was strictly bound by English theorizing. American usage 
did not conform to the expositions of Blackstone or Locke, 
although Blackstone’s catalogue of royal prerogative powers 
clearly influenced American thinking and did so to a degree 
far beyond Locke’s theory of prerogative. If the term had a 
core connotation for Americans, it was something like ‘strong 
government’ or ‘rights to government.’ They used 
“prerogative” to press a case for self-government, republican 
government and vigorous government, in each case to secure 
their rights. 
The constitutional arguments described above also 
suggest some principles useful for own constructions of 
Article II and its relationship to Article I. These, as I said at 
the outset, are not meant to provide answers to concrete 
questions about executive power. The first two principles I 
have in mind function something like canons, constraining 
our interpretation of the constitutional text, while the last is 
really a set of values for guiding analysis within the larger 
 
 314. Id. at 130. 
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context of emergency power. The first principle is that we 
should distinguish prerogative from executive power in the 
constitutional context (as opposed to, say, in political 
writings or legal treatises). The grant of executive power in 
the Article II Vesting Clause may be a substantive power, 
but, other considerations aside, it should be understood as a 
grant of the power to carry out the law, not prerogative 
power. Second, there is nothing about “prerogative” per se 
that immunizes it from legislative regulations. We should 
presume that presidential prerogatives are defeasible. Yet, 
in light of the functions that executive prerogatives serve, 
there must be some limits to legislative powers. I suggest 
two. Congressional regulation of presidential prerogatives 
should not compromise the President’s independence of 
judgment. Moreover, since a principal purpose of vesting 
prerogative powers in the President was to create a vigorous 
government capable of securing liberty and protecting 
property, courts should interpret his prerogative powers in 
ways that advance this purpose. The last principle I take 
from the discussion above is that we should generally 
presume that Locke has little to tell us about how our 
Constitution provides for meeting emergencies. The early 
American approach to emergencies involved both legislative 
and executive branches in a way that ensured emergency 
government remained a government of law and responsible 
for its actions. Although important elements of this approach 
have been displaced, the present statutory framework 
regulating emergency power, as well as the leading judicial 
framework set out in the Steel Seizure Case, continue to 
reflect the political values behind it. 
A. Prerogative and Executive Power 
As we have seen, Americans engaged in framing 
constitutions distinguished “executive power” from 
“prerogative.” They used “executive” in what has been called 
2018] EXECUTIVE PREROGATIVE 643 
its “principal,” “primary,” “precise” or “dictionary” sense.315 
Why should Americans distinguish “executive power” and 
“prerogative” in this context, when in political tracts, legal 
treatises and similar texts, “the executive” and “executive 
powers” could be used in ways that included prerogative 
power?316 Americans drew such a distinction when, and to 
the extent that, they thought it necessary for the project of 
framing a vigorous republican executive, for showing 
doubters that such a form of government was possible. In this 
context, it was crucial to distinguish traditional executive 
offices, which (like the King’s) might possess prerogatives, 
from the executive governmental function, and the powers 
necessary to discharge that function adequately. For 
example, the famous Essex Result, in which the delegates of 
Essex County, Massachusetts explained their rejection of a 
proposed state constitution, uses “executive” in both these 
senses within the same paragraph, describing first an 
“internal executive power, which is employed in the peace, 
security and protection of the subject and his property, and 
in the defence of the state.”317 In this sense, the aim of 
executive power was “to enforce the law, and to carry into 
execution all the orders of the legislative powers,” and, 
perhaps, to protect the instruments of civil government 
against the rebellious.318 In contrast, war, treaty and the 
prerogatives of the British King relating to foreign nations 
were categorized as powers of “the external executive,” and 
which the federal Constitution would assign to the 
legislature.319 
Thus, when James Wilson remarked that “[h]e did not 
consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper 
 
 315. MANSFIELD, supra note 16, at 130–49; PRAKASH, IMPERIAL supra note 1, at 
65, 84–86, 108; Adler, supra note 1, at 380; Wilmerding, supra note 1, at 334. 
 316. See, e.g., PRAKASH, IMPERIAL supra note 1, at 31. 
 317. The Essex Result, in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 112, 117 (Philip B. 
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
 318. See id. 
 319. Id. 
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guide in defining the Executive powers,” his concern was the 
function (here, “Executive” is used adjectivally, not 
nominally, as in ‘the Executive’s powers’); and his point was 
that in defining the powers necessary to execute the law (the 
function), one should not look to the traditional prerogatives 
of the office of the British King.320 The only prerogative 
necessary to carry out the law was, said Wilson, the 
appointment of executive officers.321 On this point—the 
meaning of executive power—Wilson’s principal opponent, 
Roger Sherman, was necessarily agreed, remarking that “the 
Executive magistracy [was] nothing more than an institution 
for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect.”322 The two 
disagreed as to whether the executive should carry out the 
law according to his own, independent judgment; and 
whether, to this end, the office should be vested with 
prerogative powers. Madison’s suggestion that the delegates 
“fix the extent of the Executive authority” by identifying 
powers “in their nature Executive,” was, similarly, a 
suggestion that they use executive function as a guide to 
fixing the powers of a national executive office, including any 
prerogatives.323 
Naturally there is room to contest too firm a distinction 
between uses of “prerogative” and “executive power,” even in 
the relatively narrow context of late eighteenth-century 
constitutional framing. But assume, for a moment, that the 
balance tilts in favor of drawing such a distinction and 
consider what follows. The Vesting Clause of Article II vests 
“the executive power” in a President serving for a term of four 
years.324 What does this mean? Is it a substantive grant of 
power or merely a requirement that the office be held by a 
 
 320. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 65 (emphasis added). 
 321. Id. at 66 (“The only powers he conceived strictly Executive were those of 
executing the laws, and appointing officers, not <appertaining to and> appointed 
by the Legislature.”). 
 322. Id. at 65. 
 323. Id. at 66–67. 
 324. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
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single person for a length of four years?325 To a considerable 
degree, the perceived stakes of this debate are a result of 
conflating executive power with prerogative.326 If “executive 
power” includes prerogative, and “prerogative” includes a 
discretion to act in the absence of law or even contrary to law, 
then the grant of executive power in the Vesting Clause is a 
mighty thing indeed. Its scope will almost certainly be 
settled by the President alone, and one struggles to imagine 
any President narrowing the power in the face of a crisis, or 
even threats of the kind almost constantly present.327 As the 
scope of this power pushes outward, it gradually loses its 
resemblance to executive power (the power to carry out the 
law), and increases its resemblance to an absolute power 
whose only substantive limit is, as Locke required, 
promoting the public good.328 The idea that such a thing 
 
 325. PRAKASH, IMPERIAL supra note 1, at 63 (describing the debate). See 
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 48–50 (1994) and Prakash, supra note 17, at 713–20, for 
representative positions. The former argues that the Vesting Clause fixes the 
title of the national executive and makes it a singular office while the latter 
argues that the Vesting Clause is a substantive grant of power, including 
“executive power” in a strict sense and prerogative powers traditionally 
associated with executives. 
 326. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952); 
id. at 640–41 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The Solicitor General seeks the power of 
seizure in three clauses of the Executive Article . . . Lest I be thought to 
exaggerate, I quote the interpretation which his brief puts upon it: ‘In our view, 
this clause constitutes a grant of all the executive powers of which the 
Government is capable.’ If that be true, it is difficult to see why the forefathers 
bothered to add several specific items, including some trifling ones.”); CORWIN, 
supra note 7, at 7–8; CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP 12–13 
(1948); Wilmerding, supra note 1, at 321–22. 
 327. As Justice Jackson memorably put this proposition, “emergency powers 
would tend to kindle emergencies.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 650 (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 328. LOCKE, supra note 2, at 375 (“Many things there are, which the Law can 
by no means provide for, and those must necessarily be left to the discretion of 
him, that has the Executive Power in his hands . . .”). See Louis Fisher, The 
Unitary Executive and Inherent Executive Power, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 569 (2010) 
for a more in-depth discussion on the tendency of this power to become absolute. 
Fisher argued that assertions of inherent power—power deriving from the 
executive office itself—”move a nation from one of limited powers to boundless 
646 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  66 
could be lurking in the Vesting Clause has seemed to many 
outrageous. 
If the Vesting Clause merely vests the President with a 
power to carry out the law, however, less is at stake. The 
power vested by the clause is still significant. That the 
President possesses executive power in this “dictionary” 
sense does not imply, as Harvey Mansfield suggested, that 
he is merely “an errand boy.”329 A grant of executive power 
conveys with it considerable discretion. The discretion is 
considerable, but not unbounded; it is bounded by its 
purpose, which is carrying out the law. 
That a grant of power to carry out the law must convey 
with it a discretion of considerable scope becomes apparent 
when one considers what the task involves. Legal accounts 
of executive power describe some of its key elements: 
interpreting the law, issuing orders or administrative rules, 
and using force.330 Each requires an exercise of discretion in 
the sense of choice.331 Officers and executive attorneys must 
interpret laws open to a range of reasonable constructions; 
executive agencies are tasked with developing rules within 
broad statutory frameworks, whose details have been left 
open to allow agencies to determine how best to implement 
the legislative mandate, subject in recent decades to 
increasing supervision and review through the Executive 
 
and ill-defined authority.” Id. at 589. 
 329. MANSFIELD, supra note 16, at 2–3. Chief Justice Vinson similarly referred 
to the “messenger-boy” conception of presidential power. Youngstown, 343 U.S. 
at 708 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
 330. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) (“Interpreting a law 
enacted by Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of 
‘execution’ of the law.”); CORWIN, supra note 7, at 141–61 (discussing executive 
interpretation, use of force); MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 159, 316, 318 (2d ed. 2013) (interpretation, execution, and 
non-prosecution). 
 331. See Cary Coglianese & Christopher S. Yoo, Introduction: The Bounds of 
Executive Discretion in the Regulatory State, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1591–1605 
(2016); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. 671, 696–98 (2014). 
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Office of the President.332 Presidents themselves engage in 
rulemaking using executive orders and guidance 
memoranda, and thereby “set national policy on a wide range 
of issues.”333 Executive discretion arises, as well, from limits 
imposed by fixed resources and time, which require agencies 
to establish enforcement priorities.334 Relatedly, sometimes 
law enforcement officers decide to “crack down” on an 
offense, directing additional resources to the enforcement of 
those laws.335 The result of these kinds of policies is a partial 
non-enforcement of the law, the scope and content of which 
may settled by administrators balancing a range of 
 
 332. Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 
1044–45 (2013); Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 21, at 2295–97, 2307–08; 
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 224, 2248–50 
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 335. Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31, 42–48 (2017). 
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factors.336 For similar reasons, a President vested with the 
power to carry out the law enjoys a discretion to prohibit a 
prosecution from being initiated, or to direct the entry of a 
nolle prosequi, as do United States Attorneys.337 The 
President might also forbid a prosecution because he judges 
it inequitable in the circumstances, or because it conflicts 
with other enforcement priorities.338 
These forms of executive discretion are well-known to 
legal scholarship. My purpose here is not to intervene in this 
literature, but to observe a distinction, immanent in most 
accounts, between executive discretion and the Lockean 
prerogative. Executive discretion is suited to problems of 
application and administration of a complex system; it 
requires a capacity, for instance, to adapt a general rule (or 
set of rules) to particular circumstances, or to ensure that the 
law as carried out will be adequate for legislative 
purposes.339 Lockean prerogative, in contrast, is triggered by 
 
 336. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985) (“First, an agency 
decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a number of 
factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the agency must not only 
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ordering of its priorities.”); CORWIN, supra note 7, at 144 (stating a similar 
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 338. See, e.g., The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, supra note 331, at 52. 
 339. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABROGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO 
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sudden change, and in particular those changes that 
threaten to destroy or seriously impair the state, where the 
costs of acting by law are thought to be too great to 
tolerate.340 This conceptual distinction is evident in a range 
of institutional differences. In the former case, Congress can 
set the scope of discretion as it sees fit; it can leave law open 
or highly general, and allow the President or administration 
to develop policies within the law’s scope that are fitted to 
the circumstances; or Congress can narrow the law, even 
overturning some executive policies post hoc using the 
Congressional Review Act.341 Thus, it is unsurprising to 
discover that a conception of executive discretion as 
delegated legislative power was common in early America.342 
In contrast, a constitutional power to act in the absence of 
law or to violate the law during an emergency is, by 
definition, beyond the power of Congress to regulate. 
Perhaps, then, we should read Madison’s anger over the 
“Pacificus” letters not as stemming from Hamilton’s 
suggestion that the Vesting Clause conferred a substantive 
 
supra note 331, at 675. A related idea is that executive power includes a quasi-
equitable authority to interpret and give effect to the law in a way that makes it 
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power at all, but that it implied a power to abrogate a treaty 
because the President believed the peace and security of the 
United States to be in danger.343 The discretion conferred by 
a grant of executive power did not extend to ignoring the law 
during an emergency, and to suggest it did could endanger 
the ability of the legislature to effectively regulate executive 
power. 
The only prerogative framers thought necessary for the 
President to exercise executive power was appointment.344 
This suggests that we should the Article II Vesting Clause 
and the Appointments Clause together, as jointly conferring 
“executive power.” From this perspective, the executive 
power vested by the Constitution in the President is best 
described as a power of his administration to carry out the 
law. We can discern something, as well, about the President’s 
relationship to this administration from the contrast 
Americans drew between prerogative and executive power. 
The clearest cases of powers the President must exercise 
personally, like the pardon and the veto, are prerogatives 
conveyed by enumerated grants of power.345 The Vesting 
Clause, however, is a general grant of power, which is 
consistent with a view that the President’s primary role in 
carrying out the law is supervisory, rather than personal. 
The examples of early presidents directing or forbidding 
prosecutions, adduced by proponents of a ‘unitary theory’ of 
executive power, do nothing to evidence an understanding 
that the President could personally execute the law, by 
standing in place of a ‘line officer’ or prosecutor over a 
significant period of time, in contrast to making periodic 
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executive magistrate is to execute laws, as that of the legislature is to make 
laws. . . . A treaty is not an execution of laws: it does not presuppose the existence 
of laws. It is, on the contrary, to have itself the force of a law, and to be carried 
into execution, like all other laws, by the executive magistrate.”). 
 344. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 188, at 66. 
 345. See Relation of the President to the Executive Departments, 7 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 453 (1855), in POWELL supra note 337, at 131, 138; CORWIN, supra note 7, at 
94–96; Mashaw, supra note 345, at 695–96. 
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interventions.346 To be sure, supervision may include explicit 
instruction, as in the case of cabinet Secretaries exercising 
powers conferred on the President by law, or officers 
discharging statutory duties to take direction from the 
President.347 In other cases, however, the offices to which 
individuals are appointed themselves convey an organic 
discretion, shaped by professional norms, the culture of the 
agency and what Bruce Wyman called its “internal law,” 
which makes the discharge of that office something more 
than an exercise of mere political discretion.348 
Constitutionally inferior officers are perhaps most likely to 
enjoy this kind of professional discretion, but Congress may 
 
 346. Compare STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY 
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 49, 60–61 (2008), 
with Peter M. Shane, The Originalist Myth of the Unitary Executive, 19 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 323, 327–29, 345 (2016), Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the 
Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was 
Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 585–90, 637 (1989), and Harold J. Krent, 
Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 
38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 286–90 (1989). PRAKASH, IMPERIAL supra note 1, at 29 
describes an occasion “when all the secretaries were away from the capital, [and] 
all departmental matters were transmitted to the president for his decision,” but 
this shows only the President issuing orders, which no one would doubt his 
authority to do, not standing in for (say) line prosecutors. Even exercising 
military power, although President Washington (himself a former general) 
“marched with the militia,” he did not command them during the encounter with 
the Whiskey rebels, but, as Prakash puts it, “execut[ed] the tax laws from afar.” 
Id. at 99. On this use, however, “executing the tax laws” is functionally 
indistinguishable from directing that they be executed by someone else. 
 347. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165 (1803); Jerry Mashaw, 
Governmental Practice and Presidential Direction: Lessons from the Antebellum 
Republic, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 659, 665, 667, 668–69, 675 (2008). 
 348. BRUCE WYMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW GOVERNING 
THE RELATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 4, 16 (1904); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119 YALE L.J. 
1362, 1368–73 (2010); cf. The President and the Accounting Officers, supra note 
331, at 29, 30 (arguing that the Constitution assumes the President will not 
personally exercise certain line offices); Mashaw, supra note 345, at 681–87 
(describing a series of Wirt opinions on this issue). A related case, which Krent 
and Shane have described, is the legislative vesting of executive power in officers 
over whom the chief executive has no control whatsoever. See Krent, supra note 
346; Shane, supra note 346, at 345–47. 
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explicitly provide it by statute for principal officers as well.349 
Though they may be “executive,” the nature of these offices 
seems to require that the President’s authority be 
supervisory in a looser sense, so that explicit instruction is 
generally disfavored or even prohibited by procedural rules—
and, in cases where the President himself has an interest, 
politically explosive.350 
B. Regulating and Interpreting Prerogative Powers: The 
Example of the Take Care Clause 
The power of the legislature to regulate prerogative was 
emphasized by many American writers during the imperial 
crisis. The prerogative they invoked was “prerogative under 
law,” or “legal prerogative,” rather than “high prerogative” or 
 
 349. See Mashaw, supra note 345, at 677–78, 683, 695 (“No President [in the 
first seventy-five years under the Constitution] seems to have claimed that the 
President has authority to exercise personally the statutory jurisdiction of an 
officer empowered by Congress to make a particular decision or take a particular 
action.”); Metzger, supra note 332, at 1881, 1883 (describing a principle of 
“hierarchical superintendence,” under which the President supervises primarily 
principal officers, but there is not “broad presidential control” of inferior officers). 
 350. An example of procedural guidelines regulating the investigation of 
federal crime, a purely executive function, are the Attorney General’s Guidelines 
for the FBI. See John T. Elliff, Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI 
Investigations, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 785, 786, 793–94 (1984) (describing the 
adoption of the “Levi Guidelines”). These guidelines do not expressly bar 
presidential involvement with prosecutions, but as one commentator recently 
noted, they form part of a web of formal and informal norms insulating the work 
of the Department of Justice from political interference. Benjamin Wittes, Trump 
and the Powers of the American Presidency (Part I), LAWFARE BLOG (May 25, 2016, 
3:44 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-and-powers-american-presidency-
part-i (“The Justice Department has some institutional defenses against 
[presidential, politically motivated interference] . . . They mostly do not reside in 
statute or in the sort of complex oversight structures [characteristic of 
intelligence gathering]. They reside in the Levi Guidelines, in certain normative 
rules about contacts between the Justice Department and the White House, in 
norms that have developed over the years in the FBI. And they reside in the 
hearts of a lot of replaceable people.”). The paradigm of a politically explosive 
presidential interference with a purely executive function is, of course, the 
Saturday Night Massacre during Watergate. See Strauss, supra note 332, at 972–
74, 984. 
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“absolute power.”351 This idea was essential to self-
government, whether under royal charter or constitution, 
since prerogative powers could be employed to deprive 
persons of liberty and property.352 An absolute (irregulable) 
prerogative would make it impossible for a person to use his 
property and freedom as he might hope and reasonably 
expect to do—it would make him, in the language of the 
framing generation, a “slave,” someone subject to the 
arbitrary will of another.353 This suggests that we should 
presume prerogative powers are defeasible; nothing about 
how Americans used “prerogative” implies that, as Abraham 
Sofaer suggested, “the executive could take any action falling 
within the prerogative on its own responsibility, without 
consulting [the legislature] in advance.”354 Vesting a power 
in an independent department surely implies that the 
department may decide for itself when to exercise the 
power.355 Nevertheless, we should presume that the scope of 
the power and procedures for exercising it may be settled by 
legislative regulation, and subject to post hoc investigation 
or even adjudication. This the Constitution expressly 
recognizes in the Sweeping Clause and impeachment 
provisions of Article I.356 
The texts reviewed above also suggest important limits 
to the regulability of prerogative, in addition to a 
requirement of reasonableness that courts have attached to 
Congress’s implied powers. If prerogative powers were added 
 
 351. WORMUTH, supra note 18, at 69–71, 74–77 (discussing a royalist theory of 
high prerogative and “reason of state” that entailed the King should be free of the 
law); Oakley, supra note 18, at 323–24, 326–27, 343 (describing the evolution of 
a distinction between “absolute” and “ordinary” powers of the King). 
 352. See supra Section I.A. 
 353. See ALAN TAYLOR, AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS: A CONTINENTAL HISTORY, 
1750–1804 115–19 (2016). 
 354. SOFAER, supra note 10, at 14. 
 355. See Matthew Steilen, Collaborative Departmentalism, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 
345, 359 (2013). 
 356. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; id. art. II, § 4. 
654 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  66 
to the executive department to ensure its independence from 
the legislature, with the goal of making government 
“vigorous” and securing liberty, then the legislature’s 
regulation of these prerogatives should not compromise this 
independence. The degree to which regulation compromises 
the independence of the President may differ depending on 
the prerogative power in question. For example, the veto was 
thought to be the primary device by which the President 
could resist congressional encroachment on his office. Any 
legislative limitations of the veto would impair this purpose 
and be presumptively impermissible. Pardons, too, might be 
used defensively against federal investigation or 
prosecutions that undermined the President’s constitutional 
authority; a regulation of the pardon that, say, prohibited its 
corrupt use or prevented it from impairing private rights 
would need to be construed in ways that preserved its 
defensive use.357 In contrast, the President’s power to initiate 
armed conflict is of less use in defending the executive power 
against congressional interference, and therefore regulations 
of that power would be generally permissible, the chief 
exception being an interference with command. It follows, 
then, that some of the presidential prerogatives are 
regulable to a greater degree than others. If we were to 
describe a scale of defeasibility, the veto might occupy one 
end and the Commander-in-Chief clause the other. 
This principle can also be applied with some benefit to 
the rather enigmatic Take Care Clause, whose text requires 
that the President “take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed,” and to which the Supreme Court has pinned a 
medley of constitutional doctrines.358 Some of these doctrines 
 
 357. On such limits to the British King’s prerogative to pardon, see, e.g., 
JUDSON, supra note 18, at 36, 38. This approach would permit legislative 
regulation of the presidential pardon, in contrast to the view taken by the 
Supreme Court in Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866) and Schick v. Reed, 
419 U.S. 256, 262–63 (1974). 
 358. See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 
164 U. PA. L. REV. 1835, 1836–37 (2016). 
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are manifestly in tension with one another: for example, the 
clause is said to prohibit a presidential prerogative to 
“suspend” the law or grant “dispensations,” as English Kings 
once asserted an authority to do, but also to grant the 
President a discretion not to prosecute or enforce the law.359 
This state of affairs leads the authors of a recent article to 
plead for a careful judicial construction of the clause, 
although, as we have seen, contrariety or polarity was typical 
of eighteenth-century arguments about prerogative, and its 
presence in the doctrine may evidence the continuing 
influence of such arguments on the Court’s construction of 
the clause.360 Particularly relevant to the discussion here are 
what might be called ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dimensions of 
the Take Care Clause. Internally, the clause has been used 
to describe the President’s relationship to the 
administration, and, in particular, his power to remove 
executive officers for failing to faithfully execute the law.361 
This is the Take Care Clause as the missing ‘Removal 
Clause.’ Externally, the clause has been cited as the basis of 
a “protective power” in the President to safeguard the 
property of the United States and its officers, even absent 
law authorizing such action.362 In this respect, the Take Care 
Clause empowers the President to protect the “peace of the 
nation” by shielding its government and instrumentalities 
from attack.363 
 
 359. Id. at 1838, 1863. 
 360. See supra Part I. 
 361. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 
503–04 (2010); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926); Metzger, supra 
note 332, at 1875–79. 
 362. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63–68 (1890); Monaghan, supra note 332, at 61–
70. This is much like what The Essex Result described as the “internal executive 
power” to act “in defence of the state.” See The Essex Result, supra note 317, at 
117. 
 363. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 582 (1895); Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 395 
(1879) (stating that government has the power to “command obedience to its laws, 
and hence the power to keep the peace to that extent.”); see also Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 691 (1952) (Vinson, J. dissenting) (“As 
we understand the doctrine of the Neagle case, and the cases therein cited, it is 
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Both dimensions describe familiar royal prerogatives. It 
is thus consistent with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence to 
treat the Take Care Clause as primarily a grant of 
prerogative power.364 (Unlike the Court, however, I would 
distinguish Take Care from the Article II Vesting Clause, 
which I read as a grant of executive power, not prerogative.) 
A presumption that presidential prerogatives are intended to 
ensure the independence of the office, vigorous government 
and a concomitant security of liberty and property can be 
fashioned not only as a limit on the regulatory power of 
Congress, but also as an interpretive canon for use by courts. 
We might put this canon as follows: “Interpret presidential 
prerogatives so as not to defeat the purpose of vesting them 
in the executive: to strengthen government and thereby 
protect liberty and property.” Applied to the ‘internal’ 
dimension of the Take Care Clause, the canon provides 
support for the judicial rule that the President enjoys an 
absolute removal power over officers central to the execution 
of federal law.365 
 
clearly this: The Executive is authorized to exert the power of the United 
States when he finds this necessary for the protection of the agencies, the 
instrumentalities, or the property of the Government.”) (emphasis in original) 
(quoting Brief of Solicitor General John W. Davis); Publius, supra note 310, at 
396 (“[A] vigorous executive is . . . not less essential . . . to the protection of 
property against those irregular and high handed combinations, which 
sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice to the security of liberty 
against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction and of anarchy.”). 
 364. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 171 (describing the King as 
“conservator of the peace of the kingdom”); 1 id. at 175 (“erecting and disposing 
of offices”); see also 4 BACON, supra note 55, at 174 (noting the King’s prerogative 
in creating offices). 
 365. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691–92 (1988) (“[W]e simply do not 
see how the President’s need to control the exercise of that discretion is so central 
to the functioning of the Executive Branch as to require as a matter of 
constitutional law that the counsel be terminable at will by the President.”). It is 
consistent, as well, with the (old) rule that officers exercising quasi-legislative 
power may enjoy good-cause tenure, at least on the assumption that they are not 
tasked with executing government. This was the principle of Wiener, at least prior 
to Morrison. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1958) (“The claims 
were to be adjudicated according to law, . . . by a body that was entirely free from 
the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either the Executive or the 
Congress.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). The principle admittedly 
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Applied to the ‘external’ dimension of the clause, the 
canon also makes sense of a presidential “protective power” 
in cases where the instruments of civil government are under 
attack. The President’s take-care duty is to safeguard the 
personnel and property of government itself, preserving the 
peace of the United States and the concomitant security of 
private liberty and property that follows from government.366 
Note the distinction with the Lockean prerogative power; the 
presidential “protective power” is not a general power to act 
in the absence of statutory law or against law during an 
emergency, but merely a power to protect civil government 
during such an emergency, guaranteeing peace by 
vindicating government under law.367 So constructed, the 
Take Care Clause gives the President a key role in securing 
the benefits of government. Insofar as the preservation of 
peace by government is at its center, the presidential office 
lies not in the intellectual tradition of Machiavelli or the 
Lockean “supream executive,” armed with a discretion to act 
against law, but that of Erasmus, who urged that “the 
Prince’s first and most important objective is to strive his 
utmost to preclude any future need for the science of war,” 
and to secure liberty and property by means of ordinary 
justice and police.368 
Considering the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dimensions 
together, the picture that emerges is of a clause that 
describes the President’s special relationship to government 
itself. The Take Care Clause captures the chief sense in 
 
does little to explain why such protections should also extend to officers with 
quasi-judicial powers, whose ‘independence’ is clearly accounted for by a policy 
that it is desirable to insulate their decisions from the effects of partisanship. 
 366. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. at 65–66; Monaghan, supra note 332, at 61. 
 367. Monaghan, supra note 332, at 70. Mortenson’s “republican prerogative,” 
though framed more broadly, amounts largely to a protective power of 
government. See Mortenson, supra note 1, at 75–76. 
 368. JOHN GITTINGS, THE GLORIOUS ART OF PEACE: FROM THE ILLIAD TO IRAQ 105 
(2012). See Bruff, supra note 1, at 13 and MANSFIELD, supra note 16, at 247–78, 
for a discussion on Lockean and Machiavellian approaches to the American 
presidency. 
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which the President is the head of government. One 
eighteenth-century usage of “take care” signaled the 
patriarch’s superintendence of a complex household, in 
which the father did not exercise the functions of household 
members himself, but was entrusted with ensuring that 
everyone played his or her part, thereby securing the welfare 
of them all.369 This superintendence required supervision, 
removal of those who did not play their role or who 
understood that role on terms fundamentally inconsistent 
with the patriarch, an occasional direct intervention, and the 
defense of the household itself against threats. This 
prerogative, captured best by the idea of ‘ensuring peace by 
government,’ is perhaps the core value of the Take Care 
Clause. 
C. The Constitutional Structure of Emergency Power 
In an important article, political scientist Robert 
Scigliano traced the influence of Locke on constructions of 
American executive power to the publication of Edward 
Corwin’s monograph, The President: Office and Powers.370 
Scigliano asserted that Corwin was the first modern scholar 
to advance the hypothesis that executive power included a 
Lockean prerogative, and that one could observe in the 
political science literature on the presidency after 1941 a 
dramatic rise in discussions of Locke. Although he did not 
offer an explanation as to why Lockean prerogative suddenly 
found such a large audience, a plausible hypothesis is surely 
 
 369. A classic example of this usage occurs in a letter from leading Virginia 
planter William Byrd II to Charles, earl of Orrery. Describing his plantation, 
Byrd writes, “I have a large Family of my own, and my Doors are open to Every 
Body, yet I have no Bills to pay . . . Like one of the Patriarchs, I have my Flocks 
and my Herds, my Bond-men and Bond-women, and every Soart of Trade 
amongst my own Servants, so that I live in a kind of Independence on every one 
but Providence. However . . . I must take care to keep all my people to their Duty, 
to set all the Springs in motion and to make every one draw his equal Share to 
carry the Machine forward.” Letter from William Byrd II to Charles, Earl of 
Orrery (July 5, 1726), in 32 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIO. 26, 27 (1924). 
 370. Scigliano, supra note 1, at 237. 
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that it answered a need for security that the time impressed 
on all who were living through it. Locke “constitutionalized” 
executive power, placing it for the most part under the rule 
of the legislature, but allowing also for an emergency 
prerogative in cases where the state was threatened with 
extinction.371 As another commentator observed of the post-
war period, the United States’ “new role as the world’s 
dominant superpower fed an obsession with crisis,” involving 
us in an unending series of armed conflicts around the world 
in which national security was thought to be at stake.372 
Having normalized a state of emergency, the Constitution’s 
grant of executive powers became a natural repository for 
emergency power.373 
Another political scientist writing around the same time, 
Lucius Wilmerding, described a very different view of 
emergency power.374 The root of the idea was a concept of 
high office he attributed to the framers. As Wilmerding 
explained it, the framers “thought it incumbent on those who 
accept great charges to risk themselves on great occasions, 
when the safety of the nation or some of its very high 
interests were at stake.”375 Yet, he continued, “they never 
confounded acts which the law says may be lawfully done in 
a case of necessity with acts done in violation of the law for 
the public good.”376 The latter were illegal. If, however, an 
 
 371. See MANSFIELD, supra note 16, at 203–04, 258. 
 372. Lobel, supra note 1, at 1400–04. 
 373. Id. at 1404–05; see also STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 77–88, 109–114 (2015) (arguing that the Cold War brought about 
a change in the construction of war power and presidential authority to initiate 
conflict). Lobel saw the leading academic expression of this view as Clinton 
Rossiter’s book Constitutional Dictatorship, which was published several years 
after the first edition of Corwin’s monograph. ROSSITER, supra note 326, at 12–
13. In contrast to the argument that I have developed here, Lobel describes 
Locke’s theory of prerogative as representative of the views of early Americans. 
Lobel, supra note 1, at 1392. 
 374. Wilmerding, supra note 1, at 322–24. 
 375. Id. at 322 (“high office” is my term). 
 376. Id. at 322–23. 
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officer immediately informed Congress of his action, a “full 
investigation” was performed, and Congress agreed that 
there had been an “urgent necessity as he professes,” then it 
was “the duty of the Congress to sanction his illegal act—if 
damages have been recovered against him, to indemnify him 
for those damages.”377 
Our study of “prerogative” provides some support for 
Wilmerding’s characterization of early American views, and 
thus for the historiographical thesis that American 
conceptions of emergency power have changed markedly over 
time. As I have argued, that Americans distinguished 
“executive power” from “prerogative” suggests that they did 
not constitutionalize the Lockean prerogative. Nor did early 
Americans generally use “prerogative” when describing 
governmental power to respond to emergencies.378 Above we 
saw the example of Virginia Governor Patrick Henry, who 
sought assistance from the state’s General Assembly in 
dealing with a request that he remove loyalists from a 
certain county, reminding the assemblymen that, as “the 
executive power” was “not competent to such a purpose, I 
must beg leave to submit the whole matter to the general 
Assembly, who are the only Judges how far the methods of 
proceeding directed by Law, are to be dispensed with on this 
occasion.”379 When, at another time, Henry went ahead and 
removed such individuals merely on the advice of his privy 
council, the legislature indemnified him.380 These examples 
can be readily multiplied.381 
What relevance does the early American approach to 
 
 377. Id. at 324. 
 378. See supra Section I.B. 
 379. Letter from Governor Patrick Henry to the Speaker of the House of 
Delegates, Benjamin Harrison (May 27, 1778), in 1 OFFICIAL LETTERS OF THE 
GOVERNORS OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 282, 282–83 (H. R. McIlwaine ed., 1926). 
 380. Bill Indemnifying the Executive for Removing and Confining Suspected 
Persons, in JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 120, at 119. 
 381. See MACMILLAN, supra note 187, at 83; PRAKASH, IMPERIAL supra note 1, 
at 94; Wilmerding, supra note 1, at 323–29. 
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emergency power have for us today? What relevance can it 
have, given the present dangers of terrorism, global 
instability and anti-liberalism? At the very least, we can take 
two things from the early American approach to emergency 
power. First, their approach suggests a presumption of 
institutional “joint action” in emergencies, involving the 
President and Congress, rather than a regime of executive 
unilateralism.382 While our procedures and institutions have 
changed, the modern statutory framework continues to 
reflect this institutional presumption, as well as the political 
values that lie behind it. Second, the early American 
approach to emergency power also suggests an active role for 
courts of law, namely, safeguarding a regime of “joint action” 
in emergencies. 
First, the presumption of “joint action.” We should begin 
by acknowledging that the early American regime 
Wilmerding describes of illegal action followed by legislative 
indemnity has largely been displaced. Judicial doctrines of 
official immunity protect officers from tort liability in many 
cases, and there is no longer a significant practice of 
congressional indemnification.383 Assuming, as I think we 
should, that these developments are unlikely to be reversed, 
older practices remain important for what they can reveal of 
how Americans went about preserving important political 
values in times of crisis. The legislature’s establishment of 
an administration and ex ante regulation of executive powers 
helped to ensure the continuance of civil government under 
law when an emergency unfolded. Consultation, 
 
 382. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism 
and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During 
Wartime, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND 
COMPLACENCY 161, 162 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005). 
 383. See, e.g., William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL. L. 
REV. 45, 51–61 (2018); Pfander & Hunt, supra note 262, at 1868. As Baude 
observes, police officers today are generally indemnified against liability arising 
out of their work; my point is that indemnification does not take the form of a 
special act passed by the legislature in response to a petition, as it did in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
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investigation and adjudication before and afterwards made 
executive officers responsible to the people’s representatives 
for their exercise of governmental power. An officer seeking 
indemnity was, in the words of one early representative, 
“throw[ing] himself upon the justice of his country,” much as 
he might before a jury in a parallel action for wrongful 
arrest.384 
These political values—government under law and 
responsible government—are reflected today in a series of 
framework statutes that continue to marry executive 
discretion with various forms of legislative supervision, 
regulation and control. The War Powers Resolution, the 
National Emergencies Act and the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act together define “national emergency” 
and require the President to exercise his constitutional 
powers by following a set of procedures.385 The statutes are 
afforced by doctrinal limits on the use of executive orders, 
which reflect a view that the President is under law even in 
conditions of emergency.386 The War Powers Resolution 
requires, further, that the President inform Congress when 
practicable before introducing the armed forces into 
hostilities, and it obligates him to continue reporting to 
 
 384. Wilmerding, supra note 1, at 326 (quoting 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 516 (1807)) 
(statement of Representative Barnabas Bidwell). 
 385. See War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (2012), for the definition 
of national emergency triggering the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers. 
“The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce 
United States Armed Forces into hostilities . . . are exercised only pursuant 
to . . . (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its 
territories or possessions, or its armed forces.” Id.; see also National Emergencies 
Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2012) (authorizing the President to declare national 
emergencies as defined under “Acts of Congress authorizing the exercise . . . of 
any special or extraordinary power”); International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2012) (limiting presidential emergency authority to “any 
unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial 
part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy 
of the United States”). 
 386. See McConnell, supra note 5, at 48 (stating that the President may not, 
by executive order or proclamation, change the law or affect legal rights); Price, 
supra note 331, at 689–95. 
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Congress for the duration of conflict.387 Despite the perennial 
controversy that surrounds these acts (and in particular the 
War Powers Resolution), the framework they establish 
continues the early American preference for institutional 
“joint action” in emergencies.388 Congress also uses its 
powers of investigation to subpoena government officers to 
testify about threats, attacks and governmental 
responses.389 This contributes to a process of “disclosure” and 
“public judgment” of executive conduct.390 
Historically Congress has also used its power to 
retroactively ratify illegal executive conduct.391 Although it 
is perhaps more controversial, we should presume that 
Congress may also ratify presidential violations of the War 
Powers Resolution and other statutes regulating emergency 
responses. The lesson of the Cold War is that national 
security risks can generate irresistible pressures to discover 
the Lockean prerogative lurking within ordinary executive 
power.392 In contrast, a practice of legislative ratification 
enables Congress to exercise discretion in responding to 
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emergencies. Ratification preserves a role for Congress after 
the fact, lessening the need for excessive ex ante delegations 
or a doctrine of executive unilateralism. The price, of course, 
is publicly acknowledging illegal conduct by the United 
States President. Whether one is willing to pay the price will 
depend on the value one places on firm limits on executive 
power.393 
The second lesson we can take from early American 
approaches to emergency power is that it supports a role for 
courts of law. Once we divorce executive power from the 
Lockean prerogative, it becomes easier to describe a 
reasonable use of judicial power in marking its limits.394 In 
part, this role consists of adjudicating civil damages claims 
against executive officers, although, as I mentioned, this is 
now tempered by official immunity doctrines. There is also 
the possibility of prospective injunctive relief, although there 
is concern about the nationwide scope of injunctions and we 
may see this form of relief trimmed as well.395 Yet courts can 
also play a role in enforcing a constitutional regime of “joint 
action.” As a number of commentators have observed, this 
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does not require that courts decide whether the executive has 
violated constitutionally protected rights, but that they 
determine in the course of adjudicating a case or controversy 
whether Congress has authorized the executive’s conduct, 
thus guarding the vision of an “institutional process” 
involving both branches.396 The role is what one should 
expect, if one assumes presidential prerogatives are 
generally regulable. In exercising its own war powers and in 
regulating the President’s commander-in-chief powers, 
Congress has established by law regular procedures for the 
exercise of these powers, and these are precisely the sort of 
limits that courts of law are institutionally equipped to 
enforce, in contrast to measuring an exercise of Lockean 
prerogative against the President’s assertion that it 
ultimately served the public good. 
This brings us to the Steel Seizure Case. Fortunately, 
there is no need to add a lengthy discussion to the many 
excellent treatments of the case already in existence. My 
point is a relatively narrow one: that the early American 
political values and modern institutional roles just described 
are also at work in Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence.397 
Jackson’s premise, recall, is that the Constitution must 
“integrate the dispersed powers” of the Congress and the 
President “into a workable government.” Governing requires 
that the branches be ‘interdependent’ and they exercise 
‘reciprocal’ powers, that is, that they act on one another. In 
one sense, however, the branches are not perfectly 
coordinate, since, as Jackson frames it, the President’s power 
“fluctuates” depending on what Congress has already done. 
The formulation gives Congress what one former executive-
branch attorney has described as “legal priority.”398 By 
creating an administrative structure and specifying the 
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procedures through which the President can exercise his 
powers, Congress ensures that presidential action is under 
law—a concept Jackson described as “free government.”399 
The courts then ensure the President is made responsible for 
his action. From this perspective, the significance of 
Jackson’s three categories is that they are described in the 
language of standards of judicial review, ranging from 
deferential to strict. The framework thereby establishes 
judicially workable standards for examining the exercise of 
powers whose scope is necessarily in flux. The effect is very 
different from a regime based on Lockean executive power, 
which also fluctuates, but whose contours are unilaterally 
determined, incapable of being regulated by law, judicially 
indeterminable, and thus made responsible to the people 
only through election. 
CONCLUSION 
In discussing the American patriots’ appeals to royal 
prerogative during the imperial crisis, John Phillip Reid 
remarked that “[t]he Twentieth Century may no longer 
understand what was going on in the 1770s.”400 The 
comment was off-hand, but we should take seriously the 
prospect it suggests: some ways in which the world appeared 
to the elites who led the Revolution, and some ways in which 
they aimed to take hold of that world by their arguments, 
may be beyond our ability now to grasp. (Call this, if you 
want, ‘skepticism about historical knowledge.’) In thinking 
through this possibility, it seems right to assume that our 
own experiences have some effect on what we can hope to 
understand about the past, just as they do the present lives 
of others. So even if Reid was right, and the Twentieth 
Century did not understand what was going on in the 1770s, 
the Twenty-First Century may now understand it quite well. 
Too well. The dangers of the present moment may help us 
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understand the framers’ perspective in a way that even the 
1930s, the 1950s and 2001 did not. 
In the story as I have told it, appeals to prerogative were 
often appeals to the benefits of government. The benefits of 
government were security of liberty and protection of 
property. The framers valued liberty and property and so 
they wanted vigorous self-government. Today’s dinner-table 
talk of civil dissolution, breakup of the United States, 
revision or rejection of the Constitution, all help to make real 
the framers’ way of viewing the world. Peeling away civil 
government, considering what would occur if this country’s 
government were to be unable to execute the law, puts flesh 
and blood on the framing perspective. Everything one 
values—the security of loved ones, one’s home and the things 
in it, the expectations, hopes and plans that can arise in 
conditions of security and peace—all these things are put at 
risk by the lapse of civil government. During the Revolution, 
men and women on either side risked losing their home to 
confiscation, being forcibly relocated, being harassed or 
jailed for their associations and expressions of allegiance, not 
hearing from or seeing loved ones for months on end and 
suffering from the poverty that follows severe disruption. 
The framers described an ever-present prospect of arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty or property as “slavery.” They knew 
this condition because they held slaves. To be free, to not be 
a slave, required civil government by traditional forms. Since 
government was founded on prerogative, since the exercise 
of its power was an exercise of prerogative, prerogative was 
necessary to the liberty and property that made people free. 
Most of the time, when Americans were appealing to 
“prerogative,” this was what they were appealing to. 
Prerogative was “constitutional” in the sense that it figured 
in Americans’ understanding of the ordinary political order 
and the security and protection this order entailed. It is 
understandable, then, that although the elites who led the 
Revolution and framed our constitutions had read Locke and 
found use for him elsewhere, they rarely found it appealing 
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to use “prerogative” as he had used it, to signal an executive 
discretion to act in the absence of law or against law. The 
disruption of the 1780s did not alter this perspective but 
reinforced it; prerogative powers would be necessary for a 
vigorous national government, just as they had been for 
imperial government, and the question was how many of 
these powers should be vested in an executive department to 
guarantee security of liberty and protection of property, 
without creating the appearance of a monarchy. 
These patterns of arguing and thinking remain relevant 
today, as we consider the benefits of civil government under 
our Constitution, and how to handle emergencies so as not 
by our own conduct to approximate the dissolution of 
government, but, rather, to secure its vital instruments 
against attack. 
